Essays on Banking Crises by Khan, Md Anichul Hoque
 Research Reports 
Kansantaloustieteen laitoksen tutkimuksia, No. 116:2009 
Dissertationes Oeconomicae 
 
 
 
 
KHAN MD ANICHUL HOQUE 
 
 
ESSAYS ON BANKING CRISES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ISBN 978-952-10-4834-0 (nid.)  
ISBN 978-952-10-4835-7 (pdf)  
ISSN 0357-3257 
 
  
Acknowledgements 
 
I am very grateful to my supervisor Professor Pertti Haaparanta for his guidance and 
encouragement without which I could never accomplish the job with my thesis. I am 
also grateful to Professor Tapio Palokangas who took supervising responsibility at a 
crucial stage of my thesis and provided me the necessary suggestions. Then my 
heartiest gratitude goes to the pre-examiners of the thesis, Professor Paavo Okko and 
Dr. Marko Korhonen, whose comments greatly helped me to improve the thesis.  
 
This thesis has been written during the time I have been at Economics Department of 
Helsinki University as a graduate school fellow of the Finnish Doctoral Program in 
Economic (FDPE) and as a scholar fellow of Yrjö Jahnsonn (YJ) Foundation. I thank 
both the FDPE and YJ foundation for giving me the opportunity to concentrate 
exclusively on my doctoral studies, and the Economics Dept for its arrangement of 
working room with necessary research equipments. In this regard I am very thankful 
to Professor Vesa Kanniainen for his cooperation to get position at the Dept and to get 
FDPE fellowship, and for his all time fruitful comments. I would also like to thank 
Professor Mika Linden and Professor Anne Mikkola for their time worthy instructions 
I needed to complete the thesis.  
 
During my doctoral studies I had an opportunity to visit the Monetary Policy and 
Research Dept at the Bank of Finland. My full hearted gratefulness goes to Dr. Esa 
Jokivuolle, Dr. Tuomas Takalo, Prof. Matti Viren and the unit’s head Dr. Jouko 
Vilmunen for their fruitful suggestions and encouragements on the essays of my 
thesis. My special thanks to the participants and discussants who made fruitful 
comments on my different essays in different workshops related with 
Macroeconomics and Development, and Capital Markets and Financial Economics 
arranged by FDPE and Helsinki Centre of Economic Research (HECER). I am 
thankful to HECER’s director Otto Toivonen for his suggestions made in different 
times. Then my gratitude goes to Dr. Heikki Pursiainen and Prof. Essi Eerola for their 
cooperation during the pre-examination of the thesis.  
 
Finally, my highest debt is to my mother and late father who struggled all through 
their lives for the better lives of us, the brothers and sisters. I should have done a lot to 
repay this debt, but I could not for this degree. My next highest debt is to my eldest 
brother who gave proper guidance and financial supports for living to all of us, the 
younger brothers and sisters, besides his very hard study life. In the end, definitely my 
gratitude goes to my wife Farhana and son Anan. I could not pay time as they wished 
because of this degree. 
 
Helsinki, January 2009 
 
Khan Md Anichul Hoque  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Contents 
 
 
I. Introduction............................................................................................. 1 
 
II. Deposit insurance scheme and banking crises: a special focus on less 
developed countries.................................................................................. 21 
 
III. Central bank autonomy and banking sector’s instability ................... 76 
 
IV. Factors correlating with long-lasting banking crises: a special focus 
on crisis resolution policy measures ...................................................... 109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
1 Goals and background 
 
1.1 Goals of the thesis 
 
This thesis aims at finding the role of deposit insurance scheme (DIS) and central 
bank (CB) in keeping the banking system safe. The thesis also studies the factors 
associated with long-lasting banking crises. Although many studies have attempted to 
identify the causes of banking system instability, still there is void in dealing with 
efficient DIS and powerful CB for the stability of banking system. The empirical 
study by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) shed partial light on the issue of 
efficient DIS and banking sector stability by using a smaller data set. Using a larger 
and updated dataset, this thesis attempts to give a more complete picture about the 
efficient forms of DIS with a special focus of their uses in developing countries. 
   This thesis illustrates empirically whether a more independent or more powerful CB 
is beneficial for a safe banking system. Even though there have been many studies on 
the effect of CB’s independence for price stability, there are so far no studies that 
consider the role of the strength of a CB for the safety of banking system. This thesis 
determines the impact of CB’s strength on the stability of banking system. 
   Finally, the target of the thesis is to identify the factors of long-lasting banking 
crises. The special focus is given on the crisis resolution policy measures which the 
government may (or may not) introduce right after the banking system is destabilized.   
  
 
1.2 Background 
 
1.2.1 Banking sector in a country 
 
So far, banks have been the most efficient financial intermediaries in countries around 
the globe. A bank’s most important task is to collect credit from different sources and 
lend money to the entrepreneurs. In most countries the banking sector is the backbone 
of economic development. Problems in the banking sector involve impediments to 
economic development and growth of a country. Being the sector of financial 
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intermediaries, the banking sector is the most affected sector during a financial crisis 
in a country, and hence “financial crisis” very often termed as “banking crisis”. 
 
1.2.2 Composition of financial crisis 
 
To define the composition of financial crisis I begin with Minsky model as reported in 
Kindleberger (2000). The model follows that a financial crisis start with a 
displacement implied by some exogenous outside shock to the macroeconomic 
system. The nature of this displacement is not the same; it varies from one speculative 
boom to another. It can be accompanied by the outburst or end of a war, a bumper 
harvest or crop failure, the widespread adoption of an invention with pervasive 
effects, some political event or surprising financial success, or a debt conversion that 
precipitously lowers interest rates. If this displacement is sufficiently large and 
pervasive, the economic outlook will be altered with the change of profit opportunities 
in at least one important sector. It brings opportunities for profit in some new or 
existing lines, but closing out others. A boom is said to underway if the gainers from 
the opportunities dominate the losers, for which investment and production pick up. 
However, this boom is fed by an expansion of bank credit, enlarging the total money 
supply.  
   Kindleberger argues that a boom with enlarged money supply can turn into 
“euphoria.” That is, if the effective demand for goods or financial assets gets higher 
(as it can), the higher will be the prices leading to higher profit opportunities, turning 
to more investments. And the new investments can lead to increasing income, 
stimulating further investments with further income increase. Then, there can be 
“overtrading” with a built up process that speculation for price increase is added to 
investment for production and sale. This overtrading may spread from one country to 
another. There are many factors for this spread. For instance, the increase of price of 
internationally traded goods and assets in one country can cause price increase in 
others; the income changes in a country can influence others by foreign-trade 
multiplier through increased or decreased imports; capital flows; psychological 
connections – investor euphoria in one country influences investors in others.  
   Kindleberger adds that interest rates, velocity of money-circulation, and prices of 
goods and services continue to go up while the speculative boom keeps on. At some 
point, a few insiders choose to take their profits and sell out. As new recruits to 
speculation are balanced by insiders who withdraw, there develops hesitation at the 
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top of the market. Prices starts to level off then, resulting an uneasy period of 
“financial distress”. As distress persists, a considerable segment of the speculating 
community in an economy realize that the market cannot go higher and it is time to 
withdraw their money from banks. In many cases the race for money may turn into a 
rush. A crisis may be precipitated by different ways, e.g., with the signal of failure of 
a bank or firm, the revelation of a swindle by someone who sought to escape distress 
by fraudulent means, or a fall in the price of the primary object of speculation as it is 
seen to be overpriced. Bankruptcies of firms increase as prices decline with the rush 
on. 
   There can be a “lender of last resort” to convince the market that sufficient volume 
of money will be made available to meet the demand for cash. It can be domestic, i.e., 
the government or the central bank or can be international but there is no specific 
“world government” or “world bank” to conduct this job. However, there is debate of 
using the lender of last resort instrument – proponents worry more about the current 
crisis than about prevention some future one and opponents argue that it encourages 
the speculation in the first place.  
   Kindleberger raises the question of validity and relevance about the Minsky model 
at some extents. For instance, he argues that structural changes in the institutional 
underpinnings of an economy, including the rise of corporations, big labour union, big 
government, modern banking, speedier communications, and so on make a model of 
crisis based on the instability of credit uninteresting. He also argues that there can be 
no price bubbles because market prices reflect fundamentals, and that sharp falls in 
prices frequently reflect “policy switching” by government or central bank.  
 
1.2.3 The countries with financial crises 
 
Financial crises have been the concern of economic analysts for centuries. 
Kindleberger (2000) shows the record of financial crises taken place since the 
beginning of 17
th
 century. The century’s very beginning financial crisis took place in 
the Holy Roman Empire during the period of 1618-23, and the others in Dutch 
Republic and England during 1636-37 and 1690-96 respectively. All of these crises 
were seriously related with different wars. 
   There have been many financial crises through the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. However, 
most of the crises took place in Europe, especially in England. One of the reasons for 
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the most crises in England could be that as World’s trade and financial activities were 
mostly dominated by England, the financial conditional up-down was also mostly 
affected by England. Remarkably, the other European countries or business cities 
experienced financial crises are France, Germany, Italy, Austria, and Amsterdam. 
With the independence in 1776 the USA gradually turned to be an economic power in 
the world. Gradually it has been the most powerful country to influence the world’ 
trade and financial activities for years. The USA’s economy is as well not unaffected 
by financial crises and it has experienced many. 
   During the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, most of the financial crises were explicitly related 
with the political factors rather than the economic factors. For instance, the crises of 
Amsterdam (1763 and 1772), England (1815-16 and 1857), and of France (1864) 
were related with different wars. Similarly the crises of England (1720), France 
(1720), the USA (1792), England (1793), Hamburg (1799), England (1810), the USA 
(1837), France (1838), and the USA (1873) were respectively related with the Treaty 
of Utrecht in 1713, death of Louis XIV in 1715, constitution adopted in 1789, the 
Reign of Terror after the onset of French revolution, the break of continental 
blockade, Wellington’s peninsula campaign, Jackson presidency, the Monarchy of 
1830, and the fraud exposed in 1872 campaign. 
   One of the most discussing and severe financial crises during the 20
th
 century was 
the crisis of the USA in 1929. The crisis, often called “The Great Depression”, was 
preceded by an extended economic boom (see e.g. Richardson 2006, Hori 1996, 
Cecchetti and Karras 1994, and Stricker 1984 for details about the crisis). The crisis 
inflicted immense damage not only upon the USA but also the entire world. 
Especially, it caused financial crises in Britain, Germany, Austria, and Japan in the 
early 1930s. The major reason of the crises in other countries was the cutting-off of 
the U.S. foreign lending.      
   Until the 80s of the 20
th
 century the financial crises were mostly experienced by 
some European countries and the USA (see the record of Kindleberger, 2000, and 
Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003). Financial crises have been experienced by other 
countries mostly since the 1980s. Many developing countries around the globe have 
begun to experience financial crises since the 1980s. According to Lindgren at al 
(1996), at least two-thirds of the IMF member countries have experienced some form 
of systematic financial crisis during 1980-96. In many regions, almost every country 
has experienced at least one financial crisis. Thus the widely used terms are, e.g., the 
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“Nordic Financial Crises”, “Latin American Financial Crises”, “East Asian Financial 
Crises” and so on. Financial crises have also been classified according to the 
country’s economic development, e.g. Transition Economic Financial Crises, 
Emerging Economic Financial Crises. 
   Another point to note that, unlike the crises of 17
th
 to 19
th
 centuries, almost all of the 
crises in the 20
th
 century are explicitly related with economic or financial factors 
instead of the political factors. For instance, the crisis of the USA (1929) related with 
extended economic boom, Europe (1931-33) with cut-off of U.S. foreign lending, the 
USA (1974-75) with collapse of Bretton Woods and OPEC 1973 oil price rise, the 
USA (1979-82) with the Third World syndicated bank loans, OPEC 1979 oil price 
rise, real estate in Southwest U.S., the farmland of U.S. and so on. Similarly the crisis 
of Japan (1990) explicitly related with Nikkei shares index and real estate, and the 
crisis of Mexico, East Asia, Russia and Brazil in 1990s with the financial 
deregulation, capital inflow and outflow, and the domestic boom (see Kindleberger 
2000 for details). 
 
1.2.4 Region based causes of recent banking crises  
 
So far, there have been numerous studies attempting to identify the causes of banking 
crises and to design efficient mechanisms for crisis-prevention.
1
 The list of causal 
factors has increased after every drive of crises occurrences. Rojas-Suarez and 
Weisbrod (1996), and Rojas-Suarez and Hausmann (1996), for instance, show that the 
crises in Latin American countries of the 1980s brought emphasis on the need for 
appropriate macroeconomic fundamentals, especially on the fiscal and monetary 
policies. They argue that these crises lasted longer, affected a larger segment of the 
banking industry and brought higher costs for the public. On the other hand, the 
Mexican crisis of 1994 identified that the lack of appropriate regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks in the context of financial liberalization contributed 
significantly to the crisis (see among others Guidotti et al 2004).  
   The East Asian crisis in the late 1990s popularized the role of “contagion” in the 
emergence of a crisis (see e.g. Cathie 1998 and Kawai et al 2001).
2
 Krugman (2001), 
                                                 
1
 See for example, Gavin and Hausmann (1996), Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1995), Sundararajan and 
Balino (1991). 
2
 The issue of contagion has been analyzed in a large number of papers, including, Calvo (2000), Claessens, 
Dornbusch and Park (2000), Pericolli and Sbracia (2002), Perry and Lederman (1999) and Reinhart and 
Kaminsky (2000). 
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Summers (1999), and Corsetti et al. (1998) argue that due to the government’s 
implicit guarantee, the East Asian countries had substantial investments in 
unproductive sectors and these investments created vulnerability both in the real and 
financial sectors of the countries. Simultaneously, in order to protect depositors in 
banks and other financial institutions, the governments accumulated large contingent 
liabilities. The strong trade linkages among these economies induced the contagious 
effect, spreading the crisis throughout the region. 
   Many studies have examined the Nordic banking crises (see e.g. Drees and 
Pazarbasioglu 1995, and Pesola 2001). As the crises elsewhere in the world, these 
were also caused by bad banking, inadequate market discipline, weak banking 
regulation and supervision, premature financial liberalization, and inadequate macro 
policies (Ingves, 2002). However, the severity of the causes of Nordic crises differs 
from the other crises, e.g. the crises of emerging economies.
3
 
 
1.2.5 Causes of banking crises in general 
 
In addition to studies focusing specifically on case-wise or region-wise banking crisis, 
a number of studies have examined the common causes of banking crises irrespective 
of individual cases or regions. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999, 2002 and 
2005) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) were the ground breaking studies 
examining the common causes of banking crises. The first two essays of my 
dissertation rely on studies by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (DKD henceforth) 
extensively.  
   So far, DKD (1999) has been the first study that defines the common causes of 
banking crises empirically irrespective of developing or developed country context. 
They show that a banking crisis tends to erupt in the following cases: weak 
macroeconomic environment combined with low economic growth, high inflation, 
and high real interest rate; the vulnerability of the economy to balance-of-payment 
crisis; the use of explicit deposit insurance scheme in the country; and weak law 
enforcement in the country. DKD (2005) is an extended version of DKD (1999). In 
that paper, they, with a new dataset, verify and uphold the parameters found in their 
earlier paper.  
                                                 
3
 For instance, the severity of the above mentioned causes of crises is higher in developing countries. 
See, e.g. Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003) for details about the factors of developing economies’ 
financial crises.  
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   DKD (2002) also builds on their 1999 version, but with the special reference to the 
deposit insurance scheme (DIS henceforth). The study confirms their previous finding 
that the use of explicit DIS adversely affects the bank stability. In addition, the study 
shows that this adverse impact is stronger, the more extensive the coverage offered to 
depositors. The impact is also stronger if the scheme is funded instead of it unfunded 
and if the scheme is run by the government rather than by the private sector. 
 
1.2.6 The studies of this dissertation relative to other studies 
 
The first essay of my dissertation builds on DKD (2002) by using a larger dataset both 
in terms of the time period and the number of countries. In particular, the number of 
developing countries is much higher in my dataset than in DKD (2002). Given that the 
fundamentals affecting banking crises in developing countries may differ from those 
in developed countries (see e.g. Ingves 2002), the presence of a large number of 
developing countries in a sample could change the estimation results found in DKD 
(2002). This essay attempts to examine this change by a logit estimation model. 
Explicitly, taking a sample comprising a large number of developing countries, the 
essay examines the impacts of explicit DIS forms on banking crises and also examines 
the impacts when the DIS forms handled by a country with less economic 
development. In the analysis, this essay includes some new, previously unexamined, 
forms of explicit DIS. These forms, for instance, include as follows: whether the 
scheme has power to intervene in bank’s operation; whether it has power to cancel or 
revoke the deposit insurance of banks; and whether it has power to take legal action 
against bank officials.  
   The second essay of the dissertation examines the effect of CB’s autonomy, i.e. the 
degree of CB’s independence from executive body, on banking crises. Neither DKD 
(1999, 2002 and 2005) or Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), nor any other study has 
considered this issue. There have been many studies on the influence of powerful CB, 
but most of these deals with the relationship of powerful CB over inflation, economic 
growth or government fiscal deficit (see e.g. Alesina and Summers 1993, Cukierman 
et al 1992 and 1993, Cukierman 1993 and 1994, De Long and Summers 1992, Doi 
1998). However, according to Padoa-Schioppa (2002), Freixas et al (2000), and 
Goodhart (1987), there are many reasons to expect that the CB’s role has impact on 
banking crises. Some studies, for instance Blejer and Schumacher (1998), Mishkin 
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(2000), Quintyn and Taylor (2003), Doi (1998), Cukierman (1994) and Lohmann 
(1992), argue that a powerful CB can reduce the likelihood of financial crisis. 
   Banking crises can last for a long period or for a short period. A long lasting 
banking crisis may generate massive costs to the economy. The third essay of my 
dissertation examines the factors correlated with long-lasting banking crises. This is 
closely related to Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) which deals with the relation 
between different crisis resolution policy measures
4
 and the costs of banking crises. 
Crisis resolution policy measures are usually undertaken immediately after the 
eruptions of banking crises in order to contain the panicking stage of the crises and 
then attempting to rapid recovery. Honohan and Klingebiel show that these measures 
increase the costs of banking crises. In this essay, the resolution measures are the key 
factors explaining the lengths of banking crises. It is plausible that these measures 
prolong banking crises. Other studies closely related to this essay are Abderrezak 
(2000) and Frydl (1999). Abderrezak deals with the explanatory factors of the 
durations of banking crises but does not consider the crises resolution policy 
measures. Frydl studies the relation between the lengths and the costs of banking 
crises.  
 
 
 
2 Contents of the dissertation 
 
2.1 Deposit insurance scheme and banking crises: a special focus on less    
      developed countries 
 
The aim of each country is to keep banking sector stable. With that aim, a country 
may exercise explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), where rules and regulations 
are defined in advance to insure the deposited funds in banks. Otherwise, the country 
is said to use implicit deposit insurance scheme (IDIS), because it establishes a de 
facto insurance system to depositors of banks. The first paper of my thesis examines 
the impact of EDIS on banking crises empirically, with special reference to less 
developed economies. There is disagreement among researchers on whether an EDIS 
                                                 
4
 Crisis resolution policy measures are termed as “accommodating approaches” in Honohan and 
Klingebiel (2003).  
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increases the likelihood of a banking crisis.
5
 DKD (2002) show, by a dataset of 61 
countries for 1980-1997, that an EDIS compared to IDIS increases the banking crisis 
probability. This probability is even greater if the EDIS is implemented in an 
inefficient form (or design).  
   Despite of this controversial evidence, countries, especially the less developed 
countries (LDCs), have used EDIS increasingly (12 countries in 1974, 71 in 1999, and 
87 in 2003). On the other hand, a large number of LDCs with both EDIS and IDIS 
have experienced and are still experiencing banking crises (Caprio and Klingebiel 
2003). DKD (2002) included a small number of LDCs, especially the LDCs 
exercising EDIS, in their sample. The inclusion of a larger number of LDCs in a 
sample could establish the result that IDIS causes banking crises. If EDIS causes the 
crises, the main reason could be that the EDIS handled by countries with less-
developed institutional framework. In such a case, including more LDCs, especially 
those with EDIS, in a sample can make the estimation results of DKD (2002) more 
robust. 
   By a sample of about 150 countries, of which over 70% are developing economies, 
this study examines the impact of EDIS with its different forms on banking crises for 
the period of 1980-2003. The additional speciality of this study is that, besides the 
previously studied forms of EDIS, it also examines the impact of some forms of EDIS 
newly detected by Berth et al (2004). These include the power of EDIS to intervene in 
bank operations, to cancel or revoke the deposit insurance of banks, and to take legal 
action against bank officials. These newly detected forms also include the payout time 
to depositors and the information of whether the EDIS provides any compensation to 
deposits in the event of bank failure, which were not explicitly covered earlier. I also 
examine the effect of EDIS on the probability of banking crisis when the EDIS 
handled by a country with its less developed institutional structure. Finally, I am 
interested to see how my estimation results differ from those found in DKD (2002).   
   I use a logit estimation model controlling for yearly fixed effects and a set of other 
explanatory variables. I find that the EDIS in general (i.e. without taking EDIS’s 
forms into account) is strongly significant in increasing the banking crisis probability. 
This significance level is stronger than what is found in DKD (2002). The probability 
is even stronger if the EDIS formed with ex ante funding, or with the coverage of 
                                                 
5
 For instance Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Bhattacharya et al (1998) argue in favour of EDIS’s 
decreasing crisis probability and Kane (1989) argues in favour of EDIS’s increasing the probability. 
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inter-bank deposits, or with high level of coverage in average. The crisis probability 
also becomes greater if the EDIS is not legally authorized to directly intervene in 
banks’ operation, or to cancel or revoke the banks’ deposit insurance, or if the scheme 
allows deposits to be compensated after bank failure although the deposits were not 
explicitly covered before the failure.  
   Next, this study finds that the crisis probability increases if the EDIS handled by a 
country with less developed institutional structure. Thus using the EDIS in a LDC is 
more risky than its use in an industrialized country. This probability is greater if the 
EDIS provides coverage to the inter-bank deposits, or if the EDIS lacks legal power to 
directly intervene banks, or if the EDIS compensate uncovered deposits after a bank 
failure. Interestingly this study finds that once a country’s less-development to handle 
an EDIS is controlled, the EDIS separately is not a significant factor of banking crisis 
any more. That is, a country’s overall economic development is so important to 
handle the EDIS efficiently. This result is in line with Chen and Fishe (1993), who 
argue that an EDIS cannot play its appropriate role in a LDC because of its less 
diversified economic base, making the country more tended to liquidity crisis which 
the EDIS cannot prevent. The result is also supported by Gropp and Vesala (2001), 
who show that an EDIS significantly reduces the risk taking of banks in the EU 
countries, which are mostly developed.  
   In addition, this study shows that the crisis probability decreases if a country with 
less corruption handles the EDIS. However, once the corruption level of a country 
handling the EDIS is controlled, the EDIS separately is still a significant factor to 
increase the banking crisis probability. This implies that, for a more efficient use of 
EDIS, the LDC needs to remove, not only the corruption but also other setbacks of 
being less developed, e.g. the government’s vulnerability to international and internal 
pressure, unskilled personnel in institutions, unemployment pressure, autocracy and 
repression of press, bureaucracy, poor contract enforcement, and so on.    
   By using an empirical model similar to DKD (2002), this study shows that the 
coefficient of an EDIS handling by countries with differing GDP-per-capita is larger 
in magnitude and also more strongly significant than the coefficient found in DKD 
(2002).  
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2.2 Central bank autonomy and banking sector’s instability 
 
The second paper of my thesis examines empirically the relationship between the 
level of central bank (CB) autonomy and the instability of banking system as defined 
by the systemic banking crisis. The CB, the bankers’ bank, is one of the core 
institutions of a country to uphold its monetary policy. A CB’s major role is to keep 
price stability. Besides, it plays a role in many other financial activities, e.g. managing 
the government’s financial transactions, financing budget deficit through the issuing 
of money, funding development projects undertaken by the government, and bailing 
out insolvent banks and publicly-owned enterprises (see Cukierman et al, 1992). A 
CB can have direct influence on banking sector stability through its measure of 
bailing-out banks, efficient controlling over the financing of budget deficits and that 
over the funding of inefficient government development projects. The CB’s role in 
stabilizing financial market is supported by many, as mentioned in the earlier 
subsections. 
   However, all CBs have not the same amount of autonomy to handle their tasks. 
They may have a different degree of independence granted by the executive branch of 
government. In one hand, studies claim that the independency of the CB can reduce 
the banking sector’s instability. On the other hand, there is also a conflicting view that 
the more independent CB can rather increase the instability, as the central banker can 
be undemocratic or bureaucratic and may behave opportunistically (Cukierman 1994). 
An undemocratic, opportunistic, but independent central banker can easily destabilize 
the banking sector. This paper attempts to resolve the contingent role of CB’s 
autonomy on the instability of banking sector.  
   I use the data of the decade 1980s from Cukierman et al (1992) in which the data on 
CB’s independence are by decades. CB’s independence is measured according to 16 
different legal variables and by an aggregated legal variable which takes the weighted 
average of 16 variables available. I characterize a country’s banking sector as unstable 
when the country experiences a systemic banking crisis. The dependent variable 
banking crisis dummy takes the value one if a country experiences systemic banking 
crisis for one or more years during the 1980s, otherwise zero. Each of the variables of 
CB’s independence is tested separately along with a set of control variables.  
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   Using a sample of 54 countries and a logit estimation model, I find that a more 
autonomous CB (as measured by CB’s aggregated legal power) reduces the likelihood 
of banking crisis. When different variables for CB’s independence are tested 
independently, I find that CB autonomy with regard to its chief executive officer’s 
term of office and CB autonomy in setting interest rate on loans to government 
decrease the probability of banking crisis. I also find that the crisis probability reduces 
more if an autonomous CB can perform its duties in a country with stronger law and 
order tradition. That is, a country’s improved law-and-order tradition is so important 
for an autonomous CB to perform its due role efficiently.  
 
 
2.3 Factors correlating with long-lasting banking crises: a special focus 
on crises resolution policy measures 
 
A banking crisis can last long or short. The third paper of my thesis determines the 
explanatory variables related to the long lasting crises. A long crisis-spell, i.e. the 
crisis with long duration, can have costly aftermath on the real economy. For 
example, after a long crisis-spell, domestic depositors and investors may lose their 
confidence in the banking system and transfer their funds abroad. It is therefore of the 
utmost importance to shield economy from the costly aftermath of long crisis spell.  
   In order to determine the possible explanatory variables of long crisis-spells, I 
highlight mostly the crisis resolution policy (CRP) measures, which are usually 
undertaken immediately after the occurrences of banking crises. Briefly the measures 
are:  
 
(1) blanket guarantee6 to all creditors and depositors,  
(2) open-ended and extended liquidity support to all weak financial institutions, 
(3) forbearance of any banking regulations,  
(4) recapitalization or repeated recapitalization of weak or failed banks,  
(5) public debt relief program for bank borrowers to facilitate repayment of their 
debts,  
(6) setting up a centralized Asset Management Company.7  
 
                                                 
6
 This guarantee usually means a declaration by the government that all deposits and perhaps other 
financial instruments will be protected. 
7
 See Honohan and Klingebiel (2000 and 2003) and Das and Quintyn (2002) for details.  
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Although different CRP measures are enacted to shorten crisis-spells, in practice they 
may not. The measures usually relax the existing banking regulation and are not 
market-oriented. Such measures may enable the bank management to abuse the 
measure for their personal benefit, leading rather to the longer banking sector 
instability. However, it is hard to see that a government not taking any CRP measures 
once the country is clutched by systemic banking crisis. The reason is that otherwise 
the government would not know how long the crisis would continue. In my dataset of 
35 crisis-episodes with the information of using CRP measures, only 3 episodes are 
found not using any CRP measures. Hence, the aim of this study is to see which of the 
CRP measures associated with longer crisis-spells in comparison with the other CRP 
measures. 
   The fundamentals causing the occurrences of banking crises may also prolong the 
crises. To test this assertion, I take the explanatory variables used in earlier studies as 
the causes of banking crises’ occurrences and the costs of crises (see for instance 
DKD 1999, 2002 and 2005).  
   The data on crisis-spells come from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and it is yearly 
data for the period of 1977-2002. Data on CRP measures are taken from Honohan and 
Klingebiel (2003). Both the industrialized and developing countries are included in 
the sample. The estimation model I use is a duration model. I also use the OLS model 
for the robustness check of the results.  
   From the sample of crisis-spells with CRP measures, the finding of this study is that 
the measure of regulation-forbearance which allows insolvent banks to remain open is 
strongly significant. Another measure the execution of public debt relief program 
helping bank borrowers to repay their public debt is also significant, but at weaker 
level. Both of the measures are positively related with the durations of crises, i.e. the 
use of the measures lengthen the crisis-spells. Rests of the measures are found to be 
statistically insignificant to have any relation with the durations of crises. Two of the 
measures, the blanket guarantee and the use of centralized Asset Management 
Company, are even having negative signs of relation with the durations of crises.  
   The results exemplify that the adverse effect in terms of the duration of crisis is 
relatively higher in using the measures the regulation-forbearance allowing the 
insolvent banks remain open and the execution of public debt relief program helping 
bank borrowers to repay their public debt. I therefore propose that a government 
grasped with banking crisis better to avoid using the said two measures. If it has no 
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alternatives other than using some CRP measures, it can use some measures which are 
found statistically insignificant to have any relation with the durations of crises. 
Evidently, it can use the blanket guarantee, the liquidity support, recapitalization of 
banks, or a centralized Asset Management Company. It can also use some regulation 
forbearance allowing the lesser degree of lenience towards banks (e.g. over looking 
violations of laws by individual banks or the business deregulation on banking 
designing to introduce new profit opportunities to weak banks, and so on).  
   Amongst the explanatory variables other than CRP measures, this study finds that a 
crisis lasts longer with the following factors: if the crisis begins with a higher real 
interest rate; if it begins when the banking sector has larger exposure to the private 
sector borrowers; and if it begins in the presence of explicit deposit insurance scheme. 
On the other hand, a crisis does not last long with the following factors: if the crisis 
begins with high growth (lagged by two years) of real domestic credits in the private 
sector; and if the crisis begins with high liquidity shortage in banks. Finally, similar 
with Abderrezak (2001), I find that the probability of crisis-spell termination increases 
as the spell gets older. 
 
 
3. Contributions and further research 
 
3.1 Major contributions of the thesis 
 
This thesis shows that using an EDIS instead of IDIS increases the banking system 
instability. The argument for introduction of EDIS could be the inevitably need of 
some form of depositors’ explicit safety net. This safety net is needed to stop the 
chance of bank runs for the greater and long-term economic interest of a country. 
Instead of focusing on the long-term cost-benefit analysis of using the EDIS, this 
thesis rather attempts to point out the forms (or designs) of EDIS and also other 
interacting factors that make the EDIS more risky. EDIS works better if it provides 
low coverage and if its authority is powerful enough to take punitive actions against 
banks. The most important finding is that the EDIS measure is rather efficient for the 
industrialized countries which are capable to prevent possible moral hazard in EDIS 
by their superior institutional structures. On the other hand, EDIS is no good for the 
LDCs, because of their inferior institutional structures.      
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   The CB can affect the banking sector stability in many ways. I show that curtailing 
the CB’s power (which implies its independence from the executive body) to 
performing its due role increases the risk of banking sector instability. The CB’s 
power measured by its chief executive officer’s long-term contract and its power in 
setting interest rate on government loans are especially relevant for the banking sector 
stability. I also show that an autonomous CB can perform its due role more efficiently 
to reduce the banking sector instability if the country’s law-and-order tradition is 
stronger. 
   In the final essay, I pay attention to the major causes of the long lasting banking 
crises. I show that, amongst the CRP measures used, the regulation-forbearance 
allowing the insolvent banks to remain open and the execution of public debt relief 
program helping bank borrowers to repay their public debt are respectively strongly 
and weakly significant to increase the durations of crises.  Hence, I suggest 
governments with banking crises to avoid using these two measures. However, it can 
choose the measures for instance the blanket guarantee, the liquidity support, the 
recapitalization of banks, or using a centralized Asset Management Company because 
of their insignificant relations with crises’ durations. I also show that some factors not 
only cause banking crises to occur (as found in earlier studies), but also prolong the 
crises. These factors include e.g. high real interest rate, large exposure of the banking 
sector to the private sector borrowers, and the use of explicit deposit insurance 
scheme. 
 
 
3.2 Suggestions for further research 
 
This section presents some general and particular suggestions for further research. In 
line with many other empirical studies, I have investigated the fundamentals of 
systemic banking crises where the crises are defined by multiple decisive factors and 
are designed by financial expertise related with the crises experienced countries. It 
would be easier to examine the causes of banking crises if the crises occurrences 
could be defined based on a single decisive factor. However, the single decisive factor 
needs to be uniquely defined before conducting such a study. 
   Very often it happens that a crisis could have been averted if the central authority 
would intervene in time. Proper actions and well-timed information to the depositors 
and investors could minimize to a great extent the overall economic loss. In this, the 
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freedom of the press could play a pivotal role. The relationship between freedom of 
press and the banking sector stability would be an interesting issue. 
   Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) showed that the occurrence of banking 
crisis is more frequent in the countries with EDIS. Policymakers of the countries 
across the world should be aware about this adverse effect of EDIS. Even after this, 
countries, especially the LDCs, around the globe are introducing EDIS increasingly. 
At this point a study would be interesting if it examines the long-term economic 
benefit of an economy with EDIS compared to a similar economy with IDIS.
8
 
   There are still some fundamentals which may influence the banking sector’s 
stability. For instance, supervision of banks is not uniform in countries across the 
globe. In some countries the CB supervise banks and in others ministry of finance 
does this alone or jointly with CB. I leave for further examination to show whether the 
banking sector stability is influenced by this variation of banks’ supervision, or 
whether the banking sector’s stability is influenced by discipline, provision and 
capital structures of banks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 For instance, the long-term economic growth of LDCs with EDIS compared to the long-term growth 
of LDCs with IDIS. 
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This study analyzes the effect of using explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), 
instead of using implicit deposit insurance scheme (IDIS), on banking crises. The 
panel data for the period of 1980-2003 includes all countries for which the data on 
EDIS or IDIS exist. 70% of the countries in the sample are less developed countries 
(LDCs). About 55% of the countries adopting EDIS also come from LDCs. The major 
finding is that the using of EDIS increases the crisis probability at a strong 
significance level. This probability is greater if the EDIS is inefficiently designed 
allowing higher scope of moral hazard problem. Specifically, the probability is 
greater if the EDIS provides higher coverage to deposits and if it is less powerful 
from the legal point of view. This study also finds that the less developed a country is 
to handle EDIS, the higher the chance of banking crisis. Once the underdevelopment 
of an economy handling the EDIS is controlled, the EDIS separately is no longer a 
significant factor of banking crises. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper is about the relation between different forms of deposit insurance scheme 
(DIS henceforth) and the banking sector instability with a special focus on the less 
developed countries (LDCs). There can be explicit DIS (EDIS henceforth) where the 
rules and regulations are defined to insure the deposited funds in banks, or can be 
implicit DIS (IDIS henceforth) as the governments usually step in after banking crises 
to rescue the depositors and banking sectors on an ad hoc basis. However, there is 
some controversy among researchers about the effect of EDIS on the bank stability. 
Many researchers believe that the EDIS is an optimal policy to protect bank stability 
when the stability is threatened by depositor run (see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig 
1983, Bhattacharya et al 1998).
9
 Researchers, on the other hand, acknowledge that the 
EDIS is a source of moral hazard, as banks are encouraged to finance high-risk, high-
return projects. This moral hazard problem may cause additional bank failures, 
leading to a systemic banking crisis (see, e.g., Kane 1989). 
   Regardless of the ambiguities about the effects of EDIS on banking crises, countries 
around the world have been using EDIS increasingly (12 countries in 1974, 71 in 
1999, and 87 2003). There is also wide cross-country variation regarding the types of 
EDIS. For instance, a scheme can be administered by the government, privately, or 
jointly. Bank membership in the scheme can be compulsory or voluntary. The scheme 
can be funded ex ante or ex post, and funding source can be the government or banks 
or a combination of both. Bank premium to the scheme can be fixed or risk based. 
Schemes also vary in their coverage, e.g. foreign currency deposits covered or not, 
inter-bank deposits covered or not, the overall coverage limits high or low. There are 
also some EDIS designs noted by Berth et al (2004), the effects of which on banking 
crises have not been examined yet. Those concern the EDIS’s legal power. For 
instance, EDIS’s power to intervene banks, power to cancel or revoke a bank’s 
deposit insurance contract, and power to take legal action against bank officials. 
Those also concern the time of EDIS to pay out depositors and the compensation (or 
not) of uncovered deposits after a bank failure. 
                                                 
9
 Golembe (1960) finds that the goal of DIS is more focused on restoring confidence in the liquidity of 
bank deposits than to protect small depositors. 
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   Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002; DKD will stand for Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache henceforth) attempt to resolve the ambiguities regarding the EDIS’s 
impact on banking crisis.
10
 They find that the EDIS in general increase the probability 
of banking crisis and this probability is greater when the EDIS is designed 
inefficiently (namely the banks’ membership voluntary, the administration by govt, 
EDIS funded ex ante, govt. as the funding source, and provision of high coverage). In 
addition, they show that the probability of crisis increases if the EDIS handled by a 
country with weak institutional environment. Their sample, however, leaves out a 
large number of LDCs, especially the LDCs utilizing EDIS (their sample of 61 
countries includes only 16 LDCs with EDIS).  
   More than 75% of the countries in the world are classified as LDCs and a growing 
number of these countries utilize the EDIS. On the other hand, as Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003) note, a large number of LDCs have experienced and are still 
experiencing banking crises. The number of these LDCs with IDIS is as large as their 
number with EDIS. Thus the inclusion of larger number of LDCs in a sample could 
result in finding differently from that of DKD (2002). In that the IDIS could be the 
cause of banking crises, or if the EDIS causes the crisis, the major reason could be the 
EDIS handled by the LDC’s inadequate institutional framework. A LDC’s 
institutional framework can be inadequate as a result of weak government, financial 
setbacks, non-skilled personnel, high corruption, heavy bureaucracy, weak law-and-
order tradition, unemployment pressures, and so on. In this case, the inclusion of 
additional LDCs as well as those with the EDIS in a sample could make the 
estimation results more robust than the results found by DKD (2002). 
   With a large dataset that takes almost all countries with the information of EDIS and 
IDIS (thus most of the sample countries, especially the countries with EDIS, come 
from LDCs) this study addresses the following questions. The first question: what is 
the effect on banking crisis if a country uses EDIS instead of using IDIS? Second 
question: does an EDIS have additional effect on banking crisis when it is 
inefficiently designed from the moral hazard point of view? Third question: do these 
effects depend on countries’ overall economic developments? Then we compare the 
effects depending on countries’ overall economic developments with those effects 
depending on countries’ corruption levels, as we know corruption implies merely a 
                                                 
10
 Demirgúc-Kunt and Kane (2002) also focus in resolving the ambiguities of the EDIS’s impact on 
banking crisis. 
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single kind of institutional deficiency rather than the structural institutional 
deficiency. Finally, we examine the extent to which the effects of some of the 
fundamentals on crises we find with our dataset differ from the effects found in DKD 
(2002). In that, we use the estimation model and the set of control variables similar 
with DKD (2002). 
   The panel data includes about 150 countries for the period of 1980-2003. However, 
the number of countries or observations in the regression models differs because of 
missing data of the explanatory variables we use. Using a logit estimation model with 
yearly fixed effects, we estimate the effects of EDIS (in general and with its 
inefficient designs) on the probability of systemic banking crisis (the data from Caprio 
and Klingebiel 2003). We use a set of control variables which have been defined by 
previous studies (e.g. DKD 1999, 2002, and 2005). The salient control variable for 
this study is the variable that represents the less-developed institutions. To formulate 
the variable, we classify the sample countries according to their ranking in different 
income groups as reported by Demirguc-Kunt et al (2005), i.e. high, upper-middle, 
lower-middle, and low income groups. 
   A zero-one dummy is used to test the impact of EDIS on banking crises; the value 
zero refers to IDIS and one to EDIS. In practice this impact could differ according to 
variation of moral hazards for different forms of EDIS. For instance, an EDIS with 
higher coverage to deposits is less effective because of the higher scope of moral 
hazard on the part of banks. For a similar reason, all other forms of EDIS can also be 
more or less effective. To take into account the impact of ineffective forms of EDIS 
we use more refined dummies, as DKD (2002) did, than the dummy of simple zero-
one. Each of these dummies takes zero for IDIS observations and rest of the values 
are assigned in accordance with the scope of moral hazard ensued by the forms of 
EDIS.
11
  
   Our finding is that use of EDIS instead of IDIS strongly significantly increases the 
probability of banking crisis. The probability is even greater if the EDIS has the form 
of ex ante funding, or inter-bank deposits covered, or if its average coverage is higher. 
The crisis probability is also greater if the EDIS is not empowered for the direct 
intervention in bank-operations, or not empowered to cancel or revoke banks’ deposit 
                                                 
11
 For instance, a dummy for the membership form of EDIS takes zero for IDIS, one for EDIS based on 
compulsory membership, and two for EDIS based on voluntary membership. 
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insurance contracts, or if deposits are not explicitly covered before bank failure but 
are compensated after the failure.  
     Next, the study finds that the less developed a country is to handle the EDIS the 
higher is the chance of banking crisis. This chance is greater if the EDIS provides 
coverage to the inter-bank deposits, or if the EDIS lacks legal power to directly 
intervene banks, or if the EDIS compensate uncovered deposits after a bank failure. 
An interesting result is that when a country’s economic development to handle an 
EDIS is controlled for, the EDIS separately is not a significant factor of banking crisis 
any more. That is, a country’s overall economic development is so important to 
handle the EDIS efficiently. This finding is in line with Chen and Fishe (1993) and 
Gropp and Vesala (2001). Chen and Fishe argue that an EDIS cannot play its 
appropriate role in LDCs because of their less diversified economic base, which make 
these countries more prone to liquidity crises which the EDIS cannot prevent. Gropp 
and Vesala find that an EDIS significantly reduces the risk taking of banks in the EU 
countries. 
   In addition, this study finds that the inadequate institutional infrastructure of a LDC 
cannot be offset by improving only a single indicator of institutional weakness, such 
as the corruption. This is proven by the fact that the use of an EDIS separately is still 
significant to increase the crisis probability even after the EDIS handled by a country 
with low corruption is controlled for. 
   Finally, we find that the coefficients of DIS dummies interacted with countries’ 
GDP per capita are larger in magnitude and stronger in significance levels in 
comparison to those coefficients found in DKD (2002). Note that the coefficients of 
the interaction variables have the expected signs, i.e., the EDIS (in general or with its 
inefficient designs) handled by a country with high GDP per capita decreases the 
banking crisis probability.  
   The remaining paper is structured as follows. The next section presents some 
theoretical background and hypothetical views for this empirical paper. Section three 
explains the data and the variables of this study. Section four outlines the estimation 
model, the results and the robustness of the results. Finally, the concluding remarks 
are given in section five.   
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2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
 
A DIS (deposit insurance scheme) is a guarantee to the bank depositors. The 
guarantee is that a partial or total amount of the principal and also the ensued interest 
on sheltered accounts will be paid. This guarantee may be explicit for which it is 
called EDIS (i.e. explicit DIS). The guarantee may also be implicit and then it is 
called IDIS (i.e. implicit DIS). In EDIS the law and regulation about DIS’s 
administration, banks’ membership and premium, the coverage to depositors, and 
about the legal power of the DIS are already defined. However, in IDIS the country 
establishes a de facto insurance system to the depositors and banks.
12
 
   Incorporating EDIS into a country’s depositors’ safety net is controversial. 
According to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the EDIS is an optimal policy in an 
environment where bank stability could be threatened by self-fulfilling depositor run, 
which leads to bank failure and thus to banking crisis. Note that a bank failure occurs 
when the bank becomes insolvent (i.e. the net present value of its assets falls short of 
the net present value of its liabilities) and a banking crisis occurs when a sufficient 
number of banks fail (it can also be weighed by the failed banks’ share in total 
deposits or assets) within a given period (see e.g. González-Hermosillo, 1996).
13
 
However, the depositor run could be triggered by depositors because of lack of 
transparent information and because gathering this information is costly for the 
depositors.  
   Following Allen and Gale (1998) it can be established that even if the depositors are 
capable of gathering proper information, still there could be a run because of actual 
deterioration in bank asset quality. In such a case bank’s dealing with loans, i.e., the 
performance of bank’s management, with an aim of quality assets is important for the 
protection of the bank from a run. However, a bank failure may occur in absence of 
depositor run, just because of high non-performing loans which imply the insolvency 
of bank.      
                                                 
12
 (see, for instance, Kyei 1995, Garcia 1996, DKD 1999 and 2002, Demirguc-Kunt et al 2005) 
13
 Gonzaleze-Hermosillo (1996) follows that in a broad sense a bank failure is said to occur when the 
regulator recognise the bank as insolvent and decides to liquidate it, or assist in order to keep it in 
operation. Different instruments are usually followed to assist an ailing bank. These are, for instance, 
(1) merger or acquisition of the bank with other healthy banks; (2) direct injections of additional capital 
or other recapitalization schemes; and (3) different restructuring schemes. The restructuring schemes 
usually include change in bank-management; assisted generalized rescheduling of loan maturities; and 
removal of banks' bad loans. 
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   On the other hand, enforcing an EDIS does not even ensure the stop of depositor 
runs. Following González-Hermosillo (1996) the view point can be established that 
the depositors’ decision to withdraw their deposits depends not only on the coverage 
limit of their deposits (the lower the coverage the higher the chance of self-fulfilling 
run), but also on the effective endowments which are and will be available in the 
deposit insurance fund. It also depends on the expected probability of failure of a 
significant number of other banks simultaneously. 
   While the role of EDIS to prevent depositor runs is already ambiguous, monetary 
economists find the EDIS to generate moral hazard. This moral hazard is mainly 
generated on the side of banks and their regulators. Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002) 
follows that the bankers can take advantage of weaknesses in transparency and 
deterrence of supervisors. The regulators, controlling the supervisory rudiments, can 
have insufficient incentive to monitor banks. There can be weak enforcement of 
prudential regulations as well. As a result the bankers can take inefficient risks in 
disbursement of loans. They can even engage in fraudulent activities, e.g. making 
loans to themselves or to their close associates at lower than market price or at weak 
terms and conditions. The moral hazard can also be generated on the side of 
depositors. The EDIS can cause depositors to be less careful in choosing better 
performing (e.g. in terms of asset quality) banks as they know that their deposited 
funds are insured.  
   Hence, it can be assumed that the use of an EDIS in a country increase the 
likelihood of banks to be insolvent because of higher non-performing loans. This 
likelihood of insolvency gets even higher if the EDIS is inefficiently designed. An 
EDIS is inefficiently designed if it allows higher scope of moral hazard on the 
bankers’ side (the next section discusses different designs differing with the scope of 
moral hazard). Broadly an EDIS is said to increase the moral hazard, (i) if it allows 
higher coverage to the depositors, (ii) if it generates higher promising insurance to the 
bankers, and (iii) if the scheme is weak from the legal point of view (see, e.g. DKD 
2002, Demirguc-Kunt and Kane 2002, Demirguc-Kunt et al 2005, and Kyei 1995). 
   However, the institutional development of a country is vital to allow an EDIS to 
work efficiently for the banking sector’s stability. While there are incompetent 
institutional framework for an EDIS to be inefficient in a LDC (see e.g. Chen and 
Fishe 1993 shows an EDIS to be inefficient in LDCs), there are competent 
institutional framework for the scheme to be efficient in a developed country (see e.g. 
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Gropp and Vesala 2001 which shows an EDIS to be relatively efficient in EU 
countries). The institutional development can generate enough reliability among the 
depositors about the insurance of their funds under the EDIS. At the same time the 
development can check the moral hazard ensued by the bank-management and 
regulators.  
   Thus, the more a country is economically developed, the more efficient its 
institutional framework, the better its institutional performance, and then the more 
reliability the general people (or depositors) have about the institutional performance. 
The tendency of intentional moral hazard or fraudulent activities of the people in a 
developed country is also lower because of the state supported secured and better 
living standard even in the worst possible economic condition of its citizens. In 
addition, wrong doing by any banker or regulator is more difficult as s/he knows it 
will be more difficult to be successful because of non-cooperation from other related 
officials and institutions.  
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Based on the above discussions the empirical part of this study works with the 
hypotheses as follows: 
 
(1) Given all other factors remaining constant, a banking crisis is more likely in a 
country with EDIS than with IDIS. 
(2) This crisis is even more likely, the more inefficiently the EDIS is designed. 
(3) The less developed a country with EDIS is, the more likely is banking crisis. 
 
 
 
3 The data 
3.1 The data of DIS 
 
This subsection provides the data source of DIS, and gives a brief description and 
formulation of the DIS variables. 
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   We use Demirguc-Kunt et al (2005) for the data source of DIS variables. Demirguc-
Kunt et al built the data based on the earlier studies by Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci 
(2001), Garcia (1999), Kyei (1995) and Talley and Mas (1990). The database is 
further complemented and improved with the data from various other countries and 
online sources, as well as by Barth et al’s (2004) survey. The cross-country data of 
IDIS-EDIS, including different forms of EDIS, for the countries of our sample are 
reported in Table A1 and Table A3-A4 of the appendix. 
 
 
EDIS or IDIS  
The first perceptible characteristic of the data is that EDIS is still not common in 
countries across the world. However, increasing number of countries has been 
adopting EDIS since 1980s: 88 countries in 2003, which is four times the number in 
1984 (Demirguc-Kunt et al 2005). We assume that a country follows IDIS if not 
EDIS, because the country establishes a de facto insurance system to depositors of 
banks (see, for instance, Kyei 1995, DKD 1999 and 2002, Demirguc-Kunt et al 2005).  
   The proportion in our dataset between countries with EDIS and countries with IDIS, 
and between high-income countries and middle-to-low income countries is very 
different from the proportion in the dataset used by DKD (2002). In Table A1 there 
are 150 countries, 44% of which practice EDIS (dates of EDIS enactment or revision 
are also reported). About 40% of the countries with EDIS belong to the high income 
country group. The rest are middle-to-low income countries. This figure is much 
different in DKD, in which 60% of their 61 countries’ sample enforces EDIS, and 
about 55% of the countries with EDIS belong to the high income group.  
   A variable called “IDIS-EDIS” is used in the regression model to examine the effect 
of EDIS on banking crises. The variables take the value 0 for the country-period with 
IDIS and 1 with EDIS.  
   We expect the variable to be positively associated with the probability of banking 
crisis for our hypothesis not to be rejected. 
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An EDIS can be designed or formed in many ways. The forms we take for our 
empirical analysis are as follows
14
: 
  
• EDIS’s administration: An EDIS can be administered exclusively privately, or 
exclusively by government, or jointly by the government and banks. In a privately 
administered system, a competitive market premium is expected to be set 
optimally and execution of the closure rule is also expected to be appropriate 
(Carisano 1992). On the other hand, a government administered scheme allows 
moral hazard on the part of banks (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane 2002, DKD 2002). 
The possible reason of the moral hazard is that the administration implicitly 
provides higher promising insurance to the bankers but with relatively weaker 
monitoring and inappropriate closure rules of banks. In our dataset 12 schemes are 
administered privately, 18 jointly, and 34 by government. A variable for 
regression, called “EDIS’s administration”, takes 0 for IDIS, 1 for EDIS with 
private administration, 2 for joint administration, and 3 for governmental 
administration. We hypothesize that the EDIS increases the probability of a 
banking crisis even more if the EDIS is administered by the government.   
• Banks’ membership: Banks’ membership in EDIS can be compulsory or 
voluntary. If the membership is voluntary, there can be an adverse selection 
problem as sounder banks may opt out of the system (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Kane 2002, DKD, 2002, Garcia 1999). Thus an EDIS with banks’ membership 
voluntary can increase the banking sector instability. In our dataset there are only 
6 countries with voluntary membership. The variable “Banks’ membership” takes 
the value 0 for IDIS, 1 for EDIS with compulsory membership, and 2 for 
voluntary membership. We expect that the EDIS increases the banking crisis 
probability even more if the membership in the scheme is voluntary.  
• EDIS’s funding: An EDIS can be funded ex ante, or unfunded but funding ex 
post to any bank’s failure. In a funded scheme, banks pay premium into a 
recognized fund. In an unfunded scheme, either the government reimburses 
depositors of the failed bank, or the insured financial institutions are called upon 
to contribute (see Kyei 1995). However, the scheme with ex ante funding makes 
                                                 
14
 We have taken only those forms of EDIS for which the number of observations and cross-country 
variations are sufficient for regression analysis. Demirguc-Kunt et al (2005) has outlined additional 
forms of EDIS but their cross-country variation is too little to estimate their effects on banking crises.   
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the scheme more promising against contingency. Then it widens the scope of 
moral hazard on the part of banks as they take excessive risks in disbursing loans 
(DKD 2002). Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002) also advocate the ex post funding 
as a better option as it allows relatively less moral hazard. In our dataset 11 EDIS 
countries are funded ex post and 55 countries are funded ex ante. The variable 
“EDIS’s funding” takes the value 0 for IDIS observations, 1 for EDIS with 
funding ex post, and 2 for EDIS with funding ex ante. We hypothesize that the 
EDIS increases the probability of a banking crisis even more if the scheme is 
funded ex ante. 
• EDIS’s fund-source: Funding for a scheme can come from three sources – 
exclusively from banks, from banks and government joint, and exclusively from 
government. The best option for a scheme is to collect funds exclusively from 
banks (see e.g. DKD 2002). Then the moral hazard on the part of banks is 
minimized as banks themselves pay for their own management. In our dataset 
there are 19 EDIS countries for which the funding source is banks, 43 countries 
for which the funding source is joint, and in only one country the funding source 
is the government. The variable “EDIS’s fund-source” assigns the value 0 for 
IDIS, 1 for the EDIS funded by banks, 2 for the jointly funded EDIS, and 3 for the 
government funded EDIS. We hypothesize that the EDIS’s increasing effect on 
the banking crisis probability is even greater if the scheme is funded by the 
government.   
• Banks’ premium: Banks’ premium to EDIS could be risk adjusted or fixed. Risk 
adjusted premium is more efficient than fixed premium system as it reduces the 
moral hazard on the part of banks (see e.g. Freixas and Rochet 1997 p. 267, Kyei 
1995, Garcia 1999, DKD 2002). Given the premium fixed in a scheme, banks can 
take more risks in their dealings, e.g. in allocating loans. Our dataset has 14 EDIS 
countries where the bank premium is risk-based and in 51 schemes the bank 
premium is fixed. The variable “Banks’ premium” takes the value 0 for IDIS, 1 for 
EDIS with risk-based premium, and 2 for the EDIS with fixed premium. We 
hypothesize that an EDIS increases banking crisis probability even greater if the 
bank premium in the scheme is fixed.  
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Low coverage is the best option for an EDIS (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane 2002, DKD 
2002, Garcia 1999). High coverage in a scheme allows greater scope for moral hazard 
on the part of banks. The higher the coverage to deposits, the higher the amounts 
insured, the higher the scope of banks to take excessive risks in dealing with loans. 
The coverage of an EDIS can be extended in the following forms. 
 
• Foreign currency deposits covered: An EDIS can increase its coverage by 
providing coverage to foreign currency deposits. In our dataset 22 EDIS countries 
have no coverage to foreign currency deposits while 42 countries do cover foreign 
currency deposits. The variable “Foreign currency deposits covered” assigns the 
value 0 for IDIS, 1 for the EDIS without coverage to foreign currency deposits, 
and 2 for the EDIS with this coverage. The hypothesis we work with is that the 
EDIS increases the banking crisis probability even more if the scheme extends 
coverage to foreign currency deposits.   
• Inter-bank deposits covered: An EDIS can extend its coverage to inter-bank 
deposits. 51 countries in our dataset which practice EDIS are without coverage of 
inter-bank deposits and 13 countries include that coverage. The variable 
“Interbank deposits covered” assigns the value 0 for IDIS, 1 for the EDIS without 
the inter-bank deposits covered, and 2 for the EDIS with this coverage. We 
believe that the EDIS adds to banking crisis probability even more if the scheme 
covers inter-bank deposits. 
• Coverage with co-insurance: An EDIS can increase its coverage by assigning 
co-insurance in addition to the original coverage. In our dataset there are 50 EDIS 
countries that have not assigned co-insurance and 15 countries with co-insurance. 
The variable “Coverage with co-insurance” assigns the value 0 for IDIS, 1 for the 
EDIS without co-insurance, and 2 for the EDIS with co-insurance. We assume 
that the EDIS increases the risk of a banking crisis even more if the scheme 
assigns co-insurance. 
• Average coverage of deposits to GDP-per-capita ratio: As a rule of thumb, the 
IMF typically proposes an amount equivalent to 1 to 2 times GDP per capita as an 
appropriate coverage limit (Garcia 1999). However, it was noted in our dataset 
that many countries do not follow the IMF’s coverage limit. There are 31 EDIS 
countries in which the ratio is below 2 and in another 31 the ratio is more than 
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two. It should be mentioned that we take the average ratio for the latest 5 years 
available if the adoption date of EDIS is older than 5 years, otherwise that average 
from the date of adoption.
15
 The variable “Average coverage / GDP-per-capita” is 
not in fact a dummy variable as it takes the value 0 for IDIS, but the remaining 
values are the ratio of deposits under coverage to GDP per capita. Our hypothesis 
is that the EDIS’s increasing effect on the banking crisis probability is even 
stronger if the scheme applies a greater coverage ratio.    
• Average coverage of deposits to deposit-per-capita ratio: Another way of 
measuring the coverage limit is the ratio of average coverage of deposits to 
deposits-per-capita. We prefer to examine this variable as well because the ratio in 
terms of deposits per capita may be different from the ratio in terms of GDP per 
capita. Of the available data, there are 31 countries in which the average ratio is 
below 5 and 29 countries where the ratio exceeds 5. Similarly to the variable 
above, we have taken the average ratio of latest 5 values available
16
. The variable 
“Average coverage / deposit-per-capita” is also not a dummy variable like the 
above one. It takes 0 for IDIS and the remaining values are the coverage ratios of 
the schemes. Our hypothesis is similar to the one just presented above. 
 
EDIS’s best policy is to avoid incentive problems (Garcia 1999). However, Barth et 
al’s (2004) survey finds that some forms of EDIS which clearly enable incentive 
problems and also allow greater scope of moral hazard on the part of banks. It should 
be mentioned that no previous studies have tested the influence of these forms of 
EDIS on the banking sector’s instability. The forms are as follows
17
, 
 
• EDIS’s power to intervene bank: Surprisingly, not all EDIS countries have the 
legislation empowering the scheme’s authority to decide on bank intervention 
directly. Logically, this implies an incentive problem as the scheme provides 
insurance to banks, whereas it lacks the authority to decide to intervene when 
necessary. This also allows more scope of moral hazard on the part of banks. 
                                                 
15
 Note that we drop Mexico as an outlier from the sample when we take this variable in the regression. 
The reason is that the coverage ratio for Mexico is extremely high compared to other countries and the 
estimation result for this variable is radically changed if Mexico is included. 
16
 Again Mexico is dropped as an outlier. 
17
 Demirguc-Kunt et al (2005) include additional forms of EDIS taken from Berth et al (2004), but their 
cross-country variation are too small for testing. 
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Bankers can exploit this problem for their own interest by taking risk in their 
dealing with loans. We have the data on this variable for 58 countries with EDIS. 
In 8 countries the scheme is authorized to make the intervention decision, but this 
is not the case in rest 50 countries. The variable “EDIS’s power to intervene bank” 
assigns the value 0 for IDIS, 1 for the EDIS that are authorized to decide on 
intervention, and 2 for the schemes that lack this authority. We hypothesize that 
the EDIS’s increasing banking crisis probability is even more if the scheme is not 
authorized to decide on bank intervention.   
• EDIS’s power to cancel insurance: Many of the countries practicing EDIS have 
stipulated that the authority of the scheme is not authorized to cancel or revoke the 
deposit insurance for any participating banks. Like the above one, this one also 
implies incentive problems and then the moral hazard problem on the part of 
banks. According to the available data with EDIS, 24 countries enjoy the 
cancelling power and 34 do not. The variable “EDIS’s power to cancel insurance” 
takes the value 0 for IDIS, 1 for the EDIS having the cancelling or revoking 
power, and 2 for the EDIS not having that power. We assume that the EDIS 
increases the banking crisis probability even more if the scheme has no power to 
cancel or revoke the deposit insurance for any participating banks.  
• EDIS’s power to take action against bankers: In many countries with EDIS, the 
authority of EDIS does not have the authorization to take legal action against bank 
directors or other officials. Similar to the two forms just mentioned above, this 
type of scheme also creates incentive problems because the scheme provides 
insurance to banks, but cannot initiate legal action against bank directors or other 
officials for any of their faults. Such a scheme, as a result, allows scope of moral 
hazard on the part of banks in the same manner we have mentioned above. 
According to the available data, 24 EDIS countries have that power to take legal 
action against officials and 34 do not. The variable “EDIS’s power to take action 
against bankers” takes the value 0 for IDIS, 1 for the EDIS with that 
empowerment, and 2 without that empowerment. Our hypothesis is that the 
EDIS’s increasing banking crisis probability is even more if the scheme has no 
power to take legal action against bank directors or other officials.  
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The following forms of EDIS noted by Berth et al (2004) do not have the incentive 
problems as mentioned above, but they may induce other kinds of problems.   
 
• Average time to payout depositors: Quick reimbursement to depositors can 
reveal the effective power of an EDIS. The shorter the pay-out duration, the 
greater the effective power of the scheme. Kyei (1995) and Garcia (1999) argue 
that paying depositors as quickly as possible is the best policy for an EDIS. The 
data on this variable are available for 36 schemes only. Among these, 9 
applications have the pay-out time of 0 to less than 1 month; it is between 1 to less 
than 3 months in 16 cases; in 7 cases it is between 3 to less than 12 months; and in 
4 cases it exceeds 12 months. The variable “Average time to payout depositors” 
assigns the value 0 for IDIS, 1 for 0 to less than 1 month, 2 for 1 to less than 3 
months, 3 for 3 to less than 12 months, and 4 for pay-out time exceeding 12 
months. Our hypothesis is that the banking crisis probability is further increased if 
the EDIS’s pay-out time is longer. 
• Compensation of uncovered deposits: It is observed that there are EDISs that 
compensate bank depositors even if their deposits were not covered before or 
during bank failure. Such action by schemes clearly widens the scope of moral 
hazard on the part of banks. Then banks can take higher risk in dealing with their 
loans by considering all of their deposits implicitly covered by the EDIS. The data 
on this variable are available only for 42 schemes. Of these, 30 schemes have no 
such coverage, while the rest do. The variable “Compensation of uncovered 
deposits” assigns the value 0 for IDIS, 1 for the EDIS that do lack such 
compensations, and 2 for those with the compensations. We hypothesize that the 
EDIS’s increasing banking crisis probability is even more if the EDIS has such 
compensations.  
 
 
3.2 Sample selection and the variables other than DIS  
 
The period covered in our sample is 1980-2003. To select the sample countries we 
begin by taking all the countries listed by the IMF in their IFS (International Financial 
Statistics) data series. Then we drop countries (or periods) because the countries (or 
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periods) were centrally planned economies (so called socialist countries),
18
 or were 
not sovereign nations,
19
 or were affected by civil war,
20
 or because of missing data on 
the necessary control variables.
21
 The countries in our sample are reported in Table 
A1. Furthermore, parts of the study period for some sample countries are dropped 
because of their transitional state
22
 or because of non-systemic banking crises
23
 (see 
Table A2 of the appendix). 
   After the first adoption of the EDIS, about one-third of the countries reported in 
Table A1 revised their designs. However, after the first adoption, in all countries 
except Argentina, the EDIS remain in operation. The Argentine EDIS was suspended 
for the period of 1991-95. Unfortunately, the data do not offer much information on 
the revisions undertaken by the countries. At this point, to be robust, we use the data 
on EDIS with its applied designs from the date they were enacted if not revised, or 
from the date of the latest revision if the EDIS was revised for one or more times. For 
instance, the EDIS of Finland revised at the latest in 1998, and thus we use the data of 
Finland since 1998. 
 
 
Defining banking crises 
We consider a banking sector as unstable when it experiences a systemic banking 
crisis. The data on systemic banking crises come from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). 
A systemic crisis is said to occur when a sufficient number of banks fail within a 
given period and threatens the rest of the banks in the sector
24
. Different studies
25
 find 
that because of limited information, banking crises are difficult to identify. For 
instance, many banking crises are accompanied by bank runs. However, the potential 
for a bank run cannot be observed directly. On the other hand, banking crises in recent 
                                                 
18
 China, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam are completely dropped because of their centrally planned 
economies. 
19
 Hong Kong, Micronesia, and Taiwan are not totally sovereign states yet. 
20
 Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan have been affected by civil conflicts throughout most of our study 
period. 
21
 Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brunei Darussalam, Isle of Man, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshal 
Islands, and Serbia Montenegro dropped due to lack of data series on the control variables we need.  
22
 We do not drop the entire period of transitional economies, only the first two years when they 
transform from centrally planned to market economy 
23
 Periods of non-systemic crises are dropped because: 1) non-systemic crisis may affect the systemic 
crisis and the explanatory variables in our regressions; 2) we are interested in estimating the probability 
of systemic banking crisis given that the economy is otherwise in tranquil period. 
24
 See Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996) for details. 
25
 See for example Glick and Hutchison (1999) 
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years are associated not only with bank runs, but also with deterioration in asset 
quality and subsequent government intervention. However, information on these 
causes is also limited.  
   Given the information and conceptual limitations, most studies have employed a 
combination of events to identify and date the occurrences of banking crises. 
Following the detailed information for each of the systemic crises reported in Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003), we find that to distinguish a systemic crisis at least one of the 
following conditions holds: 
 
1 The ratio of non-performing loans to total assets in the banking system 
is  at least 10 percent, or banks with at least 10 percent of the total 
assets are insolvent 
2 The costs of rescue operation was at least 2.5 percent of GDP 
3 Banking sector problems resulted in government intervention with 
measures such as large-scale nationalization of banks, or prolonged 
bank holidays, or closing banks, or merging large number of banks. 
 
The variable “Bank crisis” takes the value 0 when an economy is in tranquil state and 
1 when it experiences a systemic crisis. The years during which systemic crises were 
under way are excluded from the data, because the crisis itself may affect the 
behaviour of the explanatory variables.    
 
 
Country’s less development  
The most important explanatory factor for this study, other than the DIS, is the overall 
economic development of a country. The less developed a country economically is, 
the more inadequate the country’s institutional structure is, and then the poorer the 
performance of the institutions. The reasons are, (1) the government usually becomes 
vulnerable to domestic and international pressure to implement some inefficient 
measures, (2) the higher share of unskilled personnel, (3) greater limitation of 
financial capabilities, (4) higher level of corruption and bureaucracy, (5) lower 
standard of law and order tradition, (6) higher unemployment pressure, and so on.  
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   If the overall institutional efficiency is weaker, we cannot expect better performance 
in banks’ dealings with the deposited funds, nor can we expect better outputs of the 
projects invested by the bank loans. Thus the probability of a banking crisis is already 
higher in a country with less economic development regardless of whether the country 
practices IDIS or EDIS. 
   We generate a variable called “Less development” to examine the effect of 
countries’ less economic developments on banking crisis. The variable assigns the 
values of 1, 2, 3, and 4 for high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, 
and low income countries, respectively. Thus all the developed nations belong to the 
group of high income countries and all the LDCs belong to the groups of upper-
middle income to low income countries. Countries with the assigned values are 
reported in Table A1 (the data source is Demirguc-Kunt et al 2005). 
   What happens if the EDIS is handled by a country with less economic development? 
As already discussed in section two, an EDIS is usually used to reduce the risk of 
banking crisis, because it prevents bank-run by depositors. On the other hand, it can 
increase the crisis probability because of its moral hazard problems on the part of 
banks. However, it is possible that the EDIS increases the crisis probability because it 
is operated in a LDC, where the EDIS interacts with the weaker institutional structure, 
widening the scope of moral hazard on the part of banks. To examine the effects of 
such interactions on banking crisis, we generate interaction variables by multiplying 
the DIS dummies with the variable for countries’ less developments.    
   We use also cross-country time series indexes of corruption and then multiply with 
DIS dummies to examine how much the corruption’s interaction with EDIS can 
explain the probability of crisis. Corruption indexes, in which the index ranges from 
zero to six, increase with the quality of institutions, i.e., higher the index value lower 
the corruption. The data of corruption index is taken from the International Country 
Risk Guide. It should be noted that we have the data until 1997, after which we apply 
the 1997 corruption index to the years 1998 to 2003.
26
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 As can be seen from the data series on corruption, the corruption index of a country does not change 
frequently or even annually.  
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Other Control variables 
 
We use a set of control variables to test the effect of EDIS with its different forms on 
banking crises. A similar set of control variables is also used by DKD (2002). The 
variables, their formulation, and the data sources are reported in Table 1. Expected 
signs of the impacts of the control variables on banking crises, and sources of the 
expected signs are reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 1. Formulation and data sources of the control variables 
Variables              Definition                   Sources  
GDP growth = {(Gt – Gt-1)/Gt-1}*100, Gt = g/(GDP deflator) at time t, where g 
= yearly GDP at current price  
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS)  
Terms of trade change (Tot change) ={(Tt – Tt-1)/Tt-1}*100, Tt = E/I at time t, where E and I is the total merchandise-export 
value and total merchandise-import value respectively 
IFS  
Inflation = {(pt – pt-1)/pt-1}*100, where p = consumer price index IFS 
Depreciation = {(Dt – Dt-1)/Dt-1}*100, Dt = exchange rate (national currency per SDR) at time t. IFS 
Real interest = d – i, where d = central bank discount rate (or nominal deposit rate, or money market 
rate, or treasury bill rate, or govt. bond rate, or saving rate, or lending rate if the previous 
one is not available) and i = contemporaneous rate of inflation 
IFS 
M2/reserves = (M2/F), where M2 = the broad money and is drawn from line 34 + the quasi-money in 
line 35 in IFS and F = foreign exchange reserves (both converted to national currency) 
IFS 
Growth of real private domestic credit 
lagged by two years (Credit growtht-2) 
Credit growth = (Ct –Ct-1)/Ct-1, C  = (total domestic-credits used by private sectors)/cpi, 
where cpi = consumer price index 
IFS 
GDP per capita (GDP/Capita) Ratio of GDP (in US Dollar)  to total population IFS 
 
 
 
Table 2. Expected signs of the control variables 
 
Explanatory variables  Expected 
signs 
References and short explanations 
GDP growth -  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Gorton (1988): cyclical output downturns increase banking 
sector problems; DKD (1999, 2002, 2005): -ve relation with occurrence and costs of BC 
Tot change - Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Gorton (1988): terms of trade deteriorations increase banking 
sector problems; DKD (1999): -ve relation with occurrence and costs of BC 
Inflation + Obstfeld (1986): 2
nd
 generation theory; Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003): +ve relation with 
CC; DKD (1999, 2005): +ve relation with BC occurrence and its cost.  
Depreciation + DKD (1999, 2002): +ve relation with occurrence and costs of BC.  
Real interest + DKD (1999, 2002, 2005): +ve relation with occurrence and costs of BC. 
M2/reserves + Calvo (1998): it causes vulnerability to sudden stop; DKD (1999, 2002, 2005): +ve relation 
with occurrence and costs of BC; Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003): + ve relation with CC 
Credit growtht-2 + DKD (2002, 2005): +ve relation with occurrence of BC 
GDP/Capita - DKD (1999, 2005): -ve relation with occurrence of BC 
NB: BC and CC refer to “banking crises” and “currency crises” respectively; -ve = negative, +ve = 
positive.  
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4. Empirical evidence 
 
4.1 Estimation model 
 
A logit model is used. The model we wish to fit is  
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The dependent variable is banking-crisis dummy y, and y = 1 for a country in a year if 
the country experiences banking crisis in that year, otherwise y = 0. Vector x is the set 
of explanatory variables we have discussed in the previous section. The parameter 
vector β reflects the impact of changes in x on the probability. The notation F(.) is the 
cumulative logistic distribution.  
   The log-likelihood in the logit model is   
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where S is the set of all country-years j such that yj = 1, i.e. country-years with 
banking crises. Thus the set of “j not belonging to S” implies the set of all country-
years not-experiencing banking crises.  
   We use robust standard errors. The calculation formula for the robust variance is 
 
VuuV ˆ)(ˆˆ jj′= cq  V  
 
Where, Vˆ is typically a conventionally calculated variance matrix; uj = {1–F(xjb)}xj 
for the positive outcomes and uj = –F(xjb)xj for the negative outcomes; and qc = N/(N-
1) is a constant finite sample adjustment, which is the asymptotic-like formula. 
   We include yearly fixed effects by taking yearly dummies in the regression models 
to allow the possibility that the probability of banking crisis may change cross-year 
independently of the explanatory variables. Country fixed effects can also be included 
in the empirical model to allow the possibility that the crisis-probability may change 
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cross-country independently of the explanatory variables. In logistic estimation 
model, including country fixed effects would require all the countries omitting from 
the panel that did not experience banking crises (or if it experienced banking crises for 
the whole period). Since many of the countries in our dataset did not experience any 
banking crisis during the study period and thus would be omitted from the panel, we 
do not estimate country-fixed effects.  
   When interpreting the regression results it is important to remember that the 
estimated coefficients do not indicate the increase in the probability of a crisis given a 
one-unit increase in the corresponding explanatory variables. Instead the coefficients 
reflect the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on the probability function, as 
in the above expression. However, the sign of the coefficient does indicate the 
direction of the change. 
 
 
4.2 Estimation results 
 
In our regressions, the sample size is largest when we estimate the simple IDIS-EDIS 
dummy (i.e. zero-one dummy). On the other hand, the sample sizes are smaller and 
unbalanced when we estimate different designs of EDIS because of their missing 
values. We estimate the simple IDIS-EDIS dummy with the similar sample sizes of 
different designs the EDIS has. The reason of this estimation is to determine whether 
the coefficient of any designs of EDIS is estimated more precisely than the coefficient 
of simple EDIS. The estimation results of the simple IDIS-EDIS dummy for different 
sample sizes are reported at the bottom of the regression models. The results are 
distinguished with bold and italic style. Due to space limitations, we omit the results 
of control variables with these estimations. 
   The quality of a regression model is assessed by the following values: (1) log-
likelihood value – the higher the value, the better the model; (2) Wald Chi-squared 
value – the higher the value, the better the model; (3) joint significance level (Prob > 
Chi-square) – the lower the value is, the stronger is the model’s joint significance 
level; (4) model’s goodness of fit (Pseudo R-squared value) – the higher the value, the 
better the model; and (5) Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) 27 – the lower the 
                                                 
27
 In the general case, AIC = 2k – 2ln(L), where k is the number of parameters in the statistical model 
and L is the maximized value of the likelihood function for the estimated model. 
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value, the better the model. We also report the value of model’s overall prediction 
accuracy and the value of prediction accuracy of crises for the main models.
28
  
 
 
4.2.1 DIS and banking crises 
 
At first we estimate the effect of DIS variables taking all of the possible control 
variables and also the yearly dummies. The estimation results are reported in Table 3. 
We have not reported the results of the yearly dummies lacking enough space. Many 
of the observations are lost because of missing data of the control variables. A few 
observations, as listed in Table A9 of the appendix, are dropped since they are outlier 
with respect to the results of some explanatory variables. The number of countries in 
the samples for different regression models ranges from 98 to 104. The lists of the 
countries included in the regressions are reported in Table-A8 of the appendix. 
   The dummy for IDIS-EDIS is strongly significant with the expected positive sign. 
That is, the banking crisis probability is higher in a country with EDIS than a country 
with IDIS. This finding is already confirmed in the previous empirical studies (e.g. 
DKD 1999, 2002 and 2005). However, the level of significance of the EDIS’s effect is 
much stronger, in our study (at 0.5% level) than that found, for instance, in DKD 2002 
(at 8% level). The reason of this stronger significance could be our different dataset as 
mentioned in the first section; it could also be the different estimation model as we 
take yearly fixed effects and the slightly different set of other control variables. The 
predicted crisis-probability of Philippines (1998), Thailand (1997), and Japan (1991) 
decrease from 10.10%, 28.79%, and 3.13% to 4.99%, 15.41%, and 1.56% respectively 
for switching from EDIS to IDIS.   
   In order to infer that the crisis probability is even higher for any inefficient design of 
EDIS, its coefficient should be estimated more precisely than the coefficient of EDIS 
in general. The sign definitely has to be positive as well. We consider the coefficient 
to be more precisely estimated when we see: (1) the coefficient’s level of significance 
is as strong as the level of significance of the simple IDIS-EDIS dummy; (2) the log-
likelihood value of the model is higher; (3) the model’s goodness of fit  is better 
                                                 
28
 We take a crisis (no-crisis) correctly estimated if the predicted value of the crisis (no-crisis) more 
(less) than the crude probability of crisis, i.e. number of crises divided by total number of observations. 
Thus, for the overall prediction accuracy we take the percentage value of both crises and no-crises 
correctly estimated and for the prediction accuracy of crises the percentage value of crises correctly 
estimated. 
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(higher pseudo-R-squared value). Measured in this way, the more precisely estimated 
coefficients of the forms of EDIS and their interpretations are as follows: 
 
• EDIS’s funding The banking crisis probability is higher if an EDIS is funded ex 
ante than if it is funded ex post. Thus, this study supports the viewpoint developed 
and verified by Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002) and DKD (2002) that ex post 
funding is better than ex ante funding. The possible reason is, as the theory 
suggests, an ex ante funded EDIS grants higher promising security to the 
deposited funds, causing higher moral hazard on the part of banks. The predicted 
crisis-probability of Korea (1997) and Philippines (1998) decrease from 6.63% 
and 10.55% to 4.06% and 6.64% respectively for switching from ex ante funding 
system to ex post funding. 
• Inter-bank deposits covered Our data evidences that the banking crisis probability 
is higher when the scheme provides coverage to the inter-bank deposits than when 
it does not. Theory suggests, as we have found in the previous section, that moral 
hazard problem on the side of bankers increases with the coverage limits. It is 
likely that the moral hazard increases, increasing the crisis probability, as EDIS 
offers coverage to the deposited funds in terms covering inter-bank deposits. Like 
the parameter of simple IDIS-EDIS dummy, this parameter is also strongly 
significant in our paper (at 1% level), while its significance level is weak in DKD 
(2002; at 10% level). When checked, we find that this stronger significance level 
comes partly for our different dataset, partly for the different estimation model, 
and partly for the slightly different set of control variables. The estimated 
probability of crisis of Philippines (1998) and Thailand (1997) would have 
decreased from 13.25% and 35.41% to 7.41% and 21.71% respectively if the 
countries chose not to offer rather than offering the coverage to the inter-bank 
deposits. 
• Average coverage of deposits Either of the measures, Average coverage/ GDP-
per-capita and Average coverage/ deposits-per-capita, evidence that the crisis 
probability increases with the increase of average coverage of deposits. The 
variables are strongly significant. This finding is similar with DKD (2002), who 
find that crisis probability increases with the increase of explicit coverage limits to 
deposits. The predicted crisis-probability of Korea (1997) and Turkey (2000) 
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would decrease from 4.9% and 6.5% to 3.19% and 0.84% respectively if the 
countries reduced the “average coverage of deposits to GDP-per-capita” ratio 
from 3.86 and 12.59 to 2. Note that the IMF proposes that the average coverage of 
deposits should be 1-2 times of GDP per capita. 
 
Table 3. Estimating the effects of EDIS on banking crisis probability  
Dependent var. = 
Bank crisis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP growth 
-0.146*** 
(0.047) 
-0.140*** 
(0.047) 
-0.138*** 
(0.046) 
-0.130*** 
(0.049) 
-0.147*** 
(0.047) 
-0.139*** 
(0.047) 
-0.134*** 
(0.048) 
-0.134*** 
(0.049) 
Inflation 
-0.0125* 
(0.0068) 
-0.0121* 
(0.0069) 
-0.0120* 
(0.0069) 
-0.0096 
(0.0066) 
-0.0126* 
(0.0068) 
-0.0121* 
(0.0070) 
-0.0100 
(0.0065) 
-0.0104 
(0.0066) 
Tot change 
0.0076 
(0.0071) 
0.0073 
(0.0072) 
0.0075 
(0.0072) 
0.0068 
(0.0071) 
0.0076 
(0.0071) 
0.0073 
(0.0072) 
0.0070 
(0.0069) 
0.0068 
(0.0069) 
Depreciation 
0.0134** 
(0.0064) 
0.0130** 
(0.0064) 
0.0128** 
(0.0064) 
0.0110* 
(0.0063) 
0.0135** 
(0.0063) 
0.0129** 
(0.0065) 
0.0114* 
(0.0063) 
0.0117* 
(0.0063) 
Real interest 
0.0016 
(0.0010) 
0.0015 
(0.0010) 
0.0015 
(0.0010) 
0.0010 
(0.0009) 
0.0016 
(0.0010) 
0.0015 
(0.0010) 
0.0011 
(0.0009) 
0.0011 
(0.0009) 
M2/reserves 
-0.0024 
(0.0032) 
-0.0021 
(0.0032) 
-0.0020 
(0.0028) 
-0.0021 
(0.0031) 
-0.0024 
(0.0035) 
-0.0020 
(0.0028) 
-0.0023 
(0.0030) 
-0.0025 
(0.0036) 
Credit growtht-2 
0.0025 
(0.0078) 
0.0023 
(0.0083) 
0.0020 
(0.0079) 
0.0034 
(0.0088) 
0.0023 
(0.0077) 
0.0024 
(0.0082) 
0.0039 
(0.0087) 
0.0037 
(0.0086) 
Less development 
0.4077*** 
(0.1353) 
0.3677*** 
(0.1312) 
0.3714*** 
(0.1323) 
0.3873*** 
(0.1358) 
0.3955*** 
(0.1320) 
0.3671*** 
(0.1308) 
0.3971*** 
(0.1382) 
0.4034*** 
(0.1377) 
IDIS-EDIS 
1.004**2% 
(0.4094)        
EDIS’s 
administration  
0.2959** 
(0.1448)       
Banks’ membership   
0.5926* 
(0.3137)      
EDIS’s fund-source 
   
0.3793* 
(0.2075)     
EDIS’s funding     
0.5340*** 
(0.2058)    
Banks’ premium      
0.3624* 
(0.2169)   
Foreign currency 
deposits covered        
0.4704** 
(0.2197)  
Interbank deposits 
covered        
0.6659*** 
(0.2505) 
Constant 
-4.533*** 
(1.1205) 
-4.401*** 
(1.1156) 
-4.399*** 
(1.0672) 
-4.459*** 
(1.1045) 
-4.502*** 
(1.1148) 
-4.372*** 
(1.1201) 
-4.448*** 
(1.1448) 
-4.539*** 
(1.1474) 
obs 1134 1133 1133 1078 1134 1133 1079 1079 
Log likelihood -149.73 -148.81 -149.11 -146.48 -149.52 -149.37 -147.97 -147.05 
Wald chi2 98.95 100.54 104.74 96.6 102.45 98.03 93.71 96.16 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1665 0.156 0.1544 0.1434 0.1677 0.1529 0.151 0.1563 
AIC 359.46 357.62 358.22 350.96 359.04 358.74 353.94 352.1 
No. of crises 42 41 41 40 42 41 41 41 
% overall correct 73.54 73.17 73.43 71.15 73.63 72.73 72.01 72.47 
% crises correct 73.81 73.17 73.17 70.00 73.81 73.17 70.73 73.17 
IDIS-EDIS  
.922**3% 
(.417) 
.922**3% 
(.417) 
.851** 
(.427) 
1.004**2% 
(0.4094) 
.922**3% 
(.417) 
.939**3% 
(.418) 
.939**3% 
(.418) 
Log likelihood  -148.37 -148.37 -146.07 -149.73 -148.37 -147.52 -147.52 
Pseudo R2  0.1585 0.1585 0.1458 0.1665 0.1585 0.1536 0.1536 
Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance.  
 
 45 
 
(Table 3 continued) 
Dependent variable = 
Bank crisis 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
GDP growth 
-0.132*** 
(0.048) 
-0.128*** 
(0.048) 
-0.126*** 
(0.047) 
-0.136*** 
(0.049) 
-0.135*** 
(0.048) 
-0.131*** 
(0.048) 
-0.112** 
(0.049) 
-0.125*** 
(0.047) 
Inflation 
-0.0097 
(0.0066) 
-0.0101 
(0.0062) 
-0.0102* 
(0.0062) 
-0.0101 
(0.0065) 
-0.0102 
(0.0063) 
-0.0093 
(0.0067) 
-0.0114* 
(0.0067) 
-0.0105 
(0.0068) 
Tot change 
0.0071 
(0.0069) 
0.0068 
(0.0071) 
0.0069 
(0.0071) 
0.0070 
(0.0069) 
0.0070 
(0.0068) 
0.0072 
(0.0068) 
0.0037 
(0.0070) 
0.0062 
(0.0069) 
Depreciation 
0.0110* 
(0.0063) 
0.0114* 
(0.0060) 
0.0114* 
(0.0060) 
0.0115* 
(0.0062) 
0.0116* 
(0.0061) 
0.0107* 
(0.0064) 
0.0127* 
(0.0068) 
0.0118* 
(0.0069) 
Real interest 
0.0010 
(0.0009) 
0.0011 
(0.0008) 
0.0011 
(0.0008) 
0.0011 
(0.0009) 
0.0011 
(0.0009) 
0.0010 
(0.0009) 
0.0011 
(0.0011) 
0.0011 
(0.0012) 
M2/reserves 
-0.0021 
(0.0026) 
-0.0019 
(0.0031) 
-0.0016 
(0.0027) 
-0.0023 
(0.0029) 
-0.0022 
(0.0030) 
-0.0021 
(0.0028) 
-0.0018 
(0.0025) 
-0.0020 
(0.0027) 
Credit growtht-2 
0.0039 
(0.0084) 
0.0031 
(0.0097) 
0.0032 
(0.0095) 
0.0033 
(0.0081) 
0.0040 
(0.0085) 
0.0039 
(0.0081) 
0.0075 
(0.0130) 
0.0073 
(0.0132) 
Less development 
0.3907*** 
(0.1332) 
0.3504*** 
(0.1329) 
0.3300** 
(0.1351) 
0.4253*** 
(0.1372) 
0.4511*** 
(0.1375) 
0.3931*** 
(0.1308) 
0.3413** 
(0.1381) 
0.4116*** 
(0.1468) 
Coverage with co-
insurance  
0.5043* 
(0.2721)        
Average coverage/ 
GDP-per-capita  
0.2094*** 
(0.0827)       
Average coverage/ 
deposit-per-capita   
0.0539*** 
(0.0189)      
EDIS’s power to 
intervene bank    
0.5828*** 
(0.2108)     
EDIS’s power to 
cancel insurance     
0.7463*** 
(0.2472)    
EDIS’s power to take 
action against 
bankers      
0.3613 
(0.2262)   
Average time to 
payout depositors       
0.3435** 
(0.1633)  
Compensation of 
uncovered deposits        
1.1131*** 
(0.3018) 
Constant 
-4.405*** 
(1.1145) 
-4.296*** 
(1.1559) 
-4.211*** 
(1.1587) 
-4.645*** 
(1.1041) 
-4.655*** 
(1.1285) 
-4.429*** 
(1.0780) 
-3.963*** 
(1.0812) 
-5.202*** 
(1.1031) 
obs 1069 1076 1070 1065 1065 1065 894 939 
Log likelihood -148.47 -145.50 -145.29 -145.98 -145.88 -148.48 -135.14 -138.10 
Wald chi2 91.68 118.56 122.79 99.22 97.59 90.82 92.12 101.66 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1462 0.1488 0.1489 0.1598 0.1604 0.1454 0.1402 0.1649 
AIC 354.94 349 348.58 349.96 349.76 354.96 324.28 332.2 
No. of crises 41 40 40 41 41 41 38 40 
% overall correct 71.19 72.40 71.78 72.86 71.74 70.52 71.14 72.63 
% crises correct 73.17 72.50 70.00 73.17 75.61 73.17 73.68 72.50 
IDIS-EDIS 
.998**2% 
(.414) 
.853** 
(.427) 
.863** 
(.425) 
1.025**2%    
(.417) 
1.025**2%    
(.417) 
1.025**2%    
(.417) 
1.03**2% 
( .430) 
1.230*** 
( .392) 
Log likelihood -146.90 -146.04 -145.89 -146.65 -146.65 -146.65 -134.49 -139.17 
Pseudo R2 0.1552 0.1456 0.1453 0.1559 0.1559 0.1559 0.1444 0.1584 
Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance.  
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• EDIS’s power to intervene bank Once a country implements EDIS, it should 
empower enough the EDIS from the legal point of view. This viewpoint is 
established as this study evidences that the banking crisis probability is higher if 
an EDIS has no decision-power to intervene bank operations than the EDIS has. 
Perhaps the reason is the incentive problem as the theory suggests. The problem 
ensues in the following way. The scheme provides insurance to the bank deposits, 
whereas it has no power to directly intervene the banks’ if they have any wrong 
dealings (if any) with the deposits. Then the empowered intervening authority can 
have less incentive, which implies the moral hazard problem, to be efficient and 
prudential in intervening bank operations. At the same time it will allow wider 
opportunity to the bankers to involve in fraudulent activities. The estimated 
probability of crisis of Sri Lanka (1989) and Japan (1991) would have decreased 
from 6.53% and 3.76% to 3.7% and 2.18% respectively if the EDIS authorities of 
the countries were empowered, instead of no-power, for the direct intervention of 
the bank operations.  
• EDIS’s power to cancel insurance This study finds the evidence that the 
probability of banking crisis increases if an EDIS lacks the authority to cancel the 
deposit insurance of the participating banks instead of the scheme have that 
authority. Like the design of above one and as the theory suggests, the incentive 
and the moral hazard problems may cause this increasing crisis probability. The 
EDIS guarantees to pay the dues of the banks’ depositors as it sells the insurance 
of the deposited funds. However, it has no power to cancel the deposit insurance 
agreement with the banks for any of their defaults. Logically the first problem is 
that the authority with power to cancel the insurance will have less incentive to be 
efficient in dealing with the banks. Secondly, the banks will take this opportunity 
with wider scope of moral hazard in dealing with the deposited funds. The 
predicted crisis-probability of Argentina (2001) and Korea (1997) would decrease 
from 7.45% and 8.57% to 3.88% and 4.32% respectively for switching the EDIS 
without that power to with that power. 
• Compensation of uncovered deposits The data of this study evidences that banking 
crisis probability is higher if an EDIS compensate for some reasons to the 
deposited funds of a bank which were not covered before the bank fails. This kind 
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of treatment by the EDIS reveals the liberalized policy of the scheme. This 
liberalized policy of the scheme can increase the scope of moral hazard on the part 
of banks because the effective coverage of the deposited funds increases. The 
estimated crisis-probability of Argentina (2001) and Turkey (2000) reduces from 
14.27% and 3.87% to 5.65% and 1.29% respectively for the countries’ EDIS to 
switch from compensation of the uncovered deposits to the no-compensation of 
that. 
 
The findings explained above remain the same if we test the regression models of 
Table 3 by taking (1) only the control variables that are significant or (2) only the 
control variables that are significant and have the least number of missing values (i.e. 
dropping the control variables because of high missing values). The results are 
reported in Table A5 and A6 of the appendix. Note that, each time we use the yearly 
dummies to take into account the yearly fixed effects, but we do not report the results 
of them for the lack of spaces. In the first regression-models, the control variables are 
the GDP growth, the depreciation, and the less-development of countries. The number 
of observations ranges from 1054 to 1321 and the number of countries from 102 to 
110. In the second regression-models, the control variables are the depreciation and 
the less-development of countries. Number of observations ranges from 1617 to 1992 
and the number of countries from 140 to 149. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 EDIS with economic development and banking crisis 
 
The effect of EDIS on banking crisis when the EDIS is handled by countries with 
differing economic-developments is reported in Table 4. Instead of taking all of the 
EDIS design variables, we have taken only the variables found more precisely 
estimated to increase the crisis probability higher than the probability with the EDIS 
in general. We have used the similar set of control variables, including the yearly 
dummies, as used in Table 3. However, the variable for less economic development is 
not used separately because this is used as interacting with the DIS dummies.  
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Table 4. Effect of EDIS interacted with country’s economic development on banking     
               crisis probability 
Dependent variable = Bank crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP growth 
-0.146*** 
(0.047) 
-0.146*** 
(0.047) 
-0.136*** 
(0.048) 
-0.127*** 
(0.048) 
Inflation 
-0.0144** 
(0.0072) 
-0.0145** 
(0.0071) 
-0.0127* 
(0.0071) 
-0.0118* 
(0.0067) 
Tot change 
0.0075 
(0.0078) 
0.0076 
(0.0078) 
0.0062 
(0.0076) 
0.0071 
(0.0080) 
Depreciation 
0.0153** 
(0.0067) 
0.0153** 
(0.0067) 
0.0140** 
(0.0067) 
0.0132** 
(0.0065) 
Real interest 
0.0018* 
(0.0010) 
0.0018* 
(0.0010) 
0.0013 
(0.0010) 
0.0012 
(0.0009) 
M2/reserves 
-0.0014 
(0.0025) 
-0.0015 
(0.0026) 
-0.0009 
(0.0022) 
-0.0016 
(0.0026) 
Credit growtht-2 
0.0018 
(0.0086) 
0.0020 
(0.0084) 
0.0031 
(0.0091) 
0.0037 
(0.0106) 
IDIS-EDIS x Less development 
0.5868** 
(0.2887)    
IDIS-EDIS 
-0.6125 
(0.8237)    
EDIS’s funding x Less development  
0.2495* 
(0.1530)   
EDIS’s funding  
-0.1649 
(0.4470)   
Inter-bank deposits covered x Less 
development   
0.5299** 
(0.2240)  
Inter-bank deposits covered   
-0.8251 
(0.6598)  
Average coverage/ 
GDP-per-capita x Less development    
0.0262 
(0.0809) 
Average coverage/ 
GDP-per-capita    
0.1381 
(0.2448) 
Constant 
-3.38*** 
(1.03) 
-3.38*** 
(1.02) 
-3.45*** 
(1.07) 
-3.29*** 
(1.05) 
obs 1134 1134 1079 1076 
Log likelihood -151.24 -151.52 -147.53 -148.08 
Wald chi2 105.84 107.42 103.16 115.58 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1581 0.1565 0.1536 0.1337 
AIC 362.48 363.04 353.06 354.16 
No. of crises 42 42 41 40 
% overall correct 73.02 72.75 72.85 71.28 
% crises correct 76.19 76.19 78.05 77.50 
IDIS-EDIS x Less development  
0.5868** 
(0.2887) 
.603** 
( .305) 
.556* 
( .315) 
IDIS-EDIS  
-0.6125 
(0.8237) 
-.721 
( .881) 
-.677  
( .906) 
Log likelihood  -151.24 -149.12 -147.77 
Pseudo R2  0.1581 0.1444 0.1355 
Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance.  
 
 
 
 
 49 
 
(Table 4 continued) 
Dependent variable = Bank crisis (5) (6) (7) 
GDP growth 
-0.136*** 
(0.049) 
-0.133*** 
(0.048) 
-0.128*** 
(0.048) 
Inflation 
-0.0122* 
(0.0070) 
-0.0124* 
(0.0067) 
-0.0129* 
(0.0073) 
Tot change 
0.0070 
(0.0077) 
0.0072 
(0.0077) 
0.0060 
(0.0077) 
Depreciation 
0.0135** 
(0.0067) 
0.0137** 
(0.0065) 
0.0142** 
(0.0073) 
Real interest 
0.0013 
(0.0009) 
0.0013 
(0.0009) 
0.0013 
(0.0011) 
M2/reserves 
-0.0015 
(0.0026) 
-0.0013 
(0.0022) 
-0.0012 
(0.0022) 
Credit growtht-2 
0.0028 
(0.0087) 
0.0035 
(0.0092) 
0.0065 
(0.0143) 
EDIS’s power to intervene bank x 
Less development 
0.2971* 
(0.1683)   
EDIS’s power to intervene bank 
-0.2498 
(0.4988)   
EDIS’s power to cancel insurance 
x Less development  
0.4008 
(0.2577)  
EDIS’s power to cancel insurance  
-0.2995 
(0.7075)  
Compensation of uncovered 
deposits x Less development   
0.5644** 
(0.2601) 
Compensation of uncovered 
deposits   
-0.2479 
(0.6194) 
Constant 
-3.45*** 
(1.01) 
-3.36*** 
(1.02) 
-2.83*** 
(0.82) 
obs 1065 1065 939 
Log likelihood -148.00 -148.40 -139.14 
Wald chi2 100.7 101 105.6 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1481 0.1459 0.1586 
AIC 354.0 354.8 334.28 
No. of crises 41 41 40 
% overall correct 72.21 71.74 72.31 
% crises correct 75.61 78.05 77.50 
IDIS-EDIS x Less development 
.680** 
( .315) 
.680** 
( .315) 
.454 
( .329) 
IDIS-EDIS 
-.836 
( .900) 
-.836 
( .900) 
-.025 
( .913) 
Log likelihood -148.10 -148.10 -141.01 
Pseudo R2 0.1476 0.1476 0.1473 
 
 
   As we can see from Table 4, when DIS dummies interact with the variable for less 
economic development, most of the interaction parameters are significant. The 
interaction parameters have the expected positive sign. That is, the less developed is a 
country handling the EDIS (in general or with any of its inefficient designs), the 
higher the banking crisis probability. However, none of the DIS dummies separately 
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are significant any more. Most of the correlation signs even turn to be negative (i.e. 
decreasing the crisis probability). This implies that utilizing an EDIS does not matter 
on its own, but what is important is how developed the country is to run the scheme 
efficiently. The estimated crisis-probability of Nigeria (1990) and Kenya (1992) 
would decrease from 11.33% and 9.19% to 4.61% and 3.57% respectively if the EDIS 
in these countries interacted with the institutional framework like a developed 
country.    
   What about the additional effect for an inefficient design of EDIS? Does the 
increasing probability of the interaction parameter become greater with any of the 
EDIS’s inefficient designs? We can infer this by examining whether the coefficients 
of the less-development’s interaction with the EDIS-designs are more precisely 
estimated as compared to the coefficient of that interaction with the simple IDIS-
EDIS dummy. The more precisely estimated parameters (based on the log-likelihood 
values and the values of the model’s goodness of fit) are as follows: 
    
• Inter-bank deposits covered x Less development The banking crisis probability is 
greater if an EDIS covering inter-bank deposits handled by a country with less 
economic development than if it is handled by a higher developed country. 
Precisely, the less developed a country is, the higher the moral hazard problem 
among bankers ensued from inter-bank deposits covered, and the higher the crisis 
probability. The predicted crisis-probability of Nigeria (1990) and Kenya (1992) 
would decrease from 20.31% and 18.00% to 6.21% and 4.83% respectively if the 
EDIS in these countries covering inter-bank deposits interacted with institutional 
framework like a developed country, instead of the countries’ existing least-
developed like institutional framework. 
• EDIS’s power to intervene bank x Less development The data of this study 
evidences that the banking crisis probability generated by an EDIS lacking the 
power to directly intervene bank operations is higher if the scheme handled by less 
developed economy. In the earlier subsection (Table 3) it was argued that if the 
power to intervene directly the bank operations is bestowed on other authority 
rather than on the EDIS itself, it creates incentive problems to the authority and 
then the moral hazard problems on the part of banks, and thus increases the crisis 
probability. Now we have found that this crisis probability increases even more if 
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such an EDIS is handled by less developed economy. The possible reason is, as 
the theory suggests, the weaker institutional framework in less developed 
economy exaggerates the said incentive and moral hazard problems. The 
estimated crisis-probability of Nigeria (1990) and Kenya (1992) would decrease 
from 12.48% and 10.19% to 5.73% and 4.6% respectively if the EDIS in these 
countries without the power to directly intervene bank operations handled by 
developed-country like institutional framework.  
• Compensation of uncovered deposits x Less development The banking crisis 
probability arising from an EDIS which compensates uncovered deposits is higher 
if the scheme is handled by less developed economy. In the earlier subsection we 
argued that an EDIS compensating uncovered deposits of a bank after its failure 
reveals the liberalized policy of the EDIS, and this liberalized policy causes higher 
scope of moral hazard on the part of bankers than the scheme not compensating 
that. As a result the scheme causes crisis probability to increase. When such an 
EDIS is handled by less developed economy, the liberalization allows even higher 
scope of moral hazard to the bankers because of weaker institutional framework of 
the economy, and causes the crisis probability to increase even more. The 
predicted crisis-probability of Argentina (2001) would decrease from 11.83% to 
6.33% if the EDIS in the country compensating uncovered deposits handled by 
developed-country like institutional framework rather than the country’s existing 
institutional framework. 
 
 
Next, we want to examine the degree to which an indicator representing countries’ 
single type of institutional environment, e.g. corruption, can explain the banking 
crises when it interacts with EDIS. Many studies (e.g. DKD 1999, 2002, and 2005) 
use per capita GDP or corruption, or similar indicators to represent a country’s 
institutional environment. However, these indicators cannot represent fully the general 
institutional framework which is determined by countries’ overall economic 
developments. For instance, institutional quality in Cyprus, Korea, Kuwait, Qatar, and 
United Arab Emirates is not good in terms of their average corruption levels. 
However, in terms of financial capabilities their institutional efficiency is much 
similar to that of the industrialized countries and thus they all belong to the high 
income group. On the other hand, the corruption level in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and 
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South Africa is very low, but they have considerable institutional deficiency because 
of financial limitation and they are ranked in the second most LDC group. 
 
Table 5. Effects of EDIS interacted with corruption on banking crises 
 
Dependent var. = Bank crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP growth 
-0.171*** 
(0.064) 
-0.171*** 
(0.065) 
-0.158** 
(0.067) 
-0.151** 
(0.067) 
-0.157** 
(0.067) 
-0.154** 
(0.065) 
-0.138** 
(0.066) 
Inflation 
-0.0131* 
(0.0073) 
-0.0132* 
(0.0073) 
-0.0108 
(0.0073) 
-0.0102 
(0.0070) 
-0.0112 
(0.0072) 
-0.0113 
(0.0070) 
-0.0119 
(0.0076) 
Tot change 
0.0085 
(0.0093) 
0.0087 
(0.0092) 
0.0086 
(0.0091) 
0.0092 
(0.0095) 
0.0083 
(0.0091) 
0.0086 
(0.0092) 
0.0065 
(0.0092) 
Depreciation 
0.0138** 
(0.0068) 
0.0139** 
(0.0068) 
0.0119* 
(0.0069) 
0.0113* 
(0.0068) 
0.0123* 
(0.0069) 
0.0124* 
(0.0067) 
0.0129* 
(0.0077) 
Real interest 
0.0016* 
(0.0010) 
0.0017* 
(0.0010) 
0.0012 
(0.0010) 
0.0012 
(0.0009) 
0.0012 
(0.0009) 
0.0012 
(0.0009) 
0.0013 
(0.0012) 
M2/reserves 
0.0005 
(0.0016) 
0.00005 
(0.0015) 
0.0002 
(0.0014) 
-0.0005 
(0.0014) 
0.0004 
(0.0017) 
0.0001 
(0.0014) 
0.0004 
(0.0014) 
Credit growtht-2 
0.0030 
(0.0099) 
0.0029 
(0.0096) 
0.0041 
(0.0096) 
0.0039 
(0.0105) 
0.0044 
(0.0092) 
0.0051 
(0.0092) 
0.0079 
(0.0170) 
IDIS-EDIS x Corruption 
-0.7897** 
(0.3234)       
IDIS-EDIS 
3.2885*** 
(1.0403)       
EDIS’s funding x Corruption  
-0.3694** 
(0.1643)      
EDIS’s funding  
1.6145*** 
(0.5167)      
Interbank deposits covered x 
Corruption   
-0.4731*** 
(0.1852)     
Interbank deposits covered   
1.9346*** 
(0.5737)     
Average coverage/ 
GDP-per-capita x Corruption    
-0.2129* 
(0.1285)    
Average coverage/ 
GDP-per-capita    
0.7875** 
(0.3459)    
EDIS’s power to intervene bank x 
Corruption     
-0.4096** 
(0.1917)   
EDIS’s power to intervene bank     
1.7495*** 
(0.5848)   
EDIS’s power to cancel insurance 
x Corruption      
-0.4668* 
(0.2536)  
EDIS’s power to cancel insurance      
2.0719*** 
(0.7216)  
Compensation of uncovered 
deposits x Corruption       
-0.6644*** 
(0.2504) 
Compensation of uncovered 
deposits        
3.1064*** 
(0.7886) 
Constant 
-3.05*** 
(1.08) 
-3.07*** 
(1.07) 
-3.09*** 
(1.11) 
-2.94*** 
(1.10) 
-3.14*** 
(1.05) 
-3.01*** 
(1.07) 
-3.30*** 
(1.03) 
obs 771 771 729 726 715 715 602 
Log likelihood -107.76 -107.90 -106.36 -104.54 -105.14 -105.42 -96.10 
Wald chi2 92.67 96.37 83.99 96.51 90.01 88.02 101.97 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1907 0.1896 0.1705 0.1634 0.176 0.1738 0.1938 
AIC 271.52 271.8 266.72 263.08 264.28 264.84 244.2 
No. of crises 32 32 31 30 31 31 30 
% overall correct 74.19 73.93 73.66 72.45 73.99 73.29 75.91 
% crises correct 68.75 68.75 70.97 70.00 70.97 67.74 73.33 
Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance.  
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   Table 5 summarizes the results with corruption. The set of control variables is the 
same as that used in the earlier regressions (Table 3 or 4). Signs of the correlations of 
the interaction parameters are negative in all cases implying that the lower the 
corruption of a country managing the EDIS (in general or with any of its designs), the 
lower the banking crisis probability. All of the interaction parameters are statistically 
significant.  
   Interestingly, most of the DIS dummies separately are still significant even after the 
dummies interacted with the variable of corruption are controlled. This implies that 
targeting the low level of corruption in a LDC is not enough to offset the 
ineffectiveness of an EDIS in preventing the banking crises. The other setbacks of less 
developed economy should also be removed. The setbacks could include, (1) the 
government’s vulnerability to international pressure that affects the rules and 
regulation of financial market directly or indirectly (e.g. very often governments do 
not want but to adopt EDIS because of the IMF’s pressure), (2) the government might 
experience similar vulnerability with regard to domestic pressure, (3) the lack of 
skilled personnel in institutions, (4) high unemployment pressure, (5) the history or 
tradition of non-democracy or non-freedom of press, (6) heavy bureaucracy, (7) low 
level of law and order, (8) poor contract enforcement, and so on. 
   Note that the inferences we have drawn about the differences between the DIS 
dummies interacted with corruption and the dummies interacted with less-
development could be different because of different sample sizes (see Table 5 and 4). 
To examine this, we run the regression models of Table 4 with the similar sample 
sizes as in Table 5. The findings of DIS dummies on their own and the dummies 
interacted with the variable of country’s less-development remain much the same (the 
results are not reported but can be obtained from the author on request), and thus the 
inferences drawn are not rejected. 
 
 
4.2.3 Estimation results compared to DKD (2002) 
 
As mentioned in the first section, our sample includes more LDCs than included by 
DKD (2002). We want to examine how our results differ from those of DKD because 
of this inclusion. For this, we use the DIS variables that are common to both studies. 
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We also use a similar estimation model, which is logit model disregarding the country 
and the yearly fixed effects, and a similar set of control variables. The EDIS (in 
general or with its different designs) data are from the dates they were enacted first or 
from 1980 (if the enacting dates are prior to 1980). Table 6 reports the estimation 
results, but not the results of the control variables for reasons of brevity.  
 
Table 6. The estimation results compared to DKD (2002) 
 
 DKD Ours  DKD Ours  DKD Ours 
IDIS-EDIS .859** 
(.470) 
.817** 
(.399) 
Coverage with 
co-insurance 
0.500** 
(0.240) 
.379 
(.284) 
Foreign 
currency 
deposits covered 
0.528** 
(0.258) 
.424* 
(.225) 
IDIS-EDIS x 
GDP/Capita 
-0.059 
(0.037) 
-.0796* 
(.0428) 
Coverage with 
co-insurance x 
GDP/Capita 
-0.033* 
(0.019) 
-.0579
12%
 
(.0372) 
Foreign 
currency 
deposits covered 
x GDP/Capita 
-0.027 
(0.022) 
-.0439* 
(.0247) 
Crises, N, AIC 40,898,
298 
46, 1455, 
388  
 40, 898, 298 44, 1433, 
387 
 40,898,298 45, 1454, 
387 
 
 DKD Ours  DKD Ours  DKD Ours 
Interbank deposits 
covered 
0.497* 
(0.285) 
.761*** 
(.281) 
EDIS’s funding 0.509** 
(0.242) 
.429** 
(.2002) 
EDIS’s fund-
source 
0.427** 
(0.224) 
.317
14%
 
(.214) 
Interbank deposits 
covered x 
GDP/Capita 
-0.033 
(0.028) 
-.0768** 
(.033) 
EDIS’s funding 
x GDP/Capita 
-0.026 
(0.020) 
-.034
13%
 
(.022) 
EDIS’s fund-
source x 
GDP/Capita 
-0.021 
(0.019) 
-.033 
(.025) 
Crises, N, AIC 40,898,
299 
45, 1454, 
383 
 40,898,298 46, 1455, 
389 
 40,898,298 44, 1453, 
383 
 
 DKD Ours  DKD Ours 
EDIS’s 
administration 
0.335** 
(0.157) 
.273* 
(.146) 
Banks’ 
membership 
0.847** 
(0.396) 
.526* 
(.318) 
EDIS’s 
administration x 
GDP/Capita 
-0.020 
(0.015) 
-.0378* 
(.021) 
Banks’ 
membership x 
GDP/Capita 
-0.058* 
(0.033) 
-.063* 
(.035) 
Crises, N, AIC 40,891,
297 
45, 1446, 
383 
 40,891,297 45, 1454, 
384 
Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance; N = 
No. of observations. 
 
   In the table, the DIS dummies interact with the variable of countries’ GDP per 
capita. The coefficients of most of the interaction variables in our study are larger in 
magnitude than those found in DKD (2002). The levels of significance of most of 
them are also stronger. Note that the coefficients of the interaction variables have the 
expected sign, i.e. an EDIS in general or any of its inefficient designs handled by a 
country with high GDP per capita decreases the banking crisis probability. Perhaps 
the reason of this higher coefficient values and stronger significant levels is that as 
more LDCs are included in the sample, the degree of EDIS (in general or with its 
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inefficient designs) handled by LDCs with their weaker institutions increases. As a 
result the probability of banking crisis, in terms of magnitudes of coefficients and 
their significant levels, increases higher than that of DKD (2002).    
 
 
 
4.3 Robustness 
 
A potential criticism of the regression results is that the decision to adopt EDIS may 
be influenced by a banking crisis itself. Thus the adoption of EDIS and the banking 
crisis may be jointly determined. If this is the case, then treating the EDIS as an 
exogenous variable would lead to the simultaneity bias. To assess whether such bias 
exists, we use a two-stage logit estimation method: (1) adoption of EDIS is estimated 
from a set of explanatory variables where there is at least one variable that is not 
correlated with banking crises; (2) the IDIS-EDIS dummy is replaced by a variable 
called “EDIS-predict” in estimating the banking crisis probability. The variable EDIS-
predict takes the predicted values of adopting EDIS.  
 
Table 7. DIS and banking crises: two-stage estimation 
 
Banking 
Crisis 
Adopting 
EDIS 
Banking 
Crisis 
GDP growth 
-0.140*** 
(0.040) 
-0.050* 
(0.026) 
-0.067 
(0.052) 
Depreciation 
0.0023*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0020*** 
(0.0006) 
Less development 
0.4220*** 
(0.1459) 
-0.4803*** 
(0.1132) 
0.9201*** 
(0.3269) 
IDIS-EDIS 
1.0720*** 
(0.3993)   
EDIS-Contagion  
9.7518*** 
(2.8705)  
EDIS-Predict   
36.61** 
(17.14) 
Constant 
-5.00*** 
(1.09) 
-3.6212*** 
(0.5331) 
-7.36*** 
(1.89) 
obs 1321 1470 1321 
Log likelihood -164.09 -203.25 -165.27 
Wald chi2 99.16 29.37 98.35 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1495 0.0539 0.1435 
 
   The robustness check is done by taking a fewer control variables which were found 
significant in the previous models, e.g. in Table 3. First regression model in Table 7 
 56 
reports the results in which banking crisis is the dependent variable and IDIS-EDIS is 
an explanatory variable along with the control variables.
29
 A logit model with yearly 
fixed effect is used. The result of the regression model remains the same as in Table 3, 
i.e. utilizing the EDIS increases the banking crisis probability and it is strongly 
significant. 
   In the first stage of the two-stage estimation in Table 7, the dependent variable 
“Adopting EDIS” takes zero for IDIS and one for adopting EDIS. Once the EDISs are 
adopted by countries, we drop the subsequent periods of the countries during which 
the EDISs remain in effect. The key explanatory variable in this regression model is 
the “EDIS-Contagion”. The variable takes the year-wise proportion of the sample 
countries utilizing EDIS. The higher the proportion of the countries with EDIS, the 
more likely it is that the country adopts the EDIS. This is the instrumental variable of 
IDIS-EDIS, which is likely to be related to the application of EDIS, but not to the 
banking crisis (see DKD 2002 for supporting this view). The control variables are the 
same as those in the first regression model.  
   The logit model in the first-stage estimation disregards the yearly fixed effect 
because the year-wise proportions of the sample countries utilizing EDIS are different 
between years but are the same for all countries within the years. In this case, if we 
use the yearly dummies to include their fixed effects, the variable EDIS-Contagion 
drops from the estimation. However, we use the logit model with the yearly dummies 
in the second-stage of estimation. 
   Results of the first and second regression-columns of the table show that the 
probability of adopting an EDIS and the probability of a banking crisis are driven by 
different factors. The variable of less development is strongly significant in both 
columns but with different signs. The result follows that the less a country is 
developed, the less the chance of adopting EDIS. The levels of significance of the 
parameters with the GDP growth and the depreciation also differ between the two 
columns. Essentially, EDIS-Contagion is positively related with the probability of 
adopting an EDIS, as expected. This implies that the higher the countries around the 
globe adopt EDIS, the higher the chance of a country with IDIS to enact EDIS.     
   In the second-stage of the regression (3
rd
 regression column), the variable of EDIS-
predict is a significant (at 5% level) factor of banking crises with the expected sign. 
                                                 
29
 Table A5 of appendix also reports the results of this regression model.  
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The variables for the less development and the depreciation are also significant with 
the expected signs. Thus we infer that EDIS influences banking crisis, not the banking 
crisis itself influences the adoption of EDIS. 
 
 
 
Further robustness check     
We also estimate the effects of EDIS (in general and its different forms) on banking 
crises by dropping out the high income countries from the sample, i.e., including only 
the LDCs in the sample. The logit model taking the yearly fixed effects (but not 
reporting results with yearly dummies) is used. Table 8 reports the regression results 
only for which DIS dummies are statistically significant.  
   The finding is much similar to that in Table 3. Precisely, adopting an EDIS 
increases the banking crisis probability, and this crisis probability is higher if the 
EDIS provides coverage to inter-bank deposits and if the ratio of average coverage of 
deposits to deposits-per-capita increases. This crisis probability is also higher if the 
EDIS is not empowered to directly intervene bank operations and if it compensates 
the uncovered deposits of bank(s) after the bank(s)’ failure. An additional finding 
within the LDC countries is that the crisis probability is higher if the EDIS provides 
coverage to foreign currency deposits. One reason could be the usual moral hazard 
problem on the part of banks ensuing from the increasing coverage to the deposits, as 
mentioned in the earlier sections. Another possible reason is as follows. Although 
deposits are in foreign currency, but banks mostly lend in local currency. The local 
currency devaluation is relatively higher in LDCs. The currency devaluation causes 
the banks to be non-performed with their loans, causing the banking sector 
insolvencies.       
  We also estimate the impacts of EDIS on banking crises by using the EDIS data 
from the dates of the EDIS originally enacted, instead of the dates the EDIS latest 
revised. The findings of the estimation results remain much the similar with that of 
Table 3 when we estimate the similar regression models of Table 3 (results not 
reported here due to space limitations, but can be obtained on request from the 
author). 
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Table 8. EDIS and banking crises within the LDC countries 
Dep.Var = BankCrisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP growth 
-0.1276** 
(0.0517) 
-0.1269** 
(0.0517) 
-0.1160** 
(0.0541) 
-0.1167** 
(0.0546) 
-0.1051** 
(0.0529) 
-0.1161** 
(0.0544) 
-0.1126** 
(0.0529) 
-0.1046** 
(0.0534) 
Inflation 
-0.0131* 
(0.0072) 
-0.0131* 
(0.0071) 
-0.0106 
(0.0071) 
-0.0113 
(0.0070) 
-0.0097 
(0.0071) 
-0.0107 
(0.0071) 
-0.0103 
(0.0071) 
-0.0114 
(0.0074) 
Tot change 
0.0079 
(0.0072) 
0.0079 
(0.0072) 
0.0074 
(0.0070) 
0.0073 
(0.0071) 
0.0075 
(0.0072) 
0.0075 
(0.0070) 
0.0075 
(0.0069) 
0.0066 
(0.0071) 
Depreciation 
0.0138** 
(0.0067) 
0.0138** 
(0.0066) 
0.0117* 
(0.0067) 
0.0124* 
(0.0066) 
0.0109 
(0.0067) 
0.0118* 
(0.0067) 
0.0114* 
(0.0067) 
0.0123* 
(0.0075) 
Real interest 
0.0017* 
(0.0010) 
0.0017* 
(0.0010) 
0.0012 
(0.0010) 
0.0013 
(0.0010) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
0.0012 
(0.0010) 
0.0012 
(0.0010) 
0.0014 
(0.0013) 
M2/reserves 
-0.0012 
(0.0036) 
-0.0013 
(0.0036) 
-0.0013 
(0.0037) 
-0.0011 
(0.0035) 
-0.0012 
(0.0036) 
-0.0011 
(0.0035) 
-0.0011 
(0.0035) 
-0.0012 
(0.0036) 
Credit growtht-2 
0.0023 
(0.0091) 
0.0022 
(0.0090) 
0.0030 
(0.0094) 
0.0026 
(0.0093) 
0.0021 
(0.0107) 
0.0025 
(0.0086) 
0.0033 
(0.0090) 
0.0058 
(0.0145) 
GDP/Capita 
0.0598 
(0.1319) 
0.0671 
(0.1294) 
0.0429 
(0.1373) 
0.0856 
(0.1366) 
0.0616 
(0.1420) 
0.0486 
(0.1369) 
0.0209 
(0.1424) 
0.0361 
(0.1444) 
IDIS-EDIS 
0.9745** 
(0.4388)        
EDIS’s funding  
0.5003** 
(0.2238)       
Foreign currency deposits 
covered    
0.5054** 
(0.2288)      
Interbank deposits covered    
0.7853*** 
(0.2841)     
Average coverage/ 
deposit-per-capita     
0.0483** 
(0.0203)    
EDIS’s power to intervene 
bank      
0.5455** 
(0.2234)   
EDIS’s power to cancel 
insurance       
0.5469** 
(0.2505)  
Compensation of 
uncovered deposits        
1.2588*** 
(0.3462) 
Constant 
-3.16*** 
(1.07) 
-3.17*** 
(1.07) 
-3.13*** 
(1.09) 
-3.26*** 
(1.08) 
-3.10*** 
(1.11) 
-3.21*** 
(1.04) 
-3.09*** 
(1.08) 
-2.72*** 
(0.88) 
obs 751 751 714 714 711 701 701 636 
Log likelihood -124.88 -124.91 -122.89 -121.63 -120.75 -121.85 -122.77 -114.03 
Wald chi2 81.0 85.2 72.02 78.44 93.4 75.1 68.26 91.35 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1531 0.1529 0.1384 0.1472 0.1345 0.1416 0.1351 0.1586 
AIC 307.76 307.82 301.78 299.26 297.5 299.7 301.54 280.06 
No. of crises 37 37 36 36 35 36 36 35 
% overall correct 74.03 73.50 71.85 73.53 72.29 71.90 72.18 73.43 
% crises correct 75.68 78.38 72.22 75.00 71.43 75.00 75.00 71.43 
IDIS-EDIS  
0.9745** 
(0.4388) 
0.909** 
(.451) 
0.909** 
(.451) 
0.799* 
(.465) 
0.995** 
(.447) 
0.995** 
(.447) 
1.199*** 
(.433) 
Log likelihood  -124.88 -122.96 -122.96 -121.34 -122.22 -122.22 -115.75 
Pseudo R2  0.1531 0.1378 0.1378 0.1303 0.1389 0.1389 0.1458 
Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance.  
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5. Conclusion 
  
EDIS has been utilized by countries world wide increasingly, but its use by LDCs has 
increased more rapidly. On the other hand, most of the banking crises have been 
occurred in LDCs. With this increase a sample gets new shape or balance with the 
new possible effect of EDIS on banking crises. This study tests the effects of EDIS on 
banking crises using a sample with this new balance, although these effects were 
tested previously by DKD (2002) using an older dataset. The panel data we use is 
pretty large as it takes all the possible countries with IDIS and EDIS for the period of 
1980-2003. We use a logit model with yearly fixed effects.          
   The finding is that undertaking EDIS in general, i.e. regardless of its specific form, 
increases the banking crisis probability with strong significance level. The increase of 
this crisis probability is greater if the EDIS is funded ex ante, or if it provides 
coverage on the inter-bank deposits, or if the EDIS provides higher coverage to 
deposits in average. It is also greater if the EDIS is not empowered for intervention of 
bank operations directly, or if not empowered to cancel the deposit insurance contract 
of any participating banks, or if it compensates for the lost of deposits of failed banks 
which were not covered before the failure.  
    This study also finds that the less developed a country is to handle the EDIS, the 
higher the banking crisis probability. This probability is even more if the EDIS 
provides coverage to inter-bank deposits, or if the EDIS has no power to intervene 
bank-operations directly, or if the scheme compensate for the lost deposits of failed 
banks which were not covered before the bank failure.  
   Interestingly, once the effect of a country’s less development handling the EDIS (in 
general or with any of its designs) is controlled, the effect of the EDIS separately on 
the banking crises is no longer significant. The finding suggests that the 
implementation of an EDIS does not matter on its own, but the matter is how 
developed the country is to prevent the EDIS’s ineffectiveness (e.g. the moral hazard 
problem on the part of banks). This study also finds that the EDIS handled by a 
country with low corruption level decreases the crisis-probability, but if this 
interaction is controlled, the EDIS separately increases the crisis-probability still. That 
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is, a measure like lowering the level of corruption in a country cannot overcome the 
inefficiency of an EDIS as it does by the overall economic development.  
   Using a similar logit model and a set of control variables with DKD (2002), this 
study finds that the EDIS in general or with its inefficient designs handled by a 
country with high GDP per capita decreases the banking crisis probability. However, 
the coefficients are larger in magnitude in our study than those found in DKD (2002). 
The levels of significance of the interaction parameters are also stronger in our study. 
Perhaps the reason of this larger coefficient values and of the stronger significance 
levels is that as more LDCs are included in our sample, the degree of EDIS (in general 
or with its inefficient designs) handled by the LDCs with their weaker institutional-
structures increases. As a result the increase of the crisis-probability, in terms of the 
magnitudes of the coefficients and their significance levels, is higher in our study. 
   The robustness of the findings of this study is verified in multiple approaches. The 
major verification is determining whether the adoption of EDIS and a banking crisis 
occur simultaneously, i.e., if there is reverse causality problem. Our check shows that 
the adoption of EDIS causes a banking crisis, not the other way round. In another 
check we find that the inference about the effects of EDIS (in general or with its 
inefficient designs) on banking crises remain much the same when we use the LDCs 
data only, i.e., dropping out the high income or developed countries from the sample. 
   This study has some policy implications however. In line with Chen and Fishe 
(1993), we argue against the utilization of EDIS as long as the institutional-structure 
of a country is not developed adequately. An EDIS should not be adopted on 
international pressure unless the country’s institutional framework is viable to run the 
scheme effectively. In this regard, the position of LDCs’ governments should be 
strong enough to defy the pressure of the international organisations like the IMF or 
the World Bank to adopt the EDIS. The international organisations themselves should 
also be cautious about adopting the EDIS in LDCs due to the institutional-structural 
weakness of the LDCs. They should do so because very often governments of the 
LDCs refuse to acknowledge that the institutional-structure of the countries is weak 
and prefer to adopt the EDIS instead.  
   If for some reasons a LDC needs to adopt the EDIS, certainly it should not provide 
high coverage. Furthermore, the scheme should be empowered to supervise the 
operation of the participating banks prudentially and to take action against any 
misconduct of the banks. Another important point is the public awareness of the type 
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of DIS. The people, especially the small depositors, in LDCs are less aware about the 
type of DIS than the people in the developed world. Unfortunately, very often the 
small depositors in LDCs become aware of the type of their deposit insurance only 
after the failure of their banks. In this case, the government or the EDIS authority can 
mitigate depositors’ risk, at least partly, by simply letting the general public know 
about the type of DIS and the related risks involved. In this regard, the countries need 
a strong media and free press.      
   The study has some limitations anyway. The banking crises data are obtained from 
another source (Caprio and Klingebiel 2003) and a single decisive factor to define the 
banking crises does not exist. The study would have been more realistic, if the 
definition of a banking crisis had been based on a single decisive factor.   
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Appendix 
 
Table-A1: Cross-country systemic banking crises and DIS 
Income 
Group 
Coun-
tries 
Crises Period IDIS =0 
EDIS=1 
Date 
Enacted/Revised 
Income 
Group 
Countries Crises 
Period 
IDIS =0 
EDIS=1 
Date 
Enacted/Revised 
3 Algeria
#
 1990-93 1 1997 4 Lesotho*
 
1988-90 0  
2 Argentina 1980-82, 89-90, 95-97, 
2001- 
1 1971/95 4 Liberia
# 1991-95 0  
3 Armenia# 1994-96 0  2 Libya  0  
1 Australia*  0  2 Lithuania
# 1995-96 1 1996 
1 Austria  1 1979/96 1 Luxembourg  1 1989 
1 Bahamas  1 1999 3 Macedonia, 
FYR 
1993-94 1 1996/00/02 
1 Bahrain  1 1993 4 Madagascar
# 1988 0  
4 Bangladesh 1986-96 1 1984 2 Malaysia* 1997- 1 1998 
1 Barbados  0  3 Maldives  0  
1 Belgium  1 1974/95/98 4 Mali 1987-89 0  
2 Belize  0  4 Malawi  0  
4 Benin 1988-90 0  1 Malta  1 2003 
4 Bhutan  0  4 Mauritania 1984-93 0  
3 Bolivia 1986-88, 94- 1 2001 2 Mauritius  0  
2 Botswana*  0  2 Mexico 1981-91,  
94-97 
1 1986/90/99 
3 Brazil 1990, 94-99 1 1995/2002 4 Moldova
#  0  
3 Bulgaria# 1995-97 1 1996/98/01 4 Mongolia
#  0  
4 Burkina Faso 1988-94 0  3 Morocco 1980-85 0  
4 Burundi# 1994- 0  4 Myanmar*  0  
4 Cambodia#  0  3 Namibia  0  
4 Cameroon 1987-98 0  4 Nepal 1988 0  
1 Canada*  1 1967 4 Nicaragua 1986-96 1 2001 
3 Cap Verde 1993- 0  4 Nigeria 1990-00 1 1988 
4 Central 
African Rep. 
-1999 0  4 Niger 1983- 0  
4 Chad 1980-92 0  1 Netherlands  1 1979/96/98 
2 Chile 1981-85 1 1986 1 Norway 1987-93 1 1961/97 
3 Columbia 1982-87 1 1985 1 New 
Zealand* 
 0  
4 Congo D. R. 1980- 0  2 Oman  1 1995 
2 Croatia 1996 1 1997 4 Pakistan  0  
1 Cyprus  1 2000 2 Panama 1988-89 0  
4 Cote d’Ivoire 1988-91 0  4 Papua New 
Guinea* 
 0  
1 Denmark*  1 1987/95 3 Paraguay*
 1995-99 1 2003 
3 Djibouti# 1991-93 0  3 Peru 1983-90 1 1991 
3 Dominican 
Rep. 
 1 1962 3 Philippines 1981-87, 98- 1 1963 
3 Ecuador 1980-85, 96- 1 1998 2 Poland
# 1990-00 1 1995 
3 Egypt* 1980-85 0  1 Portugal  1 1992/95 
3 El Salvador
# 1989 1 1999 1 Qatar  0  
4 Equatorial 
Guinea
 
1983-85 0  3 Russia
# 1995, 98-99 1 2003 
4 Eritrea# 1993 0  4 Rwanda
#  0  
2 Estonia*# 1992-95 1 1998 3 Samoa  0  
4 Ethiopia#  0  2 Saudi Arabia  0  
3 Fiji  0  4 Senegal 1988-91 0  
1 Finland 1991-94 1 1969/92/98 2 Seychelles
#  0  
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1 France*  1 1980/86/99 4 Sierra Leone
# 1990-00 0  
2 Gabon*  0  1 Singapore*  0  
4 Gambia*  0  1 Slovenia
# 1992-94 1 2001 
1 Germany  1 1966/98 4 Solomon Isl.
#  0  
4 Ghana* 1982-89 0  3 South Africa*  0  
1 Greece*  1 1995/2000 1 Spain 1977-85 1 1977/96 
2 Grenada  0  3 Sri Lanka 1989-93 1 1987 
3 Guatemala*  1 1999 2 St. Lucia  0  
4 Guinea 1985, 93-94 0  3 Suriname  0  
4 Guinea 
Bissau 
1995- 0  3 Swaziland 1995 0  
3 Guyana  0  1 Sweden 1991 1 1996 
4 Haiti  0  1 Switzerland  1 1984/93 
3 Honduras  1 1999 3 Syria  0  
2 Hungary# 1991-95 1 1993 4 Tanzania 1986-00 1 1994 
1 Iceland*  1 1985/96 3 Thailand 1983-87, 97- 1 1997 
4 India*  1 1961 4 Togo 1993-95 0  
4 Indonesia* 1997- 1 1998 2 Trinidad & 
Tobago* 
 1 1986 
3 Iran#  0  3 Tunisia*  0  
3 Iraq#  0  3 Turkey* 1982-85, 00- 1 1983/00 
1 Ireland  1 1989/95 3 Turkmenistan
# 
 1 2000 
1 Israel -1983 0  4 Uganda 1994- 1 1994 
1 Italy*  1 1987/96 3 Ukraine
# 1997-98 1 1998 
3 Jamaica 1994-00 1 1998 1 United Arab 
Emirates 
 0  
1 Japan 1991- 1 1971 1 United King.*
  1 1982/95 
3 Jordan*  1 2000 1 United 
States* 
 1 1934/91 
3 Kazakhstan#  1 1999/03 2 Uruguay 1981-84, 02- 1 2002 
4 Kenya* 1985-89, 92- 1 1988 4 Uzbekistan
#  0  
1 Korea Rep. 1997- 1 1996 3 Vanuatu  0  
1 Kuwait 1980-90 0  2 Venezuela* 1994-95 1 1985/01 
4 Kyrgyz Rep.# 1990-00 0  4 Yemen Rep. 1996- 0  
2 Latvia# 1995- 1 1998 4 Zambia 1995 0  
2 Lebanon# 1988-89 1 1967 4 Zimbabwe 1995- 1 2003 
Income Groups = 1 for high income countries, = 2 for upper-middle income countries, = 3 for lower-middle 
income countries, and = 4 for low income countries; the data source Demirguc-Kunt et al (2005). The data of 
different designs of DIS are as of 2003.   
Note1. ‘#’ refers that “part of the study period dropped due to civil conflicts, war, centrally planned (i.e. 
communist) economy. ‘*’ refers that “part of the study period dropped because non-systemic banking crises 
occurred during the period;  
Note2. If a crisis continued after the study period ends (2003) or continued from past through the date the study 
period starts (1980), we mark it with the sign ‘-‘. Some crisis episodes are considered as one continuous 
occurrence rather than two or more. For instance, in our sample Cameroon (1987-98) constitutes one crisis rather 
than two (1987-93) and (1995-98). Similarly, Congo Dem. Rep. (1980-) is considered as one crisis instead of three 
(1980s, 91-92, and 94-). For some crises we drop the periods after the start of the crises, because the ending of 
their dates are not known, e.g. Niger (1983-). 
Note3.  Out of 74 EDIS, 25 were revised after initial implementation. In Argentina: the DIS was abolished in 1991 
and reintroduced in 1995.  
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Table-A2: Countries where periods were dropped from the sample 
Periods dropped due to non-systemic banking crises: 
Country Period of Crisis Country Period of Crisis Country Period of Crisis 
Australia 1989-92 Greece 1991-95 Papua New Guinea  1989- 
Botswana 1994-95 Guatemala 1990- Paraguay 2001- 
Canada 1983-85 Iceland 1985-86, 93 Singapore 1982 
Costa Rica 1980- India 1993- South Africa 1989-97 
Denmark 1987-92 Indonesia 1994 Trinidad & Tobago 1982-93 
Egypt 1991-95 Italy 1990-95 Tunisia 1991-95 
Estonia 1998 Jordan 1989-90 United Kingdom 1980-00 
France 1994-95 Kenya 1996- United States 1984-91 
Gabon 1995- Lesotho 1988- Turkey 1994 
Gambia 1985-92 Malaysia 1985-88 Venezuela 1980-90 
Gambia 1985-92 Myanmar 1996-   
Ghana 1997- New Zealand 1987-90   
Periods dropped for other reasons: 
Country Period Reasons Country Period  Country Period  
Algeria 1991-
1998 
CW Guatemala 1980-00 CW & Small-Scale 
Crisis 
Mongolia 1980-93 Com. & Tr.Per. 
Armenia 1991-94 CW Hungary 1980-91 Com. & Tr.Per. Poland 1980-91 Com. & Tr.Per. 
Benin 1980-90 Com. Iran 1980-88 War Rwanda 1990-96 CW 
Bulgaria 1980-89 Com. Iraq 1980-90, 03 War Russia 1980-91 Com. & Tr.Per. 
Burundi 1993- CW Kazakhstan 1980-92 Com. & Tr.Per. Seychelles 1980-94 Com. & Tr.Per. 
Cambodia 1980-91 CW Kyrgyz Rep. 1980-92 Com. & Tr.Per. Sierra Leone 1991-02 CW 
Congo D. R. 1994- CW Latvia 1980-92 Com. & Tr.Per. Slovenia 1980-92 Com. & Tr.Per. 
Djibouti 1991-2000 CW Lebanon 1980-90 War Solomon Isl. 1997-01 CW 
El Salvador 1980-92 CW Liberia 1989- CW Turkmenistan 1980-91 Com. & Tr.Per. 
Estonia 1980-93 Com. & Tr.Per. Lithuania 1980-91 Com. & Tr.Per. Ukraine 1980-92 Com. & Tr.Per. 
Eritrea 1998-00 War Madagascar 1980-94 Com. & Tr.Per. Uzbekistan 1980-90 Com. & Tr.Per. 
Ethiopia 1980-00 Com.,Tr.Per, & CW Moldova 1980-92 Com. & Tr.Per.    
CW=Civil War, Com.=Communism, Tr.Per.=Transitional Period. 
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) for the data on non-systemic banking crises and ‘www.wikipedia.org’ for 
others.  
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Table-A3: Cross-country forms of EDIS 
Country Memb-
ership, 
Compu-
lsory=1 
Volun-
tary=2 
Admini-
stration, 
Private=1 
Joint=2 
Govt.=3 
Funding 
Source, 
Banks=1 
Banks & 
Govt.=2 
Govt=3 
Is EDIS 
Funded? 
No=1, 
Yes=2 
Pre- 
mium: 
Risk-
based=1 
Others=2 
Foreign 
Currency 
Deposits 
Covered, 
No=1 
Yes=2 
Inter 
Bank 
Deposits 
Covered, 
No=1 
Yes=2 
Co-
insura-
nce: 
No=1 
Yes=2 
Deposits 
coverage 
to GDP 
per capita 
ratio 
(average) 
Deposits 
coverage 
to deposits 
per capita 
ratio 
(average) 
Algeria 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 4.506 14.385 
Argentina 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3.734 15.158 
Austria 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 0.768 0.918 
Bahamas, The 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 3.146 4.542 
Bahrain, King. 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 3.560 4.760 
Bangladesh 1 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 5.242 16.816 
Belgium 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0.814 0.916 
Brazil 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2.886 10.506 
Bulgaria 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2.596 10.012 
Canada 1 3 2 2 2 1 2 1 1.738 2.810 
Chile 1 3 3 1 2 2 1 2 0.778 2.020 
Colombia 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 3.608 15.828 
Croatia 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 2.696 5.754 
Cyprus 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2.533 2.113 
Denmark 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1.222 2.500 
Dominican Rep. 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0.213 0.740 
El Salvador 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 2.792 57.062 
Estonia 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 0.642 1.910 
Finland 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 0.974 2.008 
France 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2.836 4.330 
Germany 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 0.800 0.838 
Greece 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1.626 2.258 
Guatemala 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1.430 7.532 
Honduras 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 9.480 22.160 
Hungary 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 0.914 2.296 
Iceland 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 0.770 1.713 
India 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 4.530 9.510 
Ireland 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 0.690 0.860 
Italy 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 4.944 9.392 
Jamaica 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1.896 4.664 
Japan 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2.540 2.125 
Jordan 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 7.903 8.210 
Kazakhstan 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 1.144 9.934 
Kenya 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 3.108 8.788 
Korea 1 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 3.863 4.843 
Lebanon 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 0.848 0.428 
Lithuania 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 3.288 17.602 
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 0.388 0.122 
Macedonia, FYR 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 n.a. n.a. 
Malta 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 6.628 32.176 
Mexico 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 489.14 1955.03 
Netherlands 1 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 0.768 0.780 
Nigeria 1 3 2 2 2 1 2 1 1.400 7.676 
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Norway 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 6.206 12.753 
Oman 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 6.760 21.920 
Peru 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 9.268 36.136 
Philippines 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2.158 4.080 
Poland 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 3.144 8.442 
Portugal 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 2 2.076 2.176 
Russia 1 n.a. n.a. 2 2 n.a. n.a. 2 1.080 5.160 
Slovenia 1 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 1.733 3.257 
Spain 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1.192 1.430 
Sri Lanka 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1.344 3.936 
Sweden 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 0.986 n.a. 
Switzerland 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0.530 0.400 
Tanzania 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1.068 7.152 
Thailand n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 n.a. 2 2 1 n.a. n.a. 
Trinidad & Tobago 1 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1.194 2.980 
Turkey 1 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 12.590 59.390 
Turkmenistan 1 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 n.a. n.a. 
Uganda 1 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 7.144 53.110 
Ukraine 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 0.326 2.618 
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1.694 n.a. 
United States 1 3 2 2 1 2 2 1 2.842 9.388 
Uruguay 1 3 n.a. 2 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Venezuela, Rep. 1 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1.586 10.362 
 
 
Table-A4. Additional forms of EDIS 
 
Country Does the EDIS 
make the 
decision to 
intervene a 
bank? Yes=1 
No=2 
Does the EDIS 
have legal power 
to cancel or revoke 
DI for any bank? 
Yes=1 No=2 
On avg., how long 
does it take to pay 
depositors in full? 
(t=month) 
0≤t≤1=1,1<t≤3=2, 
3<t≤12=3,12<t=4  
Were any deposits 
not explicitly 
covered before bank 
failure but compen-
sated afterwards? 
No=1 Yes=2  
Can DIS take 
legal action 
against bank 
directors or 
officials? 
Yes=1 No=2 
Algeria 1 2 n.a. 1 2 
Argentina 2 2 n.a. 2 1 
Austria 2 1 2 1 2 
Bahamas, The n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bahrain, King. 2 1 n.a. n.a. 1 
Bangladesh n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Belgium 2 2 3 1 1 
Brazil 2 2 1 1 2 
Bulgaria 2 2 2 2 2 
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 
Chile 2 2 n.a. n.a. 2 
Colombia 2 2 4 1 2 
Croatia 2 2 3 1 2 
Cyprus 2 1 n.a. n.a. 2 
Denmark 2 1 2 2 2 
Dominican Rep. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
El Salvador 2 2 2 1 2 
Estonia 2 2 3 1 2 
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Finland 2 1 n.a. 2 1 
France 2 1 n.a. n.a. 1 
Germany 2 2 n.a. 2 1 
Greece 2 1 2 1 2 
Guatemala 2 2 n.a. 2 2 
Honduras 2 2 1 2 1 
Hungary 1 1 2 1 2 
Iceland 2 2 n.a. n.a. 2 
India 2 1 3 1 2 
Ireland 2 1 n.a. n.a. 2 
Italy 1 1 1 2 2 
Jamaica n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Japan 2 2 1 1 2 
Jordan 2 2 n.a. n.a. 2 
Kazakhstan 2 1 1 2 1 
Kenya 2 1 3 1 1 
Korea 2 2 2 1 1 
Lebanon 2 2 4 1 2 
Lithuania 2 1 2 2 2 
Luxembourg 2 1 2 1 2 
Macedonia, FYR 2 2 n.a. 1 2 
Malta 2 2 n.a. 1 1 
Mexico 2 2 n.a. n.a. 1 
Netherlands 2 2 2 n.a. n.a. 
Nigeria 2 1 4 1 1 
Norway 2 2 1 2 2 
Oman 1 1 n.a. n.a. 1 
Peru 2 2 2 1 1 
Philippines 2 1 2 1 1 
Poland 2 2 3 1 2 
Portugal 2 2 n.a. n.a. 2 
Russia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 
Slovenia 1 2 n.a. n.a. 1 
Spain 2 2 2 1 1 
Sri Lanka 2 1 n.a. n.a. 2 
Sweden 2 1 n.a. n.a. 2 
Switzerland 2 1 n.a. n.a. 2 
Tanzania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Thailand 2 2 1 1 2 
Trinidad & Tobago 2 2 2 1 1 
Turkey 2 2 2 2 1 
Turkmenistan 2 2 2 1 2 
Uganda n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ukraine 1 1 4 1 2 
United Kingdom 2 2 3 1 1 
United States 1 1 1 1 1 
Uruguay n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Venezuela, Rep. 2 2 n.a. n.a. 1 
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Table A5. DIS and banking crises: the control variables found to be significant in 
Table 3 are only taken.  
 
Dep.Var = BankCrisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP growth 
-0.139*** 
(0.039) 
-0.135*** 
(0.039) 
-0.130*** 
(0.038) 
-0.124*** 
(0.0386) 
-0.140*** 
(0.039) 
-0.133*** 
(0.038) 
-0.126*** 
(0.038) 
-0.129*** 
(0.039) 
Depreciation 
0.0022*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0005) 
0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0021*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0005) 
Less development 
0.422*** 
(0.1459) 
0.3814*** 
(0.1419) 
0.3672*** 
(0.1399) 
0.3975*** 
(0.1467) 
0.4061*** 
(0.141) 
0.3777*** 
(0.1415) 
0.4050*** 
(0.1479) 
0.4164*** 
(0.1482) 
IDIS-EDIS 
1.07*** 
(0.3992) 
   
    
EDIS’s administration  
0.3521** 
(0.1464) 
  
    
Banks’ membership   
0.532** 
(0.2644) 
 
    
EDIS’s fun-dsource    
0.4308** 
(0.2016)     
EDIS’s funding 
    
0.5648*** 
(0.1996)    
Banks’ premium 
    
 
0.4096** 
(0.2088)   
Foreign currency 
deposits covered  
    
  
0.4711** 
(0.2103)  
Interbank deposits 
covered 
    
   
0.7113*** 
(0.2540) 
Constant 
-4.99*** 
(1.09) 
-4.85*** 
(1.08) 
-4.75*** 
(1.04) 
-4.89*** 
(1.09) 
-4.95*** 
(1.08) 
-4.81*** 
(1.08) 
-4.88*** 
(1.13) 
-5.01*** 
(1.14) 
obs 1321 1320 1320 1259 1321 1320 1260 1260 
Log likelihood -164.09 -162.62 -163.84 -159.58 -163.86 -163.58 -161.80 -160.48 
Wald chi2 99.16 102.54 107.44 94.69 104.55 98.91 87.47 90.01 
AIC 378.18 375.24 377.68 367.16 377.72 377.16 371.6 368.96 
Pseudo R2 0.1495 0.1419 0.1355 0.1332 0.1507 0.1369 0.1370 0.1441 
IDIS-EDIS  
.991** 
( .405) 
.991** 
( .405) 
.924** 
( .412) 
1.07*** 
(0.39) 
.991** 
( .405) 
1.010** 
( .404) 
1.010** 
( .404) 
Log likelihood  -162.48 -162.48 -159.21 -164.09 -162.48 -160.88 -160.88 
Pseudo R2  0.1427 0.1427 0.1352 0.1495 0.1427 0.1419 0.1419 
The joint significance levels of the estimated parameters, i.e. Prob > Chi2 value, are “0” in all of the regression 
models. In Column 1: No. of countries = 110 (31 HIC, i.e. High Income Countries, 22 UMIC, i.e. Upper Middle 
Income Countries, 27 LMIC, i.e. Lower Middle Income Countries and 30 LIC, i.e. Low Income Countries), no. of 
crises = 44, no. countries with EDIS = 53 or approximately 48% of the total (24 HIC or approximately 45% of 
EDIS- countries, 12 UMIC, 13 LMIC and 4 LIC).  
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(Table A5 continued) 
Dep.Var = BankCrisis (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
GDP growth 
-0.127*** 
(0.038) 
-0.124*** 
(0.038) 
-0.121*** 
(0.037) 
-0.133*** 
(0.040) 
-0.131*** 
(0.039) 
-0.127*** 
(0.038) 
-0.117*** 
(0.038) 
-0.126*** 
(0.039) 
Depreciation 
0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0021*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0021*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
Less development 
0.4028*** 
(0.1432) 
0.3517** 
(0.1412) 
0.3308** 
(0.1432) 
0.4185*** 
(0.1451) 
0.4325*** 
(0.1452) 
0.3783*** 
(0.1386) 
0.3289** 
(0.1440) 
0.4022*** 
(0.1548) 
Coverage with co-
insurance  
0.5711** 
(0.2528)        
Average coverage/ 
GDP-per-capita  
0.2295*** 
(0.0735)       
Average coverage/ 
deposit-per-capita   
0.0556*** 
(0.0171)      
EDIS’s power to 
intervene bank    
0.6133*** 
(0.2116)     
EDIS’s power to cancel 
insurance     
0.7352*** 
(0.2378)    
EDIS’s power to take 
action against bankers      
0.3875* 
(0.2206)   
Average time to payout 
depositors       
0.3337** 
(0.1585)  
Compensation of 
uncovered deposits        
1.1369*** 
(0.3083) 
Constant 
-4.85*** 
(1.11) 
-4.68*** 
(1.14) 
-4.59*** 
(1.14) 
-5.00*** 
(1.08) 
-4.99*** 
(1.11) 
-4.75*** 
(1.05) 
-4.09*** 
(1.07) 
-4.02*** 
(0.83) 
obs 1240 1257 1251 1233 1233 1232 1051 1100 
Log likelihood -161.58 -158.23 -158.43 -155.65 -155.87 -158.37 -144.63 -147.67 
Wald chi2 86.76 111.39 112.29 94.27 92.38 85.73 86.26 96.78 
AIC 371.16 364.46 364.86 359.3 359.74 364.74 333.26 341.34 
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.1402 0.1382 0.1504 0.1492 0.1355 0.1325 0.1566 
IDIS-EDIS 
1.189*** 
( .417) 
.926** 
( .412) 
.935** 
( .410) 
1.084*** 
( .421) 
1.084*** 
( .421) 
1.084*** 
( .421) 
1.063** 
( .438) 
1.279*** 
( .402) 
Log likelihood -159.20 -159.17 -159.03 -156.38 -156.38 -156.36 -143.80 -148.71 
Pseudo R2 0.1477 0.1351 0.1349 0.1465 0.1465 0.1464 0.1375 0.1507 
The joint significance levels of the estimated parameters, i.e. Prob > Chi2 value, are “0” in all of the regression 
models. 
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Table A6. DIS and banking crises: only one control variable and the variable for 
country’s economic underdevelopment are included (no. of countries and of 
observations used are thus at the maximum level) 
 
Dep.Var = BankCrisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Depreciation 
.0014*** 
(.00039) 
.0013*** 
(.0004) 
.0013*** 
(.00038) 
.0013*** 
(.0004) 
.0013*** 
(.0004) 
.0013***  
(.0004) 
.0013*** 
(.0004) 
.0013*** 
(.0004) 
Less development 
.4659*** 
(.1212) 
.4421*** 
(.1188) 
.4302*** 
(.1184) 
.4566*** 
(.1232) 
.4553*** 
(.1178) 
.436*** 
(.120) 
.4600*** 
(.1226) 
.4696*** 
(.1241) 
IDIS-EDIS 
.885*** 
(.333)        
EDIS’s administration 
 
.2993**   
(.1245)       
Banks’ membership 
  
.4697**   
(.2404)      
EDIS’s fund-source 
   
.3517**   
(.1741)     
EDIS’s funding     
.4718*** 
(.1679)    
Banks’ premium      
.3355* 
(.1798)   
Foreign currency 
deposits covered        
.3941** 
(.1896)  
Interbank deposits 
covered        
.5882*** 
(.232) 
Constant 
-5.86*** 
(1.04) 
-5.77*** 
(1.04) 
-5.68*** 
(1.00) 
-5.78*** 
(1.04) 
-5.83*** 
(1.04) 
-5.72*** 
(1.04) 
-5.78*** 
(1.07) 
-5.87*** 
(1.08) 
obs 1992 1991 1991 1886 1992 1991 1887 1887 
Log likelihood -273.40 -270.96 -272.09 -265.79 -273.15 -271.95 -268.77 -267.71 
Wald chi2 71.65 69.34 72.54 65.31 75.93 62.36 67.20 65.42 
AIC 596.8 591.92 594.18 579.58 596.3 593.9 585.54 583.42 
Pseudo R2 0.0881 0.0860 0.0822 0.0816 0.0889 0.0826 0.0819 0.0855 
IDIS-EDIS 
 
.813** 
( .342) 
.813** 
( .342) 
.762** 
( .356) 
.885*** 
(.333) 
.813** 
( .342) 
.838** 
 (.346) 
.838** 
 (.346) 
Log likelihood  -270.97 -270.97 -265.44 -273.40 -270.97 -267.89 -267.89 
Pseudo R2  0.0859 0.0859 0.0828 0.0881 0.0859 0.0849 0.0849 
The joint significance levels of the estimated parameters, i.e. Prob > Chi2 value, are “0” in all of the regression 
models. In Column 1: No. of countries = 149 (34 HIC, i.e. High Income Countries, 25 UMIC, i.e. Upper Middle 
Income Countries, 41 LMIC, i.e. Lower Middle Income Countries and 49 Low Income Countries), no. of crises = 
69, no. of countries with EDIS = 62 (25 HIC, 13 UMIC, 18 LMIC and 6 LIC).  
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(Table A6 continued) 
Dep.Var = BankCrisis (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Depreciation 
.0013*** 
(.0004) 
.0013*** 
(.0004) 
.0013*** 
(.0004) 
.0014*** 
(.0004) 
.0014*** 
(.0004) 
.0013*** 
(.0004) 
.0013*** 
(.0004) 
.0014*** 
(.0004) 
Less development 
.4542*** 
(.1218) 
.4286*** 
(.1168) 
.4092*** 
(.1182) 
.4530*** 
(.1192) 
.4617*** 
(.1202) 
.4163*** 
(.1164) 
.3999*** 
(.1188) 
.4392*** 
(.1245) 
Coverage with co-
insurance  
.4570** 
(.2300)        
Average coverage/ 
GDP-per-capita  
.2211*** 
(.0674)       
Average coverage/ 
deposit-per-capita   
.0589*** 
(.0143)      
EDIS’s power to 
intervene bank    
.4647** 
(.1889)     
EDIS’s power to cancel 
insurance     
.5663** 
(.2232)    
EDIS’s power to take 
action against bankers      
.2673 
( .205)   
Average time to payout 
depositors       
.2115 
(.1413)  
Compensation of 
uncovered deposits        
1.030*** 
(.3046) 
Constant 
-5.740*** 
(1.05) 
-5.66*** 
(1.07) 
-5.58*** 
(1.08) 
-5.80*** 
(1.03) 
-5.79*** 
(1.05) 
-5.59*** 
(1.01) 
-4.90*** 
(.96) 
-4.50*** 
(.60) 
obs 1866 1882 1876 1854 1854 1853 1617 1700 
Log likelihood -268.50 -263.56 -262.51 -261.02 -261.13 -263.06 -247.49 -251.94 
Wald chi2 63.85 83.99 88.36 71.80 69.17 60.56 57.58 77.49 
AIC 585 575.12 573.02 570.04 570.26 574.12 538.98 549.88 
Pseudo R2 0.0804 0.0888 0.0918 0.0840 0.0836 0.0767 0.0703 0.0868 
IDIS-EDIS 
.988*** 
( .354) 
.765** 
( .356) 
.770** 
( .355) 
.820** 
( .374) 
.820** 
( .374) 
.822** 
( .374) 
.821** 
( .411) 
1.03*** 
( .370) 
Log likelihood -266.26 -265.38 -265.29 -261.53 -261.53 -261.52 -246.59 -253.44 
Pseudo R2 0.0880 0.0825 0.0822 0.0822 0.0822 0.0821 0.0737 0.0814 
The joint significance levels of the estimated parameters, i.e. Prob > Chi2 value, are “0” in all of the regression 
models. 
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Table A7. EDIS’s interaction with the country’s less economic development and 
banking crisis: the control variables found significant are included 
Dep.Var = BankCrisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP growth 
-0.141*** 
(0.040) 
-0.140*** 
(0.040) 
-0.130*** 
(0.039) 
-0.123*** 
(0.038) 
-0.132*** 
(0.040) 
-0.129*** 
(0.039) 
-0.129*** 
(0.040) 
Depreciation 
0.0023*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0023*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0023*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0023*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0023*** 
(0.0006) 
IDIS-EDIS x Less 
development 
0.6650** 
(0.3013)       
IDIS-EDIS 
-0.7832 
(0.8647)       
EDIS’s funding x Less 
development  
0.2888* 
(0.1630)      
EDIS’s funding  
-0.2542 
(0.4799)      
Interbank deposits 
covered x Less 
development   
0.5941** 
(0.2430)     
Interbank deposits 
covered   
-0.9844 
(0.7203)     
Average coverage/ 
GDP-per-capita x Less 
development    
0.0655 
(0.0955)    
Average coverage/ 
GDP-per-capita    
0.0413 
(0.2887)    
EDIS’s power to 
intervene bank x Less 
development     
0.3117* 
(0.1663)   
EDIS’s power to 
intervene bank     
-0.2655 
(0.4905)   
EDIS’s power to cancel 
insurance x Less 
development      
0.3749 
(0.2655)  
EDIS’s power to cancel 
insurance      
-0.2705 
(0.7266)  
Compensation of 
uncovered deposits x 
Less development       
0.5861** 
(0.2539) 
Compensation of 
uncovered deposits       
-0.2776 
(0.6072) 
Constant 
-3.79*** 
(1.00) 
-3.78*** 
(1.00) 
-3.87*** 
(1.05) 
-3.67*** 
(1.04) 
-3.81*** 
(0.99) 
-3.73*** 
(1.02) 
-2.87*** 
(0.66) 
obs 1321 1321 1260 1257 1233 1233 1100 
Log likelihood -165.16 -165.55 -160.44 -160.61 -157.31 -158.21 -148.32 
Wald chi2 94.11 96.48 84.94 94.65 85.81 82.8 89.57 
AIC 380.32 381.1 368.88 369.22 362.62 364.42 342.64 
Pseudo R2 0.144 0.142 0.1443 0.1273 0.1414 0.1365 0.1529 
IDIS-EDIS x Less 
development  
0.6650** 
(0.3013) 
0.7045** 
(0.3235) 
0.6622** 
(0.3363) 
0.7066** 
(0.3126) 
0.7066** 
(0.3126) 
0.4794 
(0.3259) 
IDIS-EDIS  
-0.7832 
(0.8647) 
-0.9572 
(0.9430) 
-0.9172 
(0.9769) 
-0.8557 
(0.8900) 
-0.8557 
(0.8900) 
-0.0534 
(0.8967) 
Log likelihood  -165.16 -161.90 -160.32 -157.42 -157.42 -150.24 
Pseudo R2  0.144 0.1365 0.1289 0.1408 0.1408 0.142 
The joint significance levels of the estimated parameters, i.e. Prob > Chi2 value, are “0” in all of the regression 
models. 
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Table-A8. Sample compositions 
 
Ro-
w-1 
Regress
ion 1-8 
and 10 
of Table 
3 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Dem. 
Rep. of Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe. 
Ro-
w-2 
Regression 9 
of Table 3 
All countries of Row-1 except Finland 
Ro-
w-3 
Regress. 11 
of Table 3 
All countries of Row-1 except United Kingdom 
Ro-
w-4 
Reg. 12-14 
of Table 3 
All countries of Row-1 except Bangladesh and Dominican Rep. 
Ro-
w-5 
Regress. 16 
of Table 3 
All countries of Row-1 except Bangladesh, Dominican Rep., Finland, and United States 
Ro-
w-6 
Regress. 15 
of Table 3 
All countries of Row-1 except Bangladesh, Dominican Rep., Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Kyrgyz Rep., 
Poland, United Kingdom, and Venezuela 
 
Table A9. Observations dropped as outliers: the observations are outliers with respect 
to the corresponding variables 
Outlying observations Corresponding 
variables 
Lesotho 
Lithuania 
1987 
1995 
GDP-GROWTH 
Guinea-Bissau 
Benin 
1993 
1992 
TOT-CHANGE 
Bolivia 1985 INFLATION 
Bolivia 
Suriname 
1985 
1994 
DEPRECIATION 
Bolivia 1985 REAL-
INTEREST 
Guinea-Bissau 
Luxembourg 
1986 
1984-88 
M2/RESERVES 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1980 GDP/CAP 
Note: some of these outlying observations would already have been dropped because 
of missing data on other explanatory variables. 
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Abstract 
 
This study aims to determine whether a country’s powerful central bank (CB) can 
lessen the instability of the banking sector by minimizing the likelihood of a banking 
crisis. The data used include indicators of the CB’s autonomy for a set of countries 
over the period of 1980-89. The study finds that in aggregate a more powerful CB 
lessens the probability of banking crisis. When the CB’s authority is disentangled with 
respect to its responsibilities, the study finds that the longer tenure of CB’s chief 
executive officer and the greater power of CB in assigning interest rate on 
government loans are necessary for reducing the probability of banking crisis. The 
study also finds that the probability of crisis reduces more if an autonomous CB can 
perform its duties in a country with stronger law and order tradition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 I am grateful to Prof. Pertti Haaparanta and other participants at HECER’s Macroeconomic and 
Development workshop for their helpful comments on this paper. However, I am responsible for any 
errors in the paper.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this study is to examine empirically the relationship between the level of 
central bank’s autonomy and the instability of banking system, as defined by banking 
crisis. Note that a bank failure occurs when the bank becomes insolvent, i.e. the net 
present value of its assets falls short of the net present value of its liabilities, and a 
banking crisis occurs when a sufficient number of banks fail (it can also be weighed 
by the failed banks’ share in total deposits or assets) within a given period (see e.g. 
González-Hermosillo, 1996).
31
 
   Central bank (CB) is one of the core institutions of a country in upholding the 
country’s monetary policy. A CB’s principal objective is to keep the price stability. 
However, maintaining the price stability necessarily extends many other tasks which 
the CB can and often does perform. These include, for instance, bailing out the 
insolvent banks and the publicly-owned enterprises, managing the government’s 
financial transactions, financing the budget deficits through the issuance of money, 
and financing the development projects undertaken by the government (Cukierman et 
al, 1992). 
   All of the tasks of CB stated above have impacts on the stability of a banking sector 
directly or indirectly, and thus on the banking crisis. For example, financing the 
inappropriate governmental development projects may hamper in various ways the 
banking sector’s smooth functioning with respect to its loans to the private sector. 
First of all, the availability of funds for the loans to the private sector is reduced. 
Secondly, banks may be forced by the CB to increase interest rates to reimburse the 
losses from governmental projects, and this could trigger the non-performance of 
bank loans. Similarly, the smooth functioning of a banking sector may be hampered 
by the CB’s inappropriate bailing out of insolvent banks and by financing the 
inappropriate budget deficits through the issuance of money.  
                                                 
31
 Gonzaleze-Hermosillo (1996) follows that in a broad sense a bank failure is said to occur when the 
regulator recognise the bank as insolvent and decides to liquidate it, or assist in order to keep it in 
operation. Different instruments are usually followed to assist an ailing bank. These are, for instance, 
(1) merger or acquisition of the bank with other healthy banks; (2) direct injections of additional capital 
or other recapitalization schemes; and (3) different restructuring schemes. The restructuring schemes 
usually include change in bank-management; assisted generalized rescheduling of loan maturities; and 
removal of banks' bad loans. 
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   The instability of banking sector can be influenced both in the short and long run. 
For instance, a CB’s timely and efficient dealing (bail out or not) of the insolvent 
banks not only prevents the instability at once but also prevents the instability in the 
future by increasing confidence among the depositors, bankers, and other economic 
agents.   
   However, not all CBs are sufficiently empowered to handle its duties. Thus the 
ultimate influential role of a CB depends on its level of autonomy from the 
government (the so called executive body). Many of the researchers support the 
argument that “higher independence of a CB reduces the instability of banking 
sector”. Cukierman (1994) and Lohmann (1992) argue that greater CB autonomy is 
required for higher effectiveness of its commitment to price stability. Blejer and 
Schumacher (1998, p.4) argue that a powerful CB can increase the confidence among 
the economic agents about the CB’s capability to maintain its commitment to 
safeguard the nominal regime. Mishkin (2000) argues for a more independent CB in 
order to ensure the fewer time inconsistent problems by the political government. 
Quintyn and Taylor (2003, p.261) argue for greater autonomy of the CB for more 
benefits in regulatory and supervisory independence, and Doi (1998) for controlling 
the inefficient public expenditure.  
   In contrast, the central banker being undemocratic or bureaucratic may behave 
opportunistically which will deter achieving a country’s policy objectives in various 
sectors (Cukierman 1994), including the banking sector. Thus, a high level of 
autonomy to a CB may be detrimental to the banking sector, increasing rather the 
instability of the sector.  
   This paper attempts to resolve the contingent role of a CB’s autonomy on the 
instability of banking sector. The research question is, “does a high powered CB 
increase (or decrease) the instability of the banking sector?” What is the effect on the 
banking sector stability if an autonomous CB performs its due roles in a country with 
stronger (or weaker) institutional environment, e.g. a country with stronger (or 
weaker) law-and-order tradition? Earlier studies have not shed light on this issue, 
although many studies have dealt with factors associated with banking sector 
instability (e.g. Calvo 1998, Corsetti et al 1999, Demirgúc-Kunt and Detragiache 1999 
and 2002, Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Drees and Pazarbasioglu 1995, Gorton1988, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999, Komulainen and Lukkarila 2003, Mishkin 1996, and 
Obstfeld 1986).   
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   The data on CB’s autonomy come from Cukierman et al (1992), and is measured 
according to 16 different legal variables and an aggregated legal variable (which is 
derived by taking weighted average of the 16 variables). Four of the 16 variables 
concern the CB’s chief executive officer, i.e. CEO, (precisely, the term of office, 
appointing, dismissal, and holding other offices of the CEO). Three variables cover 
CB’s authority to formulate policy (i.e. its power to formulate monetary policy, to 
resolve conflicts, and to influence government budgetary process). One variable is on 
its objectives, while the rest 8 variable cover CB’s power to limit funding to the 
government and public entities (e.g., non-securitized and securitized lending, terms of 
lending, potential borrowers, lending amounts, maturity and interest rates of loans, 
and buying or selling of government securities in the primary market).  
   The cross-country index on CB’s independence is available by decades. From the 
available data series, we use the latest decade (1980-89) which is one of the most 
severely stricken decades with regard to banking crises. The data contain 72 countries, 
including both the developing and the industrialized countries. However, not all 
countries can be used in the regressions because of missing data on different 
explanatory variables.  
   We consider a country’s banking sector to be unstable when the country experiences 
a systemic banking crisis. The dependent variable banking crisis dummy takes the 
value one if a country has experienced one or more banking crises for one or more 
years during the decade of 1980s, otherwise zero. Each of the variables for the 
autonomy of CB is tested separately along with a set of control variables. The control 
variables have been selected from a set of explanatory variables used in earlier studies 
as the factors of banking crises.  
   Using a logit estimation model we find that a CB needs to be more powerful in 
order to reduce the instability of banking sector. CB’s aggregated legal power is found 
to be negatively associated (with a strong significance level) with the probability of 
systemic banking crisis. This finding is in line with Cukierman (1994) and Lohmann 
(1992), Blejer and Schumacher (1998), Mishkin (2000), Quintyn and Taylor (2003), 
and Doi (1998) as mentioned above.  
   When the variables of the CB autonomy are tested separately, we find that the 
autonomy of CB with respect to its CEO’s tenure of office, and with respect to 
assigning the interest rate on the loans to government and/or public entities also have 
negative relationship with the probability of banking crisis. 
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   Finally, we find that the crisis probability reduces more if an autonomous CB can 
perform its duties in a country with stronger law and order tradition.   
   The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section provides a theoretical 
discussion and the hypotheses relating the autonomy of CB with the stability of 
banking sector. Section three analyzes the data of the dependent and the explanatory 
variables. Empirical evidence is given in section four, and the concluding remarks in 
section five.   
 
 
 
2. Theoretical views and hypotheses 
 
The central bank (CB) of a country is established with the major aim of maintaining 
price stability. However, many other macro economic and financial market factors are 
also influenced by the role of a CB. Following Cukierman et al (1992) we can state 
that the CB includes the duty of bailing out insolvent banks and also other public 
enterprises. It has also other roles which are already explained in section one. These 
roles have links with the safety and the stability of banking sector. This link is more 
justified by the following remarks of the literatures:  
 
• Kapstein (1992, p. 273) observes, “since the 1930s, central bankers have 
developed a common set of beliefs about the need for regulatory safety nets whose 
purpose is to maintain the soundness of individual banks and, when necessary, to 
keep financial systems functioning in the face of economic shocks.” 
•  Padoa-Schioppa (2002, p.11) argues, “CB is the ultimate provider of a safe 
settlement medium and liquidity to ensure the orderly functioning of the financial 
system.” 
• Freixas et al (2000, p.613) note, “CB has a role to play as a crisis manager. When 
all banks are solvent, the CB’s role of preventing a speculative gridlock is simply 
to act as coordinating device.” 
• Ferguson (2002) says, “financial stability has been and always will be a 
fundamental objective of CBs.” 
 
Let’s discuss in more details the link of CB’s duties with banking sector stability. A 
CB can use its instrument of bailing out the insolvent banks to maintain the soundness 
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of banks and thus to keep the financial system functioning. However, the efficiency of 
using this instrument depends on the self-dependency of the CB. A CB is not always 
empowered to perform its duties properly. It depends on the level of autonomy it 
enjoys from the government, i.e. the executive body, which is usually formed from 
political party. 
   The executive body may want the CB to bail out (not bail out) a bank because the 
owner of the bank is loyalist (not loyalist) to the same political party the government 
is formed from even if the bank should not (should) be bailed out for the sake of 
banking sector stability. Similarly, for the stability, the CB could bail out the insolvent 
bank(s) immediately, but from the political point of view (e.g. to gain popularity 
among voters) the executive branch could ask to delay the bailout. Thus the banking 
sector stability depends on how independently a CB can perform its duties. A more 
independent CB has greater success in avoiding such pursuit of political government’s 
time-inconsistent policies (see Mishkin 2000) and thus resulting in less instability of 
banking sector.    
   Banking sector’s stability can be influenced simply by the CB’s money issuance 
instrument (see e.g. Padoa-Schioppa 2002, p.3). As mentioned above, a government 
can ask financial support from CB through CB’s money issuance mechanism to 
finance budget deficits, or it can borrow money from the CB to finance the 
development projects undertaken by the government. The higher this support or 
borrowing, the higher could be the ultimate pressure on commercial banks, because 
the CB could simply pass this government expenditure on the commercial banks and 
the banks may charge higher lending rates to recover.  
   The CB can control the financial support or the loan to government with an aim to 
reduce the ultimate pressure on the commercial banks for the sake of the stability of 
banking sector. It can control in terms of setting the amount of money the government 
wants to borrow, in terms of setting the interest rates on the loans, in terms of setting 
the period of the loans to pay back, and such other barriers on the government-loans. 
However, its capability to control relies on its independence from the executive body. 
Doi (1998) argues that inefficient public expenditure can be reduced by an 
independent CB. Hence, the more independent a CB, the higher control it has on the 
public expenditure, the less unstable the banking sector.   
   A CB can influence the banking sector stability simply with its commitment to 
defend monetary regimes. A CB is the guarantor of the stability of financial sector and 
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it can prevent systemic banking crises by its commitment (Blejer and Schumacher 
1998, p.12). It is typically assumed that the CB is the key organization to maintain the 
financial stability (Watanagase, 2005). Thus it is reasonable to assume that the higher 
credible this commitment to the economic agents, the less panicked they are for any 
economic shock, and the less unstable the banking sector. However, the credibility of 
this commitment depends on how self-dependently the CB can perform its duties. 
Lack of power in a CB leads to loss in confidence on its capability to uphold its 
pledge to safeguard the nominal regime (see Blejer and Schumacher 1998, p.4). Thus, 
the more independent a CB is from the executive branch, the more capable it is to 
uphold its pledge to safeguard the nominal regime, the more credible is its 
commitment to the economic agents, and the less unstable is the banking sector. 
   CB’s role to stabilize banking sector can also be justified with its duty to prevent 
moral hazard among managerial behavior of banks. Taking necessary measures 
against this moral hazard is not beyond the duties of a CB (Goodhart 1987, p.88). On 
the other hand, studies find that a CB’s regulatory and supervisory independence can 
be benefited from the autonomy of a CB (see Quintyn and Taylor 2003, p.261). Thus 
the more autonomous a CB is, the higher supervisory independence it has, the less 
moral hazard scope among bankers because of higher control of CB over the problem, 
and the less unstable is the banking sector. 
   However, a CB’s independence can cause to increase the banking sector instability. 
The reason is as follows. The central banker is not elected by the country’s electorate. 
Thus it is not democratic and may not care about the welfare of the citizens, and can 
be bureaucratic. Being undemocratic or bureaucratic, the central banker may behave 
opportunistically which hampers country’s policy objectives in various sectors 
(Cukierman 1994). It can hamper as well the policy objective of reducing the banking 
sector instability. Thus, the impact of CB’s autonomy on banking sector instability is 
ambiguous.   
   Next a reasonable question comes up is “does the CB’s independence influence the 
instability of banking sector differently for different levels of institutional 
environment of countries?” We argue affirmatively. For instance, the law and order 
tradition in countries are not the same. An autonomous CB’s performance with the 
aim of reducing the instability of banking sector may be less effective in a country 
with weaker law and order tradition. For instance, an autonomous CB’s action of not 
bailing out an insolvent bank, rather closing the bank, could be delayed by bank 
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authority’s movement because of weak law and order tradition. Specifically, the bank 
authority may linger the closing process by using the flawed legal procedure. If the 
bank owner is a politically influential person, he/she could even cause the CB officials 
in trouble. These kinds of movements are usual phenomena in developing countries. 
Like the CB’s bailing out instrument, CB’s other actions can be less effective in 
reducing the instability in countries with weaker law and order tradition, because the 
effective parties may exploit the weaker tradition. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
As mentioned above, the theoretical discussions lead to kind of ambiguity about the 
effect of a CB’s independence on banking sector instability. This study will attempt 
empirically to purge this ambiguity. As strong and most of the arguments goes in 
favor of the independence of CB reduces the instability, the main hypothesis is as 
follows: 
 
• Given all other factors remaining the same, the more autonomous a CB, the less 
unstable the banking sector. 
 
Hypothesis 2    
 
The second hypothesis this study works with is as follows: 
 
• Given all other factors remaining the same, the probability of increasing banking 
sector instability by a CB’s lowering autonomy is higher if the CB is functioning 
in a country with weaker law and order tradition. 
 
 
 
3. The data 
 
3.1 CB autonomy 
 
The data of central bank independence (CBI) comes from Cukierman et al (1992). 
The data is decade-wise, i.e. an index represents the level of CBI of a country for a 
decade. The data is available for four decades 1950-59, 1960-71, 1972-79 and 1980-
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89, and it is for both the industrialized and the developing countries. We however use 
the data only for the last decade (1980-89), because in earlier decades there are almost 
no systemic banking crises (see Caprio and Klingbiel 2003) and the data of other 
control variables are mostly missing.  
   A variable called “Aggregated-CBI” is used to represent overall cross-country CBI. 
The variable is formulated by taking weighted average of the 16 variables 
representing CBI levels based on CB’s different roles (see Cukierman et al 1992 for 
the process of weighted average to aggregate them). It should be noted that the 
weighted average is taken from the available observations while ignoring the missing 
observations. Of the 16 variables, some we take for test separately and some not 
(because the observed CBI levels in the variables do not vary sufficiently to run 
regressions). The variables we take for test are presented below. The higher the value 
of a variable, the more independent the CB it reveals.  
 
• CB’s autonomy regarding the chief executive officer (CEO)’s term of office: The 
variable called “CBI on CEO’s office-term” takes the values 1.00, 0.75, 0.50, 0.25, 
and 0.00 respectively if CEO’s tenure of office is more than 8 years, 6 to 8 years, 
5 years, 4 years, and under 4 years or at the discretion of appointment agent. 
• CB’s autonomy to appoint CEO: The variable called “CBI on appointing CEO” 
assigns the values 1.00 if CEO is appointed by the board of CB, 0.75 if by a 
council of CB, executive branch and legislative branch, 0.50 if by legislature, 0.25 
if by executive office collectively (e.g. council of ministers) and 0.00 if by one or 
two members of the executive branch. 
• CB’s Autonomy to decide CEO’s holding of other offices in government: The 
variable called “CBI on CEO’s other office” takes the value 1.00 if CEO’s only 
job is with the CB; 0.50 if CEO can hold other government offices only with the 
permission of the executive branch; and 0.00 if there are no restrictions on the 
CEO holding of other positions. 
• CB’s Autonomy in formulating monetary policy: The variable called “CBI on 
formulating monetary policy” assigns the values 1.00, 0.67, 0.33, and 0.00 
respectively if monetary policy is formulated by the CB alone, if CB participates 
in the process but has little influence, if CB merely advises the government, and if 
CB has no say. 
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• Autonomy in exercising final word in the resolution of conflict: The variable called 
“CBI on conflict resolution” assigns the value 1.00 if the final word in resolution 
of conflict comes from CB, which is clearly defined in the law as its objectives; 
0.80 if the word comes from CB, but not clearly defined as the CB’s goals;  0.60 if 
the final word comes from a council of CB, executive branch, and legislative 
branch; 0.40 if the word comes from the legislature;  0.20 if the word comes from 
the executive branch, but subject to due process and possible protest by the CB; 
and 0.00 if the word comes from the executive branch as its unconditional priority. 
• CB’s autonomy with regard to ‘Advances’ or non-securitized lending to the 
government: The variable called “CBI on advances lending” takes the value 1.00 
if CB allows no advances; 0.67 if advances are permitted within strictly defined 
limits (e.g. up to 15% of government revenue); 0.33 if advances are permitted 
with flexible limits (e.g. over 15% of the government revenue); and 0.00 if there 
are no legal limits on lending to the government. 
• CB’s autonomy regarding securitized lending to government: The variable called 
“CBI on securitized lending” takes the value 1.00 if no securitized lending is 
permitted; 0.67 if the securitized loans are permitted with strict limits (e.g. up to 
15% of government revenue); 0.33 if the securitized loans are permitted with 
flexible limits (e.g. over 15% of the government revenue); and 0.00 if there are no 
legal limits on lending. 
• CB’s authority regarding terms of lending, i.e. designing the maturity, interest 
rate, and amount of lending: The variable called “CBI on lending terms” takes the 
value 1.00 if the lending terms are controlled by the CB; 0.67 if this responsibility 
is specified by CB’s charter; 0.33 if it is agreed between the CB and the executive 
branch; and 0.00 if it is decided by the executive branch alone. 
• CB’s power to specify interest rates on loans: The variable called “CBI on loans’ 
interest-rate” takes the value 1.00 if the interest rate is above the minimum market 
rate; 0.75 if it is at the market rate; 0.50 if it is below the market rate; 0.25 if the 
interest rate is not mentioned; and 0.00 if there is no interest rate on government 
borrowing from CB. 
• CB’s power on determining maturity of loans: The variable called “CBI on loans’ 
maturity” takes the value 1.00 if the loans are matured within 6 months; 0.67 if 
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matured within 1 year; 0.33 if matured after more than 1 year; and 0.00 if the 
maturity time is not specified in the law. 
 
Besides the above mentioned CBI variables, there are still some CBI variables which 
we can not test. Those comprise: the CB’s autonomy to dismiss CEO, autonomy in 
setting CB’s objectives, autonomy in government’s budgetary process, autonomy 
regarding the potential borrowers from CB, autonomy on deciding lending amounts, 
and the autonomy to buy or sell government securities in the primary market. 
   CBI indexes on different variables we take for test and also on “Aggregated-CBI” 
are reported in Table A1 of the appendix. The highest number of countries we are able 
to take in the sample is 54. It needs to mention that Cukierman et al (1992) contains 
additional countries with the data of CBI, but these are excluded because of the 
missing data on the control variables we need. Indonesia is ignored because of its 
outlying effect.
32
 
 
3.2 Banking sector instability 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, we consider the banking system of a country to 
be unstable if it experiences “systemic banking crisis”. The variable “Bank-crisis” 
takes the value 1 if the country has experienced a systemic banking crisis for one or 
more years in the decade 1980s, otherwise 0. The data on crises come from Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003). Table A1 of the appendix reports the data. 17 countries 
experienced crises during the 1980s. All of the crises began in the 1980s with the 
exception of Spain, where it began in 1977 and continued till 1985. Spain is still 
included since the autonomy of its CB remains the same both in the 1970s and the 
1980s. 
 
3.3 Control variables 
 
We use control variables from a set of explanatory variables of banking crises which 
were tested in the previous studies (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1999, 
2002 and 2005, Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999, Komulainen and Lukkarila 2003). The 
control variables for the macroeconomic factors are the GDP growth rate, the terms-
                                                 
32
 Inclusion of Indonesia in the sample radically changes the results of some variables of CB’s 
independence. 
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of-trade change, the depreciation rate, the real interest rate, and the inflation rate. The 
financial variables are the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves, and the rate of 
growth of real domestic credit in the private sector. An indicator GDP per capita is 
used to represent a country’s institutional development. Detailed theoretical views 
supporting the use of these variables are given in Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1999).  
   The formulation of yearly values of the control variables are reported in Table-A2 
of the appendix. After formulating the yearly values, we take the average of the 
values available over the period of 1979-1989 if there are no systemic crises, or we 
take the average of 5 or fewer values available before the onset of  banking crises.  
  
 
 
4. Empirical analyses 
 
4.1 Estimation model 
 
A logit model is used. The model we wish to fit is  
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The dependent variable is banking-crisis dummy y, and y = 1 for a country if the 
country experiences one or more banking crises in the decade 1980s, otherwise y = 0. 
Vector x is the set of explanatory variables we have discussed in the previous section. 
The parameter vector β reflects the impact of changes in x on the probability. The 
notation F(.) is the cumulative logistic distribution.  
   The likelihood for logit is   
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where S is the set of all countries j such that yj = 1, i.e. countries with banking crises.   
   We use robust standard errors. The calculation formula for the robust variance is 
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Where, Vˆ is typically a conventionally calculated variance matrix; uj = {1–F(xjb)}xj 
for the positive outcomes and uj = –F(xjb)xj for the negative outcomes; and qc = N/(N-
1) is a constant finite sample adjustment, which is the asymptotic-like formula. 
   When interpreting the regression results it is important to remember that the 
estimated coefficients do not indicate the increase in the probability of a crisis given a 
one-unit increase in the corresponding explanatory variables. Instead the coefficients 
reflect the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on the probability function, as 
in the above expression. However, the sign of the coefficient does indicate the 
direction of the change. 
 
 
4.2 Estimation results 
 
The estimation results of the central bank independence (CBI) variables with their 
effects on banking crisis are reported in Table 1. The results show that the CBI is one 
of the important factors to reduce the banking sector instability. Given the other 
factors remaining the same, the variable “Aggregated CBI”, which accounts for the 
overall CBI levels of countries, is strongly significant (at 2% level) to reduce the 
probability of banking crisis. 
   The result implies that the more powerful a CB is in terms of its overall 
responsibilities, the better its performance in controlling the safety of the banking 
sector, and the lower the probability of the systemic instability of the sector. It could 
be because of the public’s greater confidence on a stronger CB as Blejer and 
Schumacher (1998) observe and thus becoming less panicked for any financial 
shocks. It could be because of stronger CB’s stronger insulation of the banking sector 
from the ineffective political interests, as Mishkin 2000 finds, and thus handling more 
efficiently the CB’s bailing out instrument of the insolvent banks. It could be because 
an independent CB can reduce inefficient public expenditure, as Doi (1998) finds, and 
thus reducing the reimbursement pressure on banking sector. If the overall level of 
CBI in Morocco and Panama (respectively 0.14 and 0.22) were like the level of CBI 
in German (0.69, one of the most independent CBs), the estimated crises probabilities 
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of the countries in the 1980s would have decreased 6.54% (from 99.23% to 92.70%) 
and 14.98% (from 90.91% to 75.92%) respectively.  
   
Table 1. The relationship between banking crises and the autonomy of Central Bank  
 
Dep.Var = Bank crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average GDP-growth -0.485*** 
(0.181) 
-0.434* 
(0.226) 
-0.505** 
(0.207) 
-0.428*** 
(0.154) 
-0.445 
(0.345) 
-0.378*** 
(0.139) 
Average Tot-change -13.159*** 
(3.931) 
-8.825*** 
(2.440) 
-10.899** 
(4.279) 
-11.233** 
(4.653) 
-15.677*** 
(5.147) 
-11.235** 
(4.693) 
Average Inflation -0.122 
(0.113) 
-0.037 
(0.119) 
-0.038 
(0.056) 
-0.004 
(0.067) 
-0.159 
(0.160) 
-0.036 
(0.070) 
Average Real-interest -0.300** 
(0.132) 
-0.311** 
(0.156) 
-0.178** 
(0.070) 
-0.190** 
(0.087) 
-0.021 
(0.095) 
-0.136 
(0.093) 
Average Depreciation 0.132 
(0.092) 
0.022 
(0.121) 
0.044 
(0.052) 
0.011 
(0.057) 
0.179 
(0.165) 
0.047 
(0.064) 
Average M2/reserves -0.524*** 
(0.163) 
-0.385*** 
(0.094) 
-0.405*** 
(0.131) 
-0.410*** 
(0.131) 
-0.971** 
(0.468) 
-0.488*** 
(0.161) 
Average Credit-
growtht-2 
0.292*** 
(0.114) 
0.319** 
(0.141) 
0.272** 
(0.113) 
0.241*** 
(0.091) 
0.405** 
(0.204) 
0.263*** 
(0.090) 
Average GDP/capita -0.444 
(0.311) 
-0.190 
(0.217) 
-0.371 
(0.324) 
-0.378 
(0.294) 
-0.486 
(0.340) 
-0.303 
(0.306) 
Aggregated-CBI -13.918** 
(6.049) 
     
CBI on CEO’s office-
term  
-4.195** 
(2.018) 
 
 
   
CBI on appointing 
CEO  
 0.735 
(1.577) 
   
CBI on CEO’s other 
office  
  0.942 
(0.958) 
  
CBI on formulating 
monetary policy 
    7.782 
(4.913) 
 
CBI on conflict 
resolution 
     1.022 
(1.881) 
Constant 20.17*** 
(4.90) 
10.92*** 
(2.92) 
12.65*** 
(4.69) 
12.60** 
(5.15) 
20.06*** 
(7.30) 
13.41** 
(5.35) 
No. of Observations 54 50 54 54 38 45 
Log likelihood -7.77 -7.09 -8.58 -8.46 -5.88 -6.98 
Wald chi2 29.4 36.33 25.49 24.87 20.53 30.88 
Prob > chi2 0.0006 0 0.0025 0.0031 0.0149 0.0003 
Pseudo R2 0.7691 0.7524 0.7448 0.7484 0.7591 0.7562 
AIC
33
 35.54 34.18 37.16 36.92 31.76 33.96 
No. of crises 17 13 17 17 13 15 
% overall correct 90.74 92.00 92.59 92.59 92.11 93.33 
% crises correct 94.12 92.31 94.12 94.12 92.31 93.33 
***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance  
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 In the general case, AIC = 2k – 2ln(L), where k is the number of parameters in the statistical model 
and L is the maximized value of the likelihood function for the estimated model. 
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(Table 1 continued) 
Dep.Var = Bank crisis (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Average GDP-growth -0.465*** 
(0.140) 
-0.513** 
(0.223) 
-0.369** 
(0.178) 
-0.644*** 
(0.220) 
-0.844*** 
(0.319) 
Average Tot-change -12.036*** 
(4.110) 
-11.808** 
(4.816) 
-10.781** 
(4.734) 
-10.142*** 
(3.787) 
-14.665*** 
(5.273) 
Average Inflation -0.058 
(0.054) 
-0.043 
(0.061) 
0.003 
(0.073) 
-0.058 
(0.051) 
-0.069 
(0.076) 
Average Real-interest -0.183** 
(0.092) 
-0.121 
(0.101) 
-0.218** 
(0.101) 
-0.211** 
(0.092) 
-0.208* 
(0.111) 
Average Depreciation 0.060 
(0.050) 
0.055 
(0.056) 
0.014 
(0.070) 
0.054 
(0.048) 
0.087 
(0.074) 
Average M2/reserves -0.524*** 
(0.130) 
-0.518*** 
(0.148) 
-0.417*** 
(0.128) 
-0.384*** 
(0.113) 
-0.517*** 
(0.164) 
Average Credit-
growtht-2 
0.271*** 
(0.081) 
0.283** 
(0.114) 
0.231** 
(0.102) 
0.263*** 
(0.092) 
0.397*** 
(0.145) 
Average GDP/capita -0.316 
(0.285) 
-0.353 
(0.281) 
-0.368 
(0.308) 
-0.379 
(0.323) 
-0.428 
(0.350) 
CBI on advances 
lending 
1.453 
(1.476) 
  
  
CBI on securitized 
lending 
 2.253 
(1.996) 
 
  
CBI on lending terms   -3.927 
(3.136) 
 
 
 
CBI on loans’ interest-
rate 
   -4.200** 
(2.066)  
CBI on loans’ maturity    
 
2.712* 
(1.601) 
Constant 14.71*** 
(4.59) 
14.61*** 
(5.38) 
13.30*** 
(4.76) 
14.53*** 
(5.27) 
15.80*** 
(5.62) 
No. of Observations 51 50 54 53 53 
Log likelihood -7.21 -7.71 -8.27 -8.01 -8.33 
Wald chi2 27.05 21.87 30.71 31.68 23.48 
Prob > chi2 0.0014 0.0093 0.0003 0.0002 0.0052 
Pseudo R2 0.7778 0.7595 0.7542 0.7592 0.7494 
AIC 34.42 35.42 36.54 36.02 36.66 
No. of crises 17 17 17 17 17 
% overall correct 94.12 92.00 92.59 94.34 90.57 
% crises correct 94.12 94.12 94.12 94.12 94.12 
 
   The self-dependency of CB with respect to the office-term of its chief executive 
officer (CEO) can also explain the banking sector instability. Given that other factors 
of banking sector instability are controlled, the self-dependency of CB as justified by 
CEO’s office-term reduces the instability at 5% significance level. Precisely, the 
longer the terms of office of the CEO, the greater it signals the autonomy of CB, and 
the more independently the CEO can perform his/her duties and can decide on 
monetary policy, all of which can help to reduce the banking sector instability. The 
data shows that in the 1980s the CBs of Columbia and Argentina were among the 
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CBs, where the CEO’s office terms were most interrupted and thus the CEOs lasted 4 
years or less. The predicted crises probabilities of the countries would have decreased 
in that decade by 1.87% (from 77.82% to 75.94%) and 0.23% (from 98.09% to 
97.85%) respectively if the CEO’s office-terms were not interrupted and thus lasted 
more than 8 years, like German or Iceland. 
   A CB imposing higher interest rate on government loans is also significant (at 5% 
level) in reducing the banking crisis probability. This means that the greater the CB’s 
authority to impose higher interest rate on government loans, the lower would be the 
pressure imposed on commercial banks to reimburse the costs of government loans, 
and thus the less vulnerable would be the banking sector reducing the probability of 
banking crisis. The data shows that the CBs in Nepal and Philippines are entitled to 
set the interest rate on government loans in the 1980s at almost the lowest level; the 
CBs were in a kind of state not to specify any interest rate on government borrowings. 
The estimated banking crises probabilities of the countries would have decreased by 
1.31% (from 99.87% to 98.56%) and 3.94% (from 99.63% to 95.69%) respectively if 
the CBs are entitled to set the interest rate at the level of Austria or Australia (where 
the CB is empowered to set the interest rate on government borrowings above the 
minimum market rate).   
   CB’s design of “loans-maturity” on the loans to government and public entities has 
a positive correlation with the probability of banking crisis. However, it is weakly 
significant (at 10% level). The result is probably due to the fact that the banking crises 
took place relatively more frequently in countries where the maturities of the 
government-loans from the CBs were relatively shorter. The rational for the result 
could be that the governments are more successful in projects funded by the longer-
term loans.  
   Finally, some of the control variables are significant as well. These include the 
average GDP-growth, the average terms of trade change, the average real interest rate, 
the average ratio of the currency in circulation to the foreign exchange reserves, and 
the average private domestic credit growth. Note that all of these variables are taken 
with their average values over the decade 1980s if there were no crises, or the average 
before the crises began. Among them the average GDP-growth, average terms of trade 
change, and the average private domestic credit growth are having the expected signs, 
as noted in the previous studies (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1999 or 
2005, who studied with yearly data). That is, the higher the average GDP growth (i.e. 
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stronger economy) or the average terms of trade change (i.e. favorable trade balance), 
the lower the probability of banking crisis. On the other hand, the higher the average 
private domestic credit growth (lagged by two years), implying the more liberalized 
financial system, the higher the probability of banking crisis.  
   However, the average real interest rate and the average ratio of currency in 
circulation to foreign exchange reserves enter with different signs found in the 
previous studies (e.g. studies of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1999, 2002 or 2005 
with yearly data and Komulainen and Lukkarila 2003 with monthly data)
34
. That is, 
the higher the average real interest rate or the average ratio of currency in circulation 
to foreign exchange reserves, the lower the probability of banking crisis. The reason 
of this different sign could be our very different dataset and the different method of 
formulating the variables (e.g. the values averaged over the decade).          
   The quality of a regression model is assessed by the following values: (1) log-
likelihood value – the higher the value, the better the model; (2) Wald Chi-squared 
value – the higher the value, the better the model; (3) joint significance level (Prob > 
Chi-square) – the lower the value is, the stronger is the model’s joint significance 
level; (4) model’s goodness of fit (Pseudo R-squared value) – the higher the value, the 
better the model; and (5) Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) 35 – the lower the 
value, the better the model. We also report the value of model’s overall prediction 
accuracy and the value of prediction accuracy of crises.
36
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 With the monthly data Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003) found the ratio of currency in circulation to 
foreign exchange reserves to increase the probability of banking crisis in emerging economies. 
35
 In the general case, AIC = 2k – 2ln(L), where k is the number of parameters in the statistical model 
and L is the maximized value of the likelihood function for the estimated model. 
36
 We take a crisis (no-crisis) correctly estimated if the predicted value of the crisis (no-crisis) more 
(less) than the crude probability of crisis, i.e. number of crises divided by the total number of 
observations. Thus, for the “overall prediction accuracy” we take the percentage value of both crises 
and no-crises correctly estimated and for the “prediction accuracy of crises” the percentage value of 
crises correctly estimated. 
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4.3 CB’s autonomy, institutional environment, and banking 
sector instability 
 
This subsection sheds light on the effect of CB’s influential role on a banking crisis 
when its autonomy interacts with a country’s institutional environment. We use the 
law-and-order tradition of countries to represent their institutional environment. 
Higher scores indicate sound political institutions, a strong court system, and 
provisions for an orderly succession of power. Lower scores indicate a tradition of 
physical force or illegal means to settle claims, and after changes in government, new 
leaders may be less likely to accept the obligations of the previous regime. The values 
of the variable range 0 to 6 and reveal the yearly ranks of law and order tradition. We 
take each country’s average value of the ranks available for the decade 1980s 
(because the data on CB’s autonomy are of the decade 1980s).   
   The estimation results of the interaction variables are reported in Table 2. Note that 
the sample sizes in Table 2 are lessened by 1 as compared to the sample sizes in Table 
1. The sample sizes are lessened because of missing data on law and order tradition 
for Nepal. We compare the effects of CBI variables having the interactions with the 
law and order tradition with the effects of CBI variables without the interactions. To 
do so, we estimate the similar regression models as of Table 1 with exactly the same 
sample (i.e. dropping Nepal) and report in Table A3 of the appendix. We, however, 
report only the results of the CBI variables which are found to be significant in Table 
2.      
   This study finds that the banking sector instability is even lower if an autonomous 
CB can perform its duties in a country with stronger law and order tradition. This 
evidence comes up as the aggregated CBI interacted with the law and order tradition 
reduces the banking crisis probability at stronger significance level than the 
significance level found when the CBI variables are not interacted (as in Table A3 of 
the appendix). Not only the significance level stronger, the regression model with the 
interaction variable is also more precisely estimated (as justified by the model’s log-
likelihood value and the value of goodness of fit, i.e., the pseudo R-squared value). So 
we stick by our hypothesis that an autonomous CB can perform its duties more 
profoundly to maintain the banking sector stability when the country’s law and order 
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tradition is stronger, which implies sounder political institutions, stronger legal 
system, and so on. 
 
Table 2. CB’s autonomy with different levels of law-and-order tradition and banking 
crises  
Dep.Var = Bank crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average GDP-growth -1.727*** 
(0.559) 
-0.434* 
(0.247) 
-0.587*** 
(0.212) 
-0.428*** 
(0.144) 
-0.160 
(0.264) 
-0.366*** 
(0.142) 
Average Tot-change -40.235*** 
(10.992) 
-8.385*** 
(2.820) 
-14.518*** 
(4.078) 
-11.310** 
(4.860) 
-10.591*** 
(3.737) 
-10.855** 
(4.588) 
Average Inflation -0.433** 
(0.205) 
0.022 
(0.147) 
-0.028 
(0.080) 
-0.008 
(0.066) 
-0.035 
(0.068) 
-0.023 
(0.070) 
Average Real-interest -0.548*** 
(0.189) 
-0.395* 
(0.233) 
-0.309*** 
(0.112) 
-0.199** 
(0.085) 
-0.094 
(0.059) 
-0.134 
(0.093) 
Average Depreciation 0.411** 
(0.188) 
-0.046 
(0.162) 
0.040 
(0.077) 
0.015 
(0.055) 
0.050 
(0.067) 
0.034 
(0.063) 
Average M2/reserves -1.748*** 
(0.559) 
-0.404*** 
(0.113) 
-0.508*** 
(0.137) 
-0.407*** 
(0.138) 
-0.509*** 
(0.144) 
-0.464*** 
(0.143) 
Average Credit-growtht-2 0.698*** 
(0.192) 
0.356** 
(0.142) 
0.253*** 
(0.074) 
0.232*** 
(0.082) 
0.220** 
(0.096) 
0.250*** 
(0.090) 
Average GDP/capita -0.269 
(0.269) 
-0.041 
(0.159) 
-0.304 
(0.324) 
-0.399 
(0.302) 
-0.289 
(0.367) 
-0.296 
(0.336) 
Aggregated CBI x Law & 
order 
-10.063*** 
(2.715)      
CBI on CEO’s office-term x 
Law & order  
-1.116*** 
(0.424)     
CBI on appointing CEO x 
Law & order   
-0.755* 
(0.438)   
 
CBI on CEO’s other-office x 
Law & order  
 
 
0.200 
(0.249) 
  
CBI on formulating monetary 
policy x Law & order 
   
 
0.390 
(0.344)  
CBI on conflict resolution x 
Law & order 
   
  
0.107 
(0.549) 
Constant 62.099*** 
(16.877) 
9.611*** 
(3.506) 
17.564*** 
(4.855) 
12.849** 
(5.440) 
12.549*** 
(4.175) 
12.966** 
(5.127) 
No. of Observations 53 49 53 53 38 44 
Log likelihood -4.85 -6.78 -8.01 -8.51 -6.51 -7.01 
Wald chi2 38.8 29.17 34.8 24.12 31.2 32.36 
Prob > chi2 0 0.0006 0.0001 0.0041 0.0003 0.0002 
Pseudo R2 0.8505 0.7513 0.7531 0.7378 0.7332 0.7455 
AIC 29.7 33.56 36.02 37.02 33.02 34.02 
No. of crises 16 12 16 16 13 14 
% overall correct 92.45 91.84 92.45 92.45 92.11 93.18 
% crises correct 93.75 91.67 93.75 93.75 92.31 92.86 
***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95 
 
 
(Table 2 continued) 
Dep.Var = Bank crisis (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Average GDP-growth -0.435*** 
(0.161) 
-0.396* 
(0.203) 
-0.138 
(0.176) 
-0.625*** 
(0.217) 
-0.553*** 
(0.182) 
Average Tot-change -11.947*** 
(4.240) 
-11.013** 
(4.518) 
-19.331*** 
(4.444) 
-10.531*** 
(4.057) 
-11.685*** 
(4.464) 
Average Inflation -0.051 
(0.061) 
-0.058 
(0.062) 
0.004 
(0.089) 
-0.042 
(0.050) 
-0.021 
(0.068) 
Average Real-interest -0.171* 
(0.090) 
-0.154 
(0.095) 
-0.399*** 
(0.088) 
-0.187** 
(0.087) 
-0.203*** 
(0.075) 
Average Depreciation 0.055 
(0.056) 
0.066 
(0.055) 
0.017 
(0.111) 
0.042 
(0.047) 
0.033 
(0.053) 
Average M2/reserves -0.517*** 
(0.126) 
-0.472*** 
(0.129) 
-0.795*** 
(0.205) 
-0.410*** 
(0.125) 
-0.414*** 
(0.138) 
Average Credit-
growtht-2 
0.256*** 
(0.091) 
0.259** 
(0.113) 
0.258*** 
(0.090) 
0.292*** 
(0.098) 
0.285*** 
(0.093) 
Average GDP/capita -0.326 
(0.323) 
-0.356 
(0.306) 
-0.187 
(0.217) 
-0.309 
(0.328) 
-0.395 
(0.310) 
CBI on advances 
lending x Law & order 
0.075 
(0.426)   
 
 
 
CBI on securitized 
lending x Law & order  
-0.053 
(0.529) 
 
  
CBI on lending terms x 
Law & order 
 
 
-4.155*** 
(1.625)  
 
CBI on loans’ interest-
rate x Law & order 
   -0.840*
(6%)
 
(0.444) 
 
CBI on loans’ maturity 
x Law & order     
0.151 
(0.282) 
Constant 14.887*** 
(4.566) 
13.640*** 
(4.976) 
23.488*** 
(5.348) 
14.038*** 
(5.271) 
13.340** 
(5.305) 
No. of Observations 50 49 53 52 52 
Log likelihood -7.336 -7.830 -6.222 -7.995 -8.585 
Wald chi2 30.5 23.55 29.4 27.12 32.16 
Prob > chi2 0.0004 0.0051 0.0006 0.0013 0.0002 
Pseudo R2 0.7659 0.747 0.8083 0.7509 0.7325 
AIC 34.672 35.66 32.444 35.99 37.17 
No. of crises 16 16 16 16 16 
% overall correct 94.00 91.84 92.45 94.23 90.38 
% crises correct 93.75 93.75 93.75 93.75 93.75 
 
   As mentioned in the above subsection, the estimated crises probabilities in the 
1980s would have been reduced by 6.54% and 14.98% respectively if the level of 
aggregated CBI in Morocco and Panama were improved at the level of CBI in 
German. The reduction of the predicted crises’ probabilities would have been higher, 
12.8% (from 99.99% to 87.2%) and 29.56% (from 99.99% to 70.43%) respectively, if 
the countries’ law and order condition in the 1980s (index 1.81 for both Morocco and 
Panama) were also improved concurrently at the level of Finland’s law and order 
tradition (which has the strongest law and order tradition). 
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   Having interaction with law and order tradition, there are also other CBI variables 
more precisely estimated and strongly significant. Those are the CBI in terms of 
CEO’s office-term, in terms of appointing CEO, and in terms of designing the 
lending-terms on loans to the government and/or public entities. Results with the 
former two imply that an uninterrupted CB to remove its CEO or to appoint the CEO 
can perform its duties more efficiently for the safety of the banking sector if the law 
and order tradition of the country is stronger. Note that the CBI in terms of appointing 
CEO was not significant (even the sign was opposite) when it was tested without the 
interaction, as found in Table 1 (or Table A3 of appendix). This validates that a 
flawless law and order condition of a country is very important to execute the duties 
efficiently by the autonomous CB of the country for the stability of its banking sector.  
   From the above subsection we find that the estimated probabilities of crises of 
Columbia and Argentina would have decreased by 1.87% and 0.23% respectively if 
the CBs were not interrupted and thus the CEOs’ office-terms were more than 8 years, 
like German or Iceland. These reductions would have been higher, 4.25% (from 
81.28% to 77.03%) and 0.27% (from 97.95% to 97.68%) respectively, if the levels of 
the countries’ law and order tradition (indexes 1.27 and 2.81 respectively) were also 
improved simultaneously at the strongest level of law and order tradition like in 
Finland. 
   Like the CBI in terms of CEO’s office-term or in terms of appointing CEO, CBI in 
designing the lending-terms (i.e. designing the maturity, amount, and interest rate on 
loans to the government and/or public entities) is also effective to reduce the 
probability of crisis more if a country’s law and order condition is stronger. 
Interestingly, this CBI variable is also found in Table 1 (or Table A3 in appendix) not 
to be significant, as it is without interaction with law and order condition. However, 
having the interaction it is strongly significant (at 1% level). This implies that an 
autonomous CB’s improved designing of the lending-terms so as to reduce the 
vulnerability of the banking sector will not be useful unless the country’s law and 
order condition is improved enough. The reason could be that the opportunity cost of 
flawed law and order condition, as both the commercial banks and the public entities 
can just misuse the condition in their favor, is such a high that the efficient designing 
of the lending-terms can not help recovering this cost.  
   Without taking the interaction with law and order condition, the predicted crises 
probabilities of Morocco and Panama would reduce by 1.86% (from 96.95% to 
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95.09%) and -2.32% (from 79.55% to 81.87%) respectively for switching the CBI in 
lending-terms from the level of most interrupted by the executive body to the level of 
least interrupted. Note that the crisis probability of Panama increases instead of 
decrease. However, these probabilities would reduce further in magnitudes, 6.44% 
(from 99.79% to 93.35%) and 18.5% (from 95.49% to 76.99%) respectively, if the 
levels of the countries’ law and order tradition (index 1.81 for both of the countries) 
were also improved concomitantly to the level of strongest law and order condition. 
   Having the interaction with law and order condition, CBI in terms of setting the 
interest rate on loans to the government or public entities is also more precisely 
estimated (as justified by the log-likelihood and the pseudo R-squared values). 
However, the significance level of the interaction parameter (at 6% level) is slightly 
weaker than the significance level of the CBI parameter without the interaction (at 5% 
level). Perhaps, while taking the law and order condition into account, the CBI in 
terms of setting the interest rate is not as much useful as the CBI in terms of designing 
the lending-terms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Robustness of the results 
 
A potential criticism of the regression results is that an increase in CB’s autonomy 
may be influenced by the banking crisis itself. Thus an increase in CBI and the 
banking crisis may be jointly determined. If this is the case, then treating an increase 
in CBI as an exogenous variable would lead to simultaneity bias. We argue against the 
existence of such bias in this study, because CBI is not a continuously changing 
variable that it will change immediately after or simultaneously with the occurrence of 
banking crisis. This logic becomes stronger when we see that CBI in the 1970s 
represented by the 16 variables mentioned in section 3 remains much the same as in 
the 1980s.  
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Table 3. Banking crises and CB’s independence in the 1970s  
Dep.Var = Bank 
crisis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average GDP-
growth 
-0.481*** 
(0.182) 
-0.433* 
(0.225) 
-0.644*** 
(0.220) 
-0.844*** 
(0.320) 
Average Tot-change -13.077*** 
(3.964) 
-8.808*** 
(2.457) 
-10.142*** 
(3.787) 
-14.664*** 
(5.274) 
Average Inflation -0.121 
(0.112) 
-0.038 
(0.120) 
-0.058 
(0.051) 
-0.069 
(0.076) 
Average Real-
interest 
-0.297** 
(0.136) 
-0.307* 
(0.161) 
-0.211** 
(0.092) 
-0.208* 
(0.111) 
Average 
Depreciation 
0.132 
(0.092) 
0.024 
(0.123) 
0.054 
(0.048) 
0.087 
(0.074) 
Average 
M2/reserves 
-0.521*** 
(0.163) 
-0.384*** 
(0.094) 
-0.384*** 
(0.113) 
-0.517*** 
(0.164) 
Average Credit-
growtht-2 
0.290** 
(0.114) 
0.318** 
(0.141) 
0.263*** 
(0.092) 
0.397*** 
(0.145) 
Average GDP/capita -0.443 
(0.312) 
-0.190 
(0.216) 
-0.379 
(0.323) 
-0.428 
(0.350) 
Aggregated-CBI in 
70s 
-13.862** 
(5.952) 
   
CBI on CEO’s 
office-term in 70s 
 -4.156** 
(2.007) 
  
 
CBI on loans’ 
interest-rate in 70s 
  -4.200** 
(2.066) 
 
CBI on loans’ 
maturity in 70s 
   2.711* 
(1.601) 
Constant 20.05*** 
(4.90) 
10.90*** 
(2.94) 
14.53*** 
(5.27) 
15.80*** 
(5.62) 
No. of Observations 54 50 53 53 
Log likelihood -7.76 -7.09 -8.01 -8.33 
Wald chi2 28.67 36.29 31.68 23.46 
Prob > chi2 0.0007 0 0.0002 0.0052 
Pseudo R2 0.7693 0.7526 0.7592 0.7494 
AIC 35.52 34.18 36.02 36.66 
  
  For the robustness of our results we report the estimation results in Table 3 by taking 
CBI indexes lagged by one decade, i.e. the CBI indexes of the 1970s (see Cukierman 
et al 1992 for the data). For brevity we report only the results of the CBI variables 
which are found to be significant in Table 1.  
   As we can see, the results are much the same as in Table 1. The parameter with the 
aggregated CBI is still significant with the negative sign and with the similar 
significance level. The parameters with the CBI in connection with CEO’s office-
term, in connection with setting the maturity period of loans to the government and/or 
public entities, and in connection with setting interest rate on the loans are still 
significant with the similar significance levels and signs as found in Table 1. Thus we 
conclude that the empirical findings we have established with the CBI variables for 
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their effects on banking crisis are not muddled because of the reverse causality 
problem. 
      
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The major duty of a country’s central bank (CB) is to maintain the price stability. 
However, in doing so it faces many other financial tasks, such as bailing out insolvent 
banks and publicly-owned enterprises, managing the government’s financial 
transactions, financing the budget deficit with the issuance of money, and financing 
the government’s development projects. Hence, the role of a CB has an impact not 
only on price stability, but also on the stability of the whole financial market to a great 
extent. However, not all CBs are equally empowered to perform this role. At this 
point the open question is how the empowerment of CB affects a country’s financial 
market and thus the banking sector stability. This paper aims to empirically test the 
effect of CB’s empowerment on banking sector stability by using a dataset of 54 
countries. 
   This study finds that the CB’s autonomy in aggregate reduces the likelihood of a 
banking crisis. CB’s empowerment disentangled on the basis of its duties is also 
tested. CB’s autonomy with regard to the chief executive officer’s duration in office 
and autonomy to assign interest rate on government loans are necessary factors in 
reducing the likelihood of banking crisis.  
   There are some logical explanations for the negative relation of CB autonomy with 
banking sector’s instability. Firstly, a more autonomous CB can use its instrument of 
bailing out the insolvent banks more efficiently for the stability of banking sector. 
There are some reasons to believe this. The government or the executive body is 
usually formed of political party. Hence the government can force a CB to act in favor 
of its time inconstant policies even at the expense of banking sector stability. It can 
force the CB to bail out a bank because the bank-owner has influential role on the 
government’s political party. It can also ask the CB not to close down insolvent banks 
so as not to loose the popularity among voters, and thus to be re-elected in the office. 
At this end, a more autonomous CB is in a better position to avoid the pursuit of such 
time-inconsistent decisions of the government (Mishkin 2000), and thus maintains the 
banking sector stability.  
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   Secondly, a more empowered CB can influence banking sector stability simply by 
exercising its power, e.g., in setting interest rate on loans to the government and 
public entities. A more powered CB sets higher interests rates on the loans relative to 
the market rates. As the interest rate on government loans gets higher, the 
reimbursement pressure of the interest rate loss (i.e. the difference between the 
interest rate to the depositors and the interest rate on the government loans) from the 
banking sector gets lower. Thus the vulnerability of the banking sector would be 
reduced, reducing the probability of banking crisis.  
   Thirdly, an empowered CB can influence the banking sector stability by its money 
issuance authority, e.g., to finance government’s budget deficit which is very often 
resulted because of inefficient public expenditure. A CB with greater autonomy is 
more capable to tackle inefficient public expenditure (Doi, 1998). Through its 
controlling the inefficient public expenditure, the CB can reduce the burden that 
would otherwise be imposed on the commercial banks for the reimbursement, and 
thus helps maintaining the banking sector stability. 
   Fourthly, a CB can influence the banking sector stability with its commitment to the 
general public especially the depositors to defend the monetary regime. However, the 
credibility of this commitment depends on how self-dependently the CB can perform 
its duties. Lack of autonomy in a CB leads to loss in confidence on its capability to 
uphold its pledge to safeguard the nominal regime (Blejer and Schumacher 1998, p.4). 
Thus, the more independent a CB is from the executive branch, the more capable it is 
to uphold its pledge to safeguard the nominal regime, the more credible is its 
commitment to the economic agents, the less panicked the depositors are to any 
financial shock, and the less unstable is the banking sector. 
   This study also finds that an autonomous CB can perform its duties more effectively 
to reduce the banking sector instability when the country’s law and order condition is 
stronger. Especially, CB autonomy, as justified by the autonomy in designing the 
lending-terms on loans to the government and the public entities, would not be useful 
in reducing the banking sector instability unless the country’s law and order condition 
is improved enough. 
   The study has some limitations, however. The data on the CB autonomy are 
aggregated by decades. Hence, the probability of banking crisis in a country is 
estimated for the decade we have included in the sample. The study could have been 
more realistic if the data on CB autonomy had been available on yearly basis. 
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Furthermore, data on CB autonomy are not available for a large number of countries, 
neither are the data of the sample countries for the latest decade (e.g. 1990s). Given 
the availability of the said data, the estimation result would be more realistic.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Cross-country data of CB’s autonomy and systemic banking crises in the 
1980s 
Country 
Bank-
Crisis, 
Yes=1 
CEO’s 
Office-
Term 
Appointing 
CEO 
 
Dismiss-
CEO 
CEO’s 
Other-
Office 
Formulate-
Monetary-
Policy 
Conflict-
Resolution Objectives  
Argentina 1 0.25 0.25 0.83 1 0.33 0 0.4 
Australia 0 0.75 0 0.83 1 0.33 0.2 0.4 
Austria 0 0.5 0 0.83 1 1 0.6 0.6 
Bolivia 1 0 0 0.83 1 0.67 0.2 0.6 
Botswana 0 0.5 0 0.83 0.5 n.a. 0 0.2 
Brazil 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.33 n.a. 0 
Canada 0 0.75 0.75 0.83 1 0.33 0.2 0.2 
Chile 1 0.5 0 0.83 0.5 0.67 0.2 0.8 
Colombia 1 0 0.75 0.83 0 0 0.2 0 
Costa Rica 1 n.a. 1 0.67 1 n.a. n.a. 0.6 
Denmark 0 0 0 0.33 0 n.a. 1 0.6 
Egypt 1 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.33 0 0.6 
Ethiopia 0 0 0.25 0 0 n.a. 1 0 
Finland 0 1 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 0.8 
France 0 0 0.25 1 0.25 0.67 0.6 0 
German 0 1 0.75 1 0 0.67 1 1 
Greece 0 0.25 0.75 0.67 0.5 0.33 0.6 0.8 
Honduras 0 0.75 0 0.83 1 0.33 1 0 
Hungary 0 0.5 0.25 1 0 0.33 0 0.4 
Iceland 0 1 0.75 0.83 0.5 0.33 0.2 0.4 
India 0 0.5 0.25 0.83 0.5 n.a. 0 0.4 
Ireland 0 0.75 0.5 0.83 1 n.a. n.a. 0.8 
Italy 0 0 0.75 0.67 1 n.a. n.a. 0.2 
Japan 0 0.5 0.25 0.83 0.5 0.67 0 0 
Kenya 1 0.25 0 0.83 0.5 n.a. 0.2 0.4 
Korea 0 0.25 0.25 0.83 0.5 0.33 n.a. 0.6 
Malaysia 0 0.5 0 0.83 0 0 0.2 0.6 
Mexico 1 n.a. 1 0.83 1 0.67 0.2 0 
Morocco 1 n.a. 0.25 0 0 n.a. n.a. 0.2 
Nepal 1 0.5 0.25 0 0 n.a. 0 0.2 
Netherland 0 0.75 0 0.17 1 0.33 0.2 0.8 
New Zealand 0 0.5 0 0.83 1 0 0 0.4 
Nigeria 0 0.5 0 0.83 0.5 0.33 0.2 0.6 
Norway 1 0.75 0 0.33 1 0.33 0.2 0 
Pakistan 0 0.5 0.25 0.83 0.5 0 0 0.4 
Panama 1 n.a. 0.25 0.83 1 0.33 0 0.4 
Peru 1 0 1 0.83 1 0.67 0.2 0.4 
Philippines 1 0.75 0 0.83 0.5 0.67 0.2 1 
Poland 0 0.5 0.25 0 0 0.67 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0.25 1 0 0.33 0.6 0 
Qatar 0 0.5 0.25 0.83 0.5 0.33 0 0.4 
Singapore 0 0.25 0 0.83 0 n.a. n.a. 0.6 
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South Africa R.. 0 0.5 0 0.83 0.5 n.a. n.a. 0.2 
Spain 1 0.25 0 0 1 0.33 0 0.6 
Sweden 0 0 1 n.a. 0.5 n.a. n.a. 0.2 
Switzerland 0 0.75 0.25 n.a. 1 n.a. 1 0 
Thailand 1 0.25 0.5 0 0 0 0.2 0.6 
Uganda 0 0.5 0.5 0.83 0.5 0 0.2 0.4 
UK 0 0.5 0 0.83 1 0 0 0.2 
Uruguay 1 0.25 0.25 0.83 0 0.67 0.2 0.4 
USA 0 0.25 0.5 0 1 n.a. 0.2 0.4 
Venezuela 0 0.5 0 0.83 0.5 0.33 1 0.4 
Zaire 0 0.5 0 1 1 0.67 0.6 0.4 
Zimbabwe 0 0.75 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 
 
 (Table A1 continued) 
Country 
Advances-
Lending 
Securitized-
Lending 
Lending-
Terms 
Potential-
Borrowers 
Lending-
Amounts 
Loan-
Maturity 
Loans’ 
Interest-
rate 
Aggregated-
CBI 
Argentina 0.33 0.33 0.33 1 0.33 1 0.5 0.4 
Australia 0.33 0 0.33 0 n.a. 0.67 1 0.36 
Austria 1 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 1 1 0.61 
Bolivia 0.33 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 0.3 
Botswana 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.33 
Brazil 0.67 0 0 1 n.a. 0 0.25 0.21 
Canada 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.45 
Chile 0.33 0.33 0.67 1 n.a. 0 0.25 0.46 
Colombia 0.67 0 0.33 0 0.67 0.67 0.25 0.27 
Costa Rica 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0.67 0.25 0.47 
Denmark 1 0.33 0.67 0 n.a. 1 0.25 0.5 
Egypt 0.67 0.67 0.33 1 0.67 0.67 0.25 0.49 
Ethiopia 0.33 0.33 0.67 1 0.33 0.67 0.5 0.4 
Finland 0 0 0.67 n.a. n.a. 0 0.25 0.28 
France 0 0 0.33 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.24 
German 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 1 1 0.25 0.69 
Greece 0.67 0.67 0.33 0 1 1 0.75 0.55 
Honduras n.a. 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.25 0.43 
Hungary 0 0 0 0.33 1 0.67 1 0.24 
Iceland 0 0 0.33 1 n.a. 0.33 0.25 0.34 
India 0.33 0 0.67 0.33 1 0.33 0.25 0.34 
Ireland n.a. 0 0.33 0.33 n.a. 0.67 0.75 0.44 
Italy 0.33 0 0.33 n.a. 0 0 0.25 0.25 
Japan 0 0 0.33 n.a. n.a. 0 0.25 0.18 
Kenya 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 1 0.67 0.75 0.44 
Korea 0 0 0.33 0 n.a. 0.67 0.25 0.27 
Malaysia 0.33 n.a. 0.67 0 0.33 0.67 0.25 0.36 
Mexico 0 0 0.33 1 n.a. 0.67 0.25 0.34 
Morocco 0.33 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.25 0.14 
Nepal 0 0 0.33 1 n.a. 0.67 0.25 0.18 
Netherland 0.67 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.42 
New Zealand 0 0 0 1 n.a. 0 0.5 0.24 
Nigeria 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.37 
Norway 0 0 0 0 n.a. 0.67 0.5 0.17 
Pakistan 0 0 0 0.33 n.a. 0.67 0.25 0.21 
Panama 0 0 0 0 n.a. 0 0.25 0.22 
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Peru 0 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 1 0.25 0.43 
Philippines 0.33 0 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.43 
Poland 0 0 0.33 0 n.a. 0 0.25 0.1 
Portugal 0.67 0.67 0.67 0 1 1 0.25 0.41 
Qatar 0 0 0 0.33 n.a. 0 0.25 0.2 
Singapore n.a. n.a. 0.33 0 n.a. 1 0.25 0.29 
South Africa R. 0 0 0.33 1 n.a. 1 0.25 0.25 
Spain 0.33 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0.23 
Sweden 0.33 0 0.67 0 1 0.67 0.25 0.29 
Switzerland 1 n.a. 1 1 n.a. 1 0.25 0.64 
Thailand 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 0 0.67 0.25 0.27 
Uganda 0.33 n.a. 0.33 0.33 0.33 1 0.75 0.38 
UK 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 0.27 
Uruguay 0 0 0.67 0 n.a. 0 0.25 0.24 
USA 1 0.33 0.33 1 n.a. 1 0.25 0.48 
Venezuela 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.33 0 0.5 0.43 
Zaire 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.43 
Zimbabwe 0.33 0.33 0 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.2 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Formulation of the control variables and their data sources  
Variables (the name used)               Definition  Sources  
Growth rate of GDP (GDP-growth) = {(Gt – Gt-1)/Gt-1}*100, Gt = g/p at time t, where g = yearly GDP at current price, p = 
consumer price index
37
 
IFS  
Terms of trade change (Tot-
change) 
={(Tt – Tt-1)/Tt-1}*100, Tt = Et/It at time t, where Et and It is the total export value and 
import value of merchandise at time t respectively 
IFS  
Inflation rate (Inflation) = {(pt – pt-1)/pt-1}*100, where p = consumer price index IFS 
Depreciation rate (Depreciation) = {(Dt – Dt-1)/Dt-1}*100, Dt = exchange rate (national currency per SDR) at time t (period 
average). 
IFS 
Real interest rate (Real-interest) = d – i, where d = central bank discount rate (or nominal deposit rate, money market rate, 
treasury bill rate, govt. bond rate, saving rate, lending rate if the previous one is not 
available) and i = contemporaneous rate of inflation 
IFS 
Ratio of M2 to foreign exchange 
reserves (M2/reserves) 
= (M2/F), where M2 = broad money and is drawn from line 34 + the quasi-money in line 
35 in IFS and F = foreign exchange reserves (both converted to national currency) 
IFS 
Rate of growth of real private 
domestic credit (Credit-growth) 
= {(PVTCt – PVTCt-1)/PVTCt-1 and PVTCt  = (total domestic-credit used by private 
sectors) /( consumer price index) at time t 
IFS 
Per capita GDP (GDP/capita) Ratio of GDP (in US Dollar)  to total population IFS 
Law and order tradition (Law-&-
order) 
Higher scores indicate sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions 
for an orderly succession of power.  Lower scores indicate a tradition of reliance on 
physical force or illegal means to settle claims and after changes in government, new 
leaders may be less likely to accept the commitments of the previous regime. 
ICRG 
IFS = International Financial Statistics; ICRG = International Country Risk Guide 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
GDP deflator can be used in order to obtain the real GDP value. However, in our data source GDP 
deflator values are missing for many of the sample countries. 
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Table A3. The relationship between banking crises and the autonomy of the CB (the 
sample excludes Nepal)  
 
Dep.Var = Bank crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Average GDP-growth -0.485*** 
(0.181) 
-0.404* 
(0.226) 
-0.505** 
(0.208) 
-0.367** 
(0.181) 
-0.643*** 
(0.221) 
Average Tot-change -13.157*** 
(3.934) 
-8.151*** 
(2.657) 
-10.882** 
(4.309) 
-10.747** 
(4.807) 
-10.129*** 
(3.807) 
Average Inflation -0.122 
(0.113) 
-0.021 
(0.136) 
-0.037 
(0.056) 
0.004 
(0.072) 
-0.058 
(0.051) 
Average Real-interest -0.300** 
(0.132) 
-0.342* 
(0.207) 
-0.178** 
(0.070) 
-0.218** 
(0.100) 
-0.211** 
(0.093) 
Average Depreciation 0.132 
(0.092) 
0.001 
(0.146) 
0.044 
(0.052) 
0.013 
(0.071) 
0.053 
(0.048) 
Average M2/reserves -0.524*** 
(0.163) 
-0.368*** 
(0.107) 
-0.404*** 
(0.133) 
-0.416*** 
(0.131) 
-0.383*** 
(0.114) 
Average Credit-
growtht-2 
0.292*** 
(0.114) 
0.320** 
(0.140) 
0.271** 
(0.114) 
0.230** 
(0.103) 
0.262*** 
(0.093) 
Average GDP/capita -0.444 
(0.311) 
-0.186 
(0.210) 
-0.371 
(0.325) 
-0.367 
(0.310) 
-0.378 
(0.324) 
Aggregated-CBI -13.915** 
(6.052)     
CBI on CEO’s office-
term  
-4.387** 
(2.068)    
CBI on appointing 
CEO   
0.736 
(1.576)  
 
CBI on lending terms 
 
 
 
-3.933 
(3.142) 
 
CBI on loans’ interest-
rate 
   
 
-4.197** 
(2.070) 
Constant 20.167*** 
(4.902) 
10.049*** 
(3.549) 
12.625*** 
(4.737) 
13.251*** 
(4.862) 
14.506*** 
(5.305) 
No. of Observations 53 49 53 53 52 
Log likelihood -7.77 -7.05 -8.58 -8.26 -8.01 
Wald chi2 29.33 31.62 25.08 30.1 31.21 
Prob > chi2 0.0006 0.0002 0.0029 0.0004 0.0003 
Pseudo R2 0.7607 0.7414 0.7356 0.7454 0.7505 
AIC 35.54 34.1 37.16 36.52 36.02 
***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance  
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Table-A4. Sample compositions 
 
Regressions 1, 3, 
4 & 9 of Table 1 
All countries reported in Table A1 
Regression 2 of 
Table 1 
All countries reported in Table A1 except Costa Rica, Mexico, Morocco and Panama. 
Regression 5 of 
Table 1 
All countries reported in Table A1 except Botswana, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Ireland, 
Italy, Kenya, Morocco, Nepal, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA. 
Regression 6 of 
Table 1 
All countries reported in Table A1 except Brazil, Costa Rica, Ireland, Italy, Korea Rep., Morocco, Singapore, 
South Africa, and Sweden. 
Regression 7 of 
Table 1 
All countries reported in Table A1 except Honduras, Ireland, and Singapore. 
Regression 8 of 
Table 1 
All countries reported in Table A1 except Malaysia, Singapore, Switzerland, and Uganda. 
Regression 10 & 
11 of Table 1 
All countries reported in Table A1 except France 
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Abstract 
 
The costs of long-lasting banking crises are high because both the depositors and the 
investors lose confidence in the banking system. For a rapid recovery of the crisis, the 
government very often undertakes one or more crisis resolution policy (CRP) 
measures. Existing studies have paid little attention to the CRP and other explanatory 
variables correlated with the durations of banking crises. This study examines such 
explanatory variables. The major finding is that the CRP measure allowing the 
regulation forbearance to keep the insolvent banks operative and the public debt 
relief program are respectively strongly and weakly significant to increase the 
durations of crises. Some other explanatory variables, which were found by previous 
studies to be related with the probability of crises to occur, are also correlated with 
the durations of crises. 
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1. Introduction  
 
This paper examines different explanatory variables related to the durations of 
banking crises. An economy is affected not only by the occurrence of banking crisis, 
but also by the long duration of crisis. A long crisis-spell can have costly 
repercussions on the real economy and that costs can be large and difficult to measure. 
For example, due to a longer crisis-spell, both the domestic depositors and the 
investors lose confidence in the banking system and move their funds abroad. To 
address this problem the government needs to find credit outside the domestic source, 
e.g. from the IMF or the World Bank, but at a high cost.
38
 The government can also 
attract the inflow of international private capital – e.g. foreign direct investment 
(FDI), portfolio equity and debt flows. However, this attempt can also be rather 
costly, because the more distressed the country’s banking system is, the tougher the 
terms and conditions imposed by the foreign creditors or investors.
39
 
   It is thus of the utmost importance to shield the economy from paying such a high 
price for a long crisis-spell. We attempt to find empirically the possible explanatory 
variables correlated with the length of crises. We mostly highlight the crisis resolution 
policy (CRP henceforth) measures which are usually undertaken right after the 
banking crises take place. To date there is no study which sheds light on the relation 
between CRP measures and the durations of crises. Briefly the CRP measures are (1) 
a blanket guarantee to all creditors and depositors, (2) an open-ended and extended 
liquidity support to all weak financial institutions, (3) forbearance of any banking 
regulations, (4) recapitalization or repeated recapitalization of weak or failed banks, 
(5) public debt relief program for bank borrowers to facilitate repayment of their 
debts, and (6) setting up a centralized Asset Management Company.
40
  
   For an early recovery of crises, the authorities can be strict with the existing banking 
regulation, or can take one or more CRP measures which would breach the existing 
                                                 
38
 There are studies that support the assumptions that loan from the IMF or the World Bank is 
becoming more and more costly. 
39
 Portfolio equity and debt flows were subject to large reversals during the 1997-98 global financial 
crises (Dadush et al 2000 and Lipsey 2001). It is natural for the countries affected by the crises to face 
tougher terms and conditions in order to regain such private capital flows. On the other hand, Loungani 
and Razin (2001) follow that FDI is not only a transfer of ownership from the domestic to the foreign 
residents, but also a mechanism that makes it possible for the foreign investors to exercise the 
management and control over the host country firms. 
40
 See Honohan and Klingebiel (2000 and 2003) and Das and Quintyn (2002) for details.  
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bank regulation. Although different CRP measures are enacted to shorten the 
durations of crises, in practice they may not do so. The reason is that most of the 
measures relax the existing banking regulations and the bank managements can use 
the relaxed regulations for some inappropriate advantages. In addition, they may not 
be fully market-oriented and very often the outcomes of using such measures are 
unknown or unpredictable. Most of the CRP measures are found to be positively and 
significantly related with the costs of banking crises (see Honohan and Klingebiel 
2003). On the other hand, the costs of banking crises are found to be positively, 
although not statistically significant, related with the length of banking crises (see 
Frydl 1999). Thus our research question is “do the CRP measures increase (or 
decrease) the lengths of crises as well?”  
   However, it is very difficult for a government not to take any CRP measures once 
the country is clutched by systemic banking crisis. Almost all of the banking crises in 
our dataset, for which the information of CRP measures’ use are available, include at 
least one of the CRP measures. Hence, our aim is to see which of the CRP measures 
are associated with longer crisis-spells in comparison with the other CRP measures 
used.  
   Explanatory variables other than the CRP measures may also cause a crisis-spell to 
be long. This study examines these explanatory variables as well. The variables 
included in this test are those examined by earlier studies as being the causes of 
banking crises to occur and of the costs of crises (see for instance Demirguc-kunt and 
Detragiache 1999, 2002 and 2005; DKD stands for Demirguc-kunt and Detragiache 
henceforth). Some, but not all, of these explanatory variables have already been tested 
and found to be associated with the durations of banking crises (see Abderrezak 
2000).
41
         
   We use a duration estimation model.
42
 The data on the durations of crises are yearly 
and for the period of 1977-2003. The data come from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). 
Both the industrialized and the developing countries are included in the sample. 
Applying Honohan and Klingebiel (2000), we obtain the data on the durations of 
crises with CRP measures for 35 crisis episodes. The data for most of the explanatory 
                                                 
41
 Abderrezak (2000) estimates a duration model by using monthly data on 32 international banking 
crises. The study finds that the back-dated financial sector reforms and the government fiscal deficits 
are the major factors associated with long lasting banking crises. 
42
 Certain episodes of the sample are incomplete. A duration estimation model is able to produce robust 
result since it takes into account the censoring problem caused by incomplete spells 
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variables other than the CRP measures come from IFS (International Financial 
Statistics).
43
 
   Amongst the CRP measures used, we find that the regulation forbearance in order to 
keep the insolvent banks open enlarge at a strong significance level the durations of 
crises relative to the use of other CRP measures. The reason could be that this 
forbearance allows the bank managements of the insolvent banks to play undue role 
for the personal benefit on their own, i.e. the moral hazard problem. This problem 
may deteriorate the already distressed banking system, enlarging the crisis-spell. 
Besides, the managements of the solvent banks may also take the advantage of the 
forbearance by signifying themselves as insolvents. 
   Like the regulation forbearance to keep the insolvent banks open, the CRP measure 
to relieve the borrowers at wider scale from paying their debts back also enlarges (at 
weak significance level) the durations of crises. The possible reason is again the moral 
hazard problem among the bank managements. To be more precise, the bank 
managements may classify the borrowers, who wouldn’t otherwise be benefited from 
this debt relief program, in return of unjustified personal benefits. This classification 
may worsen the already distressed banking system.  
   The other CRP measures are not found statistically significant to be associated with 
the enlarged durations of banking crises. Some of them even have different signs of 
relationship.   
   To check the reverse causality, an instrumental variable estimation approach is used 
to purge the endogenous components of the CRP measures. We find that the purged 
CRP measures (i.e. the predicted values of CRP measures) have the similar impacts 
on the durations of crises like the impacts of the real CRP measures.    
   Amongst the explanatory variables other than the CRP measures, we find that some 
but not all are related with the durations of crises in a fashion similar to how they are 
related with the occurrences or the costs of crises. Specifically, a crisis lasts longer 
when it begins during a period of higher real interest rates, or with the banking sector 
having larger exposure to private sector borrowers, or in the presence of deposit 
insurance scheme (DIS). All these three explanatory variables are found by DKD 
(1999, 2005 and 2002) to increase the probability of banking crisis to occur. 
According to DKD (1999), these factors also increase the costs of banking crises. 
                                                 
43
 The data on deposit insurance scheme (DIS) come from Garcia (1999), McCarthy (1980), Talley and 
Mas (1990), De Lange (1992), and Kyei (1995).    
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   On the other hand, a crisis is found to be short, i.e. recovery is faster, if it begins 
with a lagged (by two years) growth of real domestic credits in the private sector. It is 
also short if it begins during a period of high liquidity shortage of banks in proportion 
to the banks’ total assets. Finally, like Abderrezak (2000) we also find that the 
probability of a crisis-exit increases by itself as the crisis gets older. 
   This paper is structured as follows. Section two briefly analyzes the theoretical 
views about the potential sources of long-lasting crises. Section three explains the 
dataset and the measurement of different variables. Descriptive statistics of the 
durations of crises in conjunction with the CRP measures present or absent, the 
required estimation model, estimation results, and the robustness of the results are 
illustrated in section four. Section five concludes. 
 
 
 
 
2. Theoretical discussions and the hypothesis  
 
Crises resolution policy (CRP) measures and the long-lasting crises          
With the aim of minimizing the possible fiscal and financial costs resulting from a 
long-lasting crisis, governments usually step in to deter the continuation of the 
panicking stage of a crisis first and then to rehabilitate and restructure the distressed 
banking sector. They may or may not enact any kind of CRP measures. There are 
different kinds of CRP measures, but the theoretical literature which analyses the CRP 
measures in details is lacking. Following Honohan and Klingebiel (2000; HK stands 
for Honohan and Klingebiel henceforth) and Das and Quintyn (2002), we can develop 
the following conception on different CRP measures. 
    The government can maintain a strict policy instead of enacting any CRP measures. 
This strict policy choice usually encompasses decisive action without hasty or 
unexpected measures. The strict policy regulation is usually stringent – e.g. 
discontinue the operation of a failed bank immediately without any opportunity for 
the failed bank to continue. On the other hand, the government may enact some CRP 
measures that relax the existing banking regulation, with the aim to ensure that other 
healthy banks are not contagiously affected or to prevent depositors of both insolvent 
and solvent banks from panicking.  
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    CRP measures can be classified into two phases – the containment phase, and the 
rehabilitation and restructuring phase. The containment phase, usually short-termed 
and occurs at the panicking stage of a crisis. During this phase the government enacts 
the CRP measures with the aim of restoring public confidence in the banking system 
and thus minimizing the costly economical repercussion. However, instead of this 
costly repercussion minimized, the cost can rather increase as the beneficiary groups, 
e.g. the banks, can take advantage of the CRP measures. To be more specific, the CRP 
measures included in this phase and the possible effects of using these measures are as 
follows: 
 
• Blanket guarantee. Under a blanket guarantee the government usually provides a 
guarantee to all financial institutions regardless of whether they are solvent or 
insolvent. However, there is a real possibility of an adverse effect, in which such 
guarantee may reduce the incentive of the creditors to monitor their financial 
institutions. In addition, having failed on their own, the management of the 
institutions may gamble for resurrection. For instance, being aware of the 
government guarantee, the bank management may be more careless with funds 
already allocated. They may even attempt a private settlement with the loss-
making borrowers which would benefit both of them causing a more destabilized 
banking system. However, arguments in favour of this measure state that a short-
term timely guarantee can protect the economy from much greater fiscal and 
economic costs. These costs can result from widespread panic triggered by the 
closing of few banks. 
• Open-ended, extensive liquidity support. This is another CRP measure to limit the 
panicking stage of a crisis in a shorter time span. The government may have 
difficulties in identifying the failed banks. In this case, they can provide liquidity 
support which is unrestricted to both the solvent and the insolvent financial 
institutions. The critiques of this option find that in applying this measure the 
government delay recognition of the crisis. It avoids intervention in already failed 
banks and this measure may instead worsen the problem. The reason is it merely 
provides more funding to nonviable borrowers and allows the management of the 
financial institutions to engage in the misappropriation of funds. 
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During the restructuring and rehabilitation phase, the aim of a government in enacting 
CRP measures is to restore the capital position of the banking institutions, and to 
recover the bad assets. However, like the CRP measures of the containment phase, 
there could be bad consequence on the already destabilized banking sector of using 
any CRP measures of this phase. The CRP measures with the possible effects are as 
follows:  
  
• Regulation forbearance. The government may try to rehabilitate the failed 
financial institutions by allowing the regulation forbearance instead of the strict 
application of prudential banking regulations. The forbearance of banking 
regulations implies a degree of lenience towards banks. The most accommodating 
forbearance allows the banks generally known to be insolvent to remain open. The 
medium level forbearance can be characterized by government’s allowing a 
severely under-capitalized bank to remain open for an extended period. There is 
also a lesser level of forbearance that includes, e.g., i) a temporary relaxation of 
other regulations – e.g. loan classification and loan loss provisioning 
requirements; ii) over looking violations of laws, standards and regulations by 
either individual banks or the entire banking system; iii) rapid business 
deregulation on banking, designing to introduce new profit opportunities to weak 
banks by permitting them to engage in non-traditional banking businesses such as 
securities trading, investment banking, credit card and travel services. 
   One of the purposes of such forbearance is to protect bank customers from the 
disruption of financial services that may result from widespread suspension or 
bank closure. However, it may generate an apparent contradiction which involves 
relaxation of requirements just when they need the opposite, i.e., the stringent 
action. The management of financial institutions may misuse this forbearance in 
the similar manner of gambling for resurrection. 
• Recapitalization of financial institutions. The government may implement a 
recapitalization program. Under this programme, insolvent or marginally solvent 
financial institutions are bailed out through immediate recapitalization supported 
by the government. With this measure the government aims to restore the 
solvency of these institutions. If needed, the recapitalization may be repeated. 
However, with recapitalization there might be a greater risk of moral hazard. The 
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cost of implementing such a programme is that the bank management in the hope 
of being bailed out may be careless in collecting their allocated loans. At the same 
time, borrower may have less incentive to repay loans. The argument in favour of 
this program is that this type of recapitalization constitutes only a part of the 
magnitude of costs compared to the fiscal pressure that can result from immediate 
recognition of the complete need for additional capital. 
• Public debt relief programs. The government may also implement a public debt 
relief program. With this program, the government targets assistance to the 
borrowers of the financial institutions, not the financial institutions through their 
management. The government undertakes this measure to relieve borrowers from 
their public debt obligations. Since the direct assistance to bank management is 
bypassed, the opportunity of the gambling for resurrection is relatively smaller 
with this measure than the other CRPs. However, if the program is open-ended, 
there is the danger that it will attract the borrowers who would not be able to pay 
off even in good times. 
• Asset Management Company (AMC). The government has two choices for asset 
resolution strategies: i) a centralized AMC under which there is a government 
agency with full responsibility for acquiring, restructuring, and selling assets; ii) a 
decentralized approach under which the banks themselves are responsible for 
managing their own non-performing assets. There are a number of setbacks to 
using a centralized AMC effectively. For instance, 1) there might be difficulties to 
avoid political pressure, especially if political entities hold a large portion of 
corporate claims; 2) transfer of loans to a centralized AMC may break the link 
between banks and corporations, which can create problems for banks’ as they 
lose privileged access to corporate information. Arguments in favour of the 
centralized AMC are: 1) such a centralization promotes the consolidation of skills 
and resources; 2) supervising and monitoring of asset management tasks become 
easier; and 3) more control over debtors resulted by consolidated claims, and 
severed perverse linkages between banks and corporations may ultimately 
facilitate better collection of loans.
44
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 Besides HK (2000) and Das and Quintyn (2002), Klingebiel (2000) and Scott (2002) have also found 
similar advantages and disadvantages of using a centralized AMC. 
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Main hypothesis 
 
The empirical part of this paper will clarify the effect of using any CRP measures on 
durations of banking crises. Based on the above discussions about different CRP 
measures we assume that the use of any such measures increases the durations of 
banking crises. However, almost all of the banking crisis-episodes with the 
information of CRP measures used in our data set include some CRP measures. In this 
perspective, we are limited to test whether the uses of any CRP measure during crises 
causes the crises to last longer relative to the crises where the measure is not used. 
Specifically, the hypothesis we are going to work with is as follows,    
 
• Given other factors remaining the same, the use of any CRP measure cause a 
banking crisis to last longer than the crisis lasts if the measure not used. 
 
Testing the hypothesis for all the mentioned CRP measures will reveal a CRP 
measure’s effectiveness in terms of crises’ durations relative to the other CRP 
measures in use. 
 
Other explanatory variables  
Explanatory variables other than the CRP measures may also affect the lengths of 
crises. We attempt to determine these explanatory variables as well. Another purpose 
to determine these variables is to use them as the control variables when we test the 
relationship between the CRP measures and the durations of crises. We choose these 
variables from a set of explanatory variables applied in different studies as the 
determinants of the occurrences and the costs of banking crises.  
    DKD (1999, 2002 and 2005) use different macroeconomic, financial, and 
institutional variables to test their relationship with the occurrences and the costs of 
crises. The macroeconomic variables are the GDP growth rate, the terms-of-trade 
change, the depreciation rate, the real interest rate, the inflation rate, and the ratio of 
the government budget surplus to GDP. The financial variables are the ratio of liquid 
reserves to total assets of banks, the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves, the ratio 
of domestic credit in the private sector to GDP, and the rate of growth of real 
domestic credit in the private sector. The institutional variable is the use of deposit 
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insurance scheme (DIS) which is explicitly formed. To represent a country’s 
institutional environment, the indicator is the per capita GDP. The detailed theoretical 
views of using these variables are given in DKD (1999).  
   However, Table-1 summarizes the signs of the explanatory variables we expect to 
be related with the dependent variable, the durations of banking crises. We derive the 
expected signs following different theoretical and empirical studies shedding light on 
the relationship between the variables and the vulnerability of banking sector. In the 
table, we also report the key findings of the studies regarding the variables.  
 
Table 1. Expected signs of the explanatory variables other than the CRP measures 
with reference to different studies 
Explanatory variable  Expected 
sign 
Reference and short explanation 
GDP growth rate  -  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Gorton (1988): cyclical output downturns increase banking 
sector problems; DKD (1999, 2002, 2005): -ve relation with occurrence and costs of BC 
Terms of trade 
change 
- Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Gorton (1988): terms of trade deterioration increase 
banking sector problems; DKD (1999): -ve relation with occurrence and costs of BC 
Inflation rate  + Obstfeld (1986): 2. generation theory; Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003): +ve relation with 
CC; DKD (1999, 2005): +ve relation with BC occurrence and its cost.  
Depreciation rate  + Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Valesco (1987): defend exchange rate against speculative 
attack; DKD (1999, 2002): +ve relation with occurrence and costs of BC.  
Real interest rate  + DKD (1999, 2002, 2005): +ve relation with occurrence and costs of BC. 
Govt. budget / GDP - Krugman (1979): 1. generation theory; Abderrezak (2000): -ve relation with BC-length, 
Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003): -ve relation with CC 
Broad  money / foreign 
exchange reserves  
+ Calvo (1998): creates vulnerability to sudden stop; DKD (1999, 2002, 2005): +ve relation 
with occurrence and costs of BC; Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003): + ve relation with CC 
Banks’ cash reserve / 
total asset  
- Wyplosz (2002): indicate soundness of banking sector;  
Claims on private 
sector / GDP  
+ Corsetti et al (1999): measures lending boom; Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003): +ve 
relation with CC; DKD (1999, 2005): +ve relation with occurrence and costs of BC 
Domestic credit 
growth  
+ Krugman (1979): 1. generation theory; Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003): +ve relation 
with CC; DKD (1999): +ve relation with occurrence and costs of BC  
Private domestic 
credit growth 
+ DKD (2002, 2005): +ve relation with occurrence of BC 
The use of explicitly 
formed DIS  
+ Kane (1989): creates incentives for taking excessive risks (moral hazard) by banks; DKD 
(1999, 2002, 2005): +ve relation with occurrence and costs of BC  
GDP per capita - DKD (1999, 2005): +ve relation with occurrence of BC 
NB: BC = banking crises; CC = currency crises; Otherwise mentioned, all the variables in the table 
measured in the year BC begin. 
 
   Note that the proxy variables used to estimate the effect of financial liberalization 
are different in different studies. For example, the growth of real total domestic credit 
is used by DKD (1999) and by Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003); the growth of real 
private domestic credit by DKD (2005 and 2002); and Abderrezak (2000) considers 
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the period between the date of reform for the liberalized financial system and the 
dates of the occurrences of crises
45
. 
    Similar to DKD (2005 and 2002), we use the growth of real private domestic credit 
as the proxy variable of liberalized financial system. In a sense, using this growth is 
more sensible than the growth of real total domestic credit. The reason is that in the 
capitalist economic world the liberalization of a financial system has a stronger 
impact on liberalizing the channel for domestic credits in the private sector than in the 
whole sector. We use the lagged growth (by two years the beginning of crises) to see 
whether the variable has the similar effect on the durations of crises as it has on the 
occurrences or the costs of crises. The growth of real private domestic credit averaged 
over the period of crises last is also used to determine whether the variation in this 
credit growth during the ongoing crises has any relation with the durations of crises. 
 
 
 
3. The data 
 
One of the major problems to study the explaining factors of the durations of banking 
crises is to find a specific standard or decisive factor to determine the durations of 
banking crises. Some studies have attempted to solve this problem. For instance, 
Lindgren et al (1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 2000, and 2003; CK stands 
for Caprio and Klingebiel henceforth) report the durations of crises on the basis of the 
data from financial experts of the crises experienced countries. The dataset we use 
come from CK (2003). The time period of the data is 1977-2003.
46
 The initial year is 
1977 because the crises have been experienced more frequently since then. Our 
sample includes both the developing and the industrialized countries.  
   Centrally planned economies and economies in transition are excluded from the 
sample; because the interrelation between the banking system and the rest of the 
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 The reform date is defined when one or more measures are taken to free a repressed financial system. 
The characteristics of a repressed system corrected or freed are as follows: 1) interest rates become 
free-market determined; 2) government control on capital flows and exchange rates is cancelled; 3) 
barriers to exit for financial institutions and their major clients are eliminated; 4) government sponsored 
programs to guarantee minimum business activities are removed. 
46
 It should be mentioned that we began this paper with the dataset of CK (2000); therefore the dataset 
of all the explanatory variables collected was for the period of 1977 – 1999. However, we updated the 
dataset on the durations of crises from CK (2003) and found 3 additional new crises episodes, i.e. 
Argentina (2001), Turkey (2000) and Uruguay (2002), which started since 2000. These episodes were 
dropped due to the extensive time and effort needed to collect the data on each of the explanatory 
variables. 
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economy in these countries is distinctive from the market economies. Sierra Leone, 
Congo Republic and El Salvador are also omitted, because these countries were 
affected by civil war for most of our study period. Some crises episodes are dropped 
because of non-availability of the data about the ending dates of the crises. Otherwise, 
we take all the crisis-episodes characterized by the so called “systemic banking crises” 
reported in CK (2003). 
    From the detailed crises information reported in CK (2003), we find that at least 
one of the two following conditions holds for most of the systemic crises to take 
place: 1) the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets is 10 percent or more, 2) the 
costs of the rescue operations is at least 2 percent of GDP.
47
 In addition to the 
systemic crises, we also include some non-systemic (sometimes referred as the 
borderline or small scale) crises, as reported by CK (2003). To include these non-
systemic crises, at least one of the two just mentioned conditions needs to hold. All 
together, we obtain 78 crisis-episodes in 64 countries which are reported in Table-2.  
 
Table 2. Countries with banking crises  
Country 
Crisis 
starts 
Dura-
tion Country 
Crisis 
starts 
Dura-
tion Country 
Crisis 
starts 
Dura-
tion Country 
Crisis 
starts 
Dura-
tion 
Algeria 1990 3 Djibouti 1991 3 Kuwait 1980 10 Senegal 1988 4 
Argentina-1 1980 3 Ecuador-1 1980 6 Lebanon 1988 3 Spain 1977 9 
Argentina-2 1989 2 Ecuador-2 1996 7c Madagascar 1988 1 Sri Lanka 1989 5 
Argentina-3 1995 3 Egypt 1980 6 Malaysia-1 1985 4 Swaziland 1995 1 
Australia 1989 4 Equ. Guinea 1983 3 Malaysia-2 1997 6c Sweden 1991 4 
Bangladesh 1986 11 Finland 1991 4 Mali 1987 3 Tanzania 1986 14 
Benin 1988 3 Ghana-1 1982 8 Mauritania 1984 10 Thailand-1 1983 5 
Bolivia 1986 3 Ghana-2 1997 6c Mexico-1 1981 11 Thailand-2 1997 6c 
Brazil-1 1990 1 Guinea-1  1985 1 Mexico-2 1994 4 Togo 1993 3 
Brazil-2 1994 6 Guinea-2 1993 2 Morocco 1980 6 Tunisia 1991 5 
Burkina Faso 1988 7 India 1993 10c Nepal 1988 1 Turkey 1982 4 
Cameroon-1 1987 7 Indonesia-1 1992 3 Nicaragua 1985 12 Uganda 1994 9c 
Cameroon-2 1995 4 Indonesia-2  1997 6c Nigeria 1990 10 USA 1984 8 
Central Afr. 1988 12 Israel 1977 7 Norway 1987 7 Uruguay 1981 4 
Chad 1980 12 Jamaica 1996 7c Panama 1988 2 Venezuela 1994 2 
Chile 1981 3 Japan 1992 11c Paraguay 1995 5 Vietnam 1997 6c 
Columbia 1982 6 Jordan 1989 2 Peru 1983 8 Zambia 1995 1 
CongoD. R.-1 1980 13 Kenya-1 1985 5 Philippines-1 1981 7 Zimbabwe 1995 8c 
Congo D. R.-2 1994 9c Kenya-2 1992 11c Philippines-2 1998 5c    
Cote d'lvoir 1988 4 Korea, Rep. 1997 6c Sao Tome P. 1980 20    
Note: ‘c’ refers to the continuation of crisis (e.g. 6c = duration observed for 6yrs and still continuing). 
The data source is Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).    
                                                 
47
 For the rest of the systemic crises, the conditions that apply include banking sector problems 
resulting in government intervention with measures such as large-scale nationalization of banks, or 
prolonged bank holidays, or closing banks, or merging large number of bank, or that banks with at least 
10% of the total assets insolvent. 
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Table 3. Banking crises along with CRP measures enforced 
Containment phase Rehabilitation and restructuring phase 
Country 
Crisis 
starts 
Dura-
tion 
Blanket 
guaranty 
Open ended, 
extensive liquidity 
supply 
Forbeara
nce-A 
Forbear
ance-B 
Recapitaliza
tion 
Asset Management 
Company 
centralized 
Public debt 
relief program 
Argentina-1 1980 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Argentina-2 1995 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Australia 1989 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Brazil 1994 6 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Chile 1981 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Columbia 1982 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Cote d'lvoir 1988 4 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Ecuador-2 1996 7c 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Egypt 1991 5 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Finland 1991 4 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
France 1994 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Ghana 1982 8 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Indonesia-1 1992 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Indonesia-2 1997 6c 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Japan 1992 11c 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Korea, Rep. 1997 6c 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Malaysia-1 1985 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Malaysia-2 1997 6c 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Mexico 1994 4 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
NewZealand 1987 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 1987 7 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Paraguay 1995 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Philippines-1 1981 5 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Philippines-2 1998 5c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Senegal 1988 4 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Spain 1977 9 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Sri Lanka 1989 5 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Sweden 1991 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Thailand-1 1983 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Thailand-2 1997 6c 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Turkey-1 1982 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey-2 1994 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
USA 1984 8 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Uruguay 1981 4 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Venezuela 1994 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Note: ‘c’ in column 3 refers to the continuation of crisis (e.g. 6c = duration observed for 6yrs and still 
continuing).   
 
    The data on CRP measures are lacking for many of the crisis-episodes reported in 
Table 2. The data with CRP measures are available for 40 crisis-episodes and it comes 
from HK (2000). As the centrally planned and transitional economies are excluded, 
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we obtain the data for 35 crisis-episodes and it is reported in Table 3. All of the 
episodes, except 3, are found to use some CRP measures. 
   Durations of 31 episodes in the table match with the durations of the episodes 
reported in Table 2,
48
 but the remaining four (Egypt-1991, France-1994, New 
Zealand-1987, and Turkey-1994) do not. Nevertheless, these 4 episodes belong to the 
group of “non-systemic banking crises”, as reported by CK (2003).
49
 In Table 3 the 
value “1” implies that the respective CRP measure is in force and “0” implies that it is 
not.  
   We plot a histogram graph (Figure 1) of the crisis-episodes for which the durations 
are complete (28 crisis-episodes). We find that most of the crisis-episodes last for 4 
years. More than 64% of the episodes are within the range of 3-5 years in duration. 
The shortest duration is 1 year and occurred only once. The longest duration is 8 years 
and occurred 3 times.    
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Figure 1. Crisis-episodes with CRP measures for which the durations are complete 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 The beginning and ending years for some of the crises spells are slightly different between CK 
(2003) and HK (2000). In that case, we follow the length reported in CK (2003) because their data are 
more reliable and richer.   
49
 In the regression we use both of the samples with all 35 crises spells and with 31 crises spells. 
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3.2 Measuring the explanatory variables 
 
CRP measures 
All the CRP measures mentioned in section two relax the existing policy regulations 
of a banking system. We use a dummy variable for each of the CRP measures. The 
dummy variable takes the value ‘0’ when the CRP measure to test is absent and it 
takes ‘1’ if the CRP measure is used. 
   The variable “Blanket guaranty” takes the value ‘1’ if in a measure the government 
either issues an explicit guarantee to all depositors, or the market participants are 
implicitly protected from losses through the stipulation that public banks’ market 
share exceeds 75 percent.  
   The variable “Open ended, extensive liquidity supply” takes the value ‘1’ if in a 
measure the government extends liquidity support (often at below-market rate) for 
more than 12 months and the overall support are greater than the total banking capital.  
   The variable “Forbearance-A” takes the value ‘1’ if in a measure the banks are 
permitted to continue operation despite being insolvent.  
   The variable “Forbearance-B” takes the value ‘1’ if in a measure either the variable 
“Forbearance-A” is applied or other bank prudential regulations are suspended, or not 
fully applied.  
   The variable “Recapitalization” takes the value ‘1’ if in a measure the banks are 
recapitalized or repeatedly recapitalized.  
   The variable “Public debt relief program” takes the value ‘1’ if in a measure the 
government implements a broad public debt relief program. This program is for 
corporations or other types of borrowers to facilitate their debt repayments, and it 
includes an exchange rate guarantee program or the rescue of corporations.  
   Finally, the variable “Asset management company” takes the value ‘1’ if in a 
measure the government sets up a centralized asset management company. 
   Formulation of the explanatory variables other than the CRP measures and their data 
sources are reported in Table-4. 
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Table 4. Formulation and data sources of the variables other than the CRP measures 
Variables               Definition                   Sources  
GDP growth rate = {(Gt – Gt-1)/Gt-1}*100, Gt = (yearly GDP at current price) / (consumer 
price index) at time t
50
 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS)  
Terms of trade change ={(Tt – Tt-1)/Tt-1}*100, Tt = (the unit value of export) / (the unit value of imports), at time t IFS  
Inflation rate = {(pt – pt-1)/pt-1}*100, where p = consumer price index IFS 
Depreciation rate = {(Dt – Dt-1)/Dt-1}*100, Dt = exchange rate (national currency per USD) at time t. IFS 
Real interest rate = d – i, where d = nominal deposit rate (or central bank discount rate if deposit rate is 
absent) and i = contemporaneous rate of inflation 
IFS 
M2 / Foreign exchange reserves = (M2/F), where M2 = the broad money and is drawn from line 34 + the quasi-money in 
line 35 in IFS and F = foreign exchange reserves, (both converted into national currency) 
IFS 
Govt. budget surplus / GDP  = (government budget surplus / GDP)*100 IFS 
Private domestic credit / GDP = (Domestic credits to private-sector / GDP)*100; both are computed at current price IFS 
Banks’ cash reserve / Total 
assets 
= (BLR / BTA)*100, where BLR = banks’ liquid reserves; drawn from line 20 of IFS and 
BTA = banks’ total assets; drawn from line-21 + line-22a + line-22d 
IFS 
Private domestic credit growtht-2 = (Ct – Ct-1)/Ct-1; Ct = (total domestic-credits used by the private sectors) / (consumer price 
index), at time t 
IFS 
Average private domestic credit 
growth 
Private domestic credit growth averaged over the crises episodes last, for which the values 
are available. 
IFS 
GDP / Capita Ratio of GDP (in US Dollar)  to total population IFS 
DIS (Deposit insurance scheme) A dummy takes 1 if there used an explicitly formed 
DIS, otherwise 0 
Garcia (1999), McCarthy (1980), Talley 
and Mas (1990), De Lange (1992), and 
Kyei (1995) 
 
Note that the observed values for all the variables, except the private domestic credit 
growth, are taken at the time the crises begin. As mentioned in the table, the observed 
values for one of the variables of private domestic credit growth are lagged by 2 years 
the crises begin and for another the values averaged over the durations of crises.  
 
 
 
4 Empirical analyses 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics: durations of crises and the CRP 
measures 
 
We can analyze the relative effectiveness of the CRP measures by using descriptive 
statistics. In the statistics, we can compare the average duration of crises when a CRP 
is used with the average duration of whole crises. Table-5 below reports the 
descriptive statistics of the durations of crises (i.e. the mean, the minimum, and the 
maximum durations of crises) in conjunction with the CRP measures present or 
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 In order to obtain the real GDP value, GDP deflator can be used. However, in our data source, 
deflator values are missing for many of the sample countries. 
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absent. The numbers reported in the table are derived from the sample of crisis-
episodes with durations complete (28 episodes), while the numbers in the parentheses 
are from the sample with durations both complete and incomplete (35 episodes).  
   The statistics might be different for the sample of crises with durations complete 
from the sample of crises with durations both complete and incomplete. In our case, 
however, they are much the same. Here we mainly focus on analysing the descriptive 
statistics derived from the sample of crises with only the durations complete. The 
average duration of total crises in the sample is 4.57. The measure “Blanket 
guarantee” was enforced (i.e. the variable takes the value ‘1’) in about 46% of the 
cases (from the data of Table-3). The average duration of the crises in this case, 4.62, 
is about the same as the average duration of the total sample crises.  
   The measure “Open ended, extensive liquidity supply” was implemented in about 
57% of the cases. The average duration of crises with this measure present, 5.00, is 
higher than the average duration of the total crises, indicating that the use of liquidity 
support is likely to be associated with longer crises. 
   The measure “Forbearance-A” was applied in about 18% of the cases. The average 
duration of crises with this forbearance present, 6.6, is much higher than the average 
of the total crises. This indicates that the presence of this measure could be associated 
with long-lasting crises. 
 
 
Table 5. Lengths of crises in conjunction with the CRP measures present or absent 
 No. of crises Mean duration 
of crises  
Min Max. 
Total Crises 28 (35) 4.57 (5) 1 (1) 9 (11) 
Blanket guaranty present 13 (18) 4.62 (5.28) 1 (1) 8 (11) 
Blanket guaranty  absent 15 (17) 4.53 (4.70) 2 (2) 9 (9) 
Open ended, extensive liquidity supply 
present 
16 (20) 5.00 (5.45) 2 (2) 9 (11) 
Open ended, extensive liquidity supply 
absent 
12 (15) 4.00 (4.40) 1 (1) 8 (8) 
Forbearance-A present 5 (7) 6.60 (6.57) 4 (4) 8 (8) 
Forbearance-A  absent 23 (28) 4.13 (4.60) 1 (1) 9 (11) 
Forbearance-B present 23 (29) 4.65 (5.13) 1 (1) 9 (11) 
Forbearance-B absent 5 (6) 4.2 (4.33) 3 (3) 6 (6) 
Recapitalization present 3 (7) 4.33 (6.00) 4 (4) 5 (11) 
Recapitalization absent 25 (28) 4.60 (4.75) 1 (1) 9 (9) 
Public debt relief program present 8 (9) 4.87 (5.11) 3 (3) 8 (8) 
Public debt relief program absent 20 (26) 4.45 (4.96) 1 (1) 9 (11) 
Asset Management Company centralized 10 (13) 4.30 (4.69) 2 (2) 7 (7) 
Asset Management Company decentralized 18 (22) 4.72 (5.18) 1 (1) 9 (11) 
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   The measure “Forbearance-B” was used in about 82% of the cases. The average 
duration of crises with this forbearance present, 4.65, is not much different from the 
average of the total crises. That is, initiating this forbearance may not make a 
significant change to the duration of a crisis. 
   The measure “Recapitalization” was used in about 10% of the cases only, which is a 
very low or insignificant use. The average duration of crises with this measure 
present, 4.33, is little lower than the average of the total crises. It is unlikely that this 
measure will produce any significant change on the durations of crises because of the 
very limited use of this measure and the fact that the average duration of crises does 
not differ much from the total’s average. However, there is an exception to this 
measure. When we consider the sample of crises with durations both complete and 
incomplete (given in parenthesis), the statistics is different. The average duration of 
crises in the presence of this measure is then higher than the average of the total. 
   The measure “Public debt relief program” was initiated in about 29% of the cases. 
In its presence the average duration of crises, 4.87, is higher than the average of the 
total. This indicates that the presence of this program could be associated with long-
lasting crises.  
   Finally, the use of centralized “Asset Management Company” is found in about 36% 
of the cases. With this measure present the average duration of crises, 4.3, is lower 
than the average of the total, indicating that a centralized AMC could produce a 
negative association with the durations of crises.  
 
 
 
4.2 Estimation model 
 
Empirical analysts very often begin estimation with the ordinary least square (OLS) 
model. However, there is a problem in using the OLS model in this study. A part of 
the crises in our sample are incomplete and the OLS model does not differentiate 
between the complete and the incomplete crises. In this case estimating the 
explanatory variables associated with the durations of crises using the OLS model will 
not give us the robust results. One way to circumvent this problem is to use OLS 
model taking the sample of crises with durations only complete, but this reduces the 
sample size. Another option is to use a duration estimation model, in which the crises 
with durations incomplete do not need to be dropped out.  
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   A duration model confirms the robustness of the results by taking into account the 
censoring problems resulted from crises with ongoing durations. We have the right, 
but no left, censoring problems, because the durations of some crises in our sample 
did not end within the study period.
51
 Still the question of using the duration model 
could arise since we use annual data. Duration models using annual data, however, 
have been estimated by e.g. Miranda (2006) and Mata and Portugal (1994).
52
 A brief 
analysis of a duration model, much of which is developed from Kiefer (1988), is as 
follows. 
   Hazard function, 
 
(t), describes the probability that a switch will occur conditional 
on the spell surviving through time t. When λ(t) increases in t, the hazard function is 
said to exhibit positive duration dependence and the opposite occurs when λ(t) 
decreases in t. Hazard function is defined as follows, 
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Where T refers to the duration of a spell, t to the realization of T of the spell, S(t) the 
survival function
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 and f(t) the density function of the spell. 
   The frequently used model for adjusting survival functions for the effects of 
covariates is the proportional hazard model. In the proportional hazard model, the 
concomitant covariates have a multiplicative effect on the hazard function 
 
       (t, x,  , ) = (x´) 0(t,).    
 
0(t, ) is called the baseline hazard corresponding to (.) = 1. A popular choice is to 
let (x´) = exp(x´). The hazard, when all covariates are zero, is actually equal to 
0(t, )exp(0). That is, the intercept term serves to scale the baseline hazard. The 
function 0(t, ) may be left unspecified in which case Cox proportional hazard model 
is used. It may take a specific parametric form as well. There are two well-known 
distributions, exponential and Weibull, for the specific parametric form. If we let 0(t, 
                                                 
51
 The problem is left censoring if the ending date of a spell is within the sample period but not the 
starting date, while it is right censoring if the starting date is within but not the ending date.  
52
 Duration model is mostly used in microeconomics with micro data, where time units usually 
constitute an hour, a day, and a month. 
53
 S(t) = Pr(T ≥ t), which yields the probability that the spell duration T lasts at least to time t. 
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) = t 
-1
,  in exponential distribution  = 1 and 0(t, ) = 1, and in Weibull 
distribution 

 is greater or less than ‘1’ which is estimated from the sample. >1 
implies that the hazard is positive duration dependent and the opposite holds for <1.  
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        Figure 2. The plot of log(-logS(t)) vs. log(duration-of-spells)   
 
   Having a non-parametric estimation analysis, we find that the survival values for 
our data are not linearly related with the durations of crisis-spells (i.e.  ≠ 1). The 
details of our non-parametric estimation are reported in the appendix. A graphical plot 
of log(-logS(t)) vs. log(durations-of-spells) helps us to identify the proper distribution 
of a duration model fit. The plot looking like linear hints the distribution to fit the 
Weibull model.   
   In Figure-2 (a), the plot represents a sample of 41 crisis-spells without the data of 
CRP measures. The sample is used in estimating the explanatory factors, other than 
the CRP measures, of the durations of crises (results reported in Table 6 later). The 
plot of Figure-2 (b) represents the sample of 35 crisis-spells with the data of CRP 
measures (as reported in Table-3). Both of the plots hint that using a Weibull 
distribution is better than the Exponential one. However, we can still reconfirm that 
the distribution is Weibull by looking at the estimated value of 

, which should be 
greater than ‘1’ and statistically significant.  
   The estimation of   and of the ancillary parameter  is done via a maximum 
likelihood method. A subject known to fail at time tj contributes fj(tj)/Sj(t0j) – the value 
of the density at time tj conditional on the entry time t0j – to the likelihood function. 
On the other hand, a censored observation only known to survive up to time tj 
a) The sample of crisis-spells without CRP 
measures used in the final regression (presented 
in column 1 of Table-6) 
b) The sample of crisis-spells with CRP 
measures 
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contributes Sj(tj)/Sj(t0j) – the probability of surviving beyond time tj conditional on the 
entry time t0j. The log-likelihood is thus given by 
 
        ln L = { }∑
=
−−+
n
j
jjjjjjjj tStSdtfd
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0 )(ln)(ln)1()(ln . 
 
Where di = 1 if the ith spell is uncensored and = 0 if censored, tj is the analysis time 
when spell record ends, and t0j is the analysis time when spell record begins (which is 
always ‘0’ in our case). Note that we use the single record data – a single observation 
for each of the explanatory variables we use is taken as oppose to each of the crisis-
spells
54
. Otherwise mentioned, the observations are taken for the years when the 
crisis-spells begin. The regression parameters   and the ancillary parameter  are 
implicit in the above log-likelihood expression. They both are components of the 
chosen Sj(t) and its corresponding fj(t).  
   We take the robust standard errors (see e.g. Huber, 1967 and White, 1980), 
according to which the standard errors are adjusted for countries’ clustering. The 
robust method is used for the weak assumption that (xi,  i) are independently but not 
necessarily identically distributed, where xi and  i are the regressors and the error 
terms respectively. Note that a point estimate b (the estimated coefficient of xi) is the 
same for both the conventional (where xi and  i are independently and identically 
distributed) and the robust standard errors. 
 
 
 
4.3 Regression results  
 
4.3.1 Explanatory variables other than the CRP measures  
 
First we estimate the factors, other than the CRP measures, that are associated with 
the durations of crises so that these can be used as the control variables when we 
estimate the effects of CRP measures. All the variables listed in Table 4 of Section 3 
are included in the test. 
                                                 
54
 The reason of not using the multiple record data is that complete observations of many explanatory 
variables we use in the regression are not available for years the crises spells last. Thus we get a high 
number of missing values for different explanatory variables and the estimation result becomes 
spurious or misleading.  
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   All 78 crisis-episodes reported in Table 2 could be used if there were no missing 
data for the explanatory variables we include. However, there are many missing data 
(see the summary statistics in Table-A2 of appendix). In addition to the missing data, 
the sample size decreases as we drop out some observed values of the variables. These 
values are outliers as the estimation results of the variables are markedly changed if 
we run the regressions with these values. The outlying observations and the 
corresponding variables are reported in Table A3 of the appendix. 
   In our estimation technique, we first use the explanatory variables all together and 
then each independently. This type of estimation technique is followed in many 
empirical studies (see for instance Klein 1996). There are also other reasons for 
choosing this technique. Error because of omitted variables is reduced if we estimate 
an equation by taking all the variables together. On the other hand, since there are 
missing values, the highest number of observations can be used only when we 
estimate each of the explanatory variables independently.   
   Table-6 reports the estimation results obtained with the duration model. The first 
column shows the result of all the explanatory variables together. In the column, the 
variable for terms of trade change is not included. This variable is not statistically 
significant either it is tested independently or jointly with others (results not reported). 
However, taking this variable in conjunction with others simply reduces the number 
of observations, since it has the lowest number of observations (see the summary 
statistics in Table A2 of the appendix). The next two columns show the results of each 
variable tested independently (the parameters found statistically significant are only 
reported).  
   In the duration model the sign of a coefficient indirectly indicates the covariate’s 
relation with the durations of spells - because it estimates the hazard of ending the 
spells, not the durations of the spells directly. The hazard sign goes in the opposite 
direction to the duration of a spell. A unit change in a covariate x corresponds to 
(exp(coefficient of x) – 1)*100) percentage change in the hazard function. The 
number of failures (i.e. the number of spells with durations complete) and the time at 
risk (i.e. the sum of the durations of all completed spells or censored spells) are 
reported in addition to the number of observations. 
   We find that the real interest rate is negatively associated with the hazard of crisis-
spell. That is, the duration of a crisis is longer if it begins during a period of high real 
interest rate. This finding is in line with other studies on banking crises. For instance, 
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DKD (1999 and 2005) find that a crisis is more likely to occur when the real interest 
rate increases. High real interest also makes a banking crisis more costly, as DKD 
(1999) find.  
 
Table 6. Estimating the hazard function of crisis-spells taking the explanatory factors 
other than the CRP measures 
 
Dep. Var. = hazard of 
crisis-spells 
(1) (2) (3) 
GDP growth rate .0441 
 (.032) 
  
Inflation rate -.0106 
(.0165) 
  
Depreciation rate .0005  
(.0146) 
  
Real interest rate -.032** 
(.015) 
  
Govt. budget surplus / 
GDP 
.0713  
(.075) 
  
M2 / Foreign exchange 
reserves 
-.0002 
(.0012) 
  
Private domestic credit / 
GDP 
-.0331** 
(.0156) 
  
Private domestic credit 
growtht-2 
.0373** 
(.0175) 
.0140*** 
(.0047) 
 
Average private domestic 
credit growth 
.0435  
(.0268) 
 -.015*  
(.0082) 
Banks’ cash reserve / Total 
assets 
-.0465*** 
(.0160) 
  
DIS -.9938** 
(.4796) 
  
GDP / Capita .0503  
(.0333) 
  
 
 3.018*** 
(.7234) 
2.066*** 
(.2096) 
1.96***  
(.177) 
Constant -3.96*** 
(1.24) 
-4.198*** 
(.4809) 
-3.90*** 
 (.404) 
No. of Obs. 41 62 62 
No. of Failures 31 50 50 
Time at Risk 237 374 374 
Log-likelihood -27.27 -57.37 -58.64 
Wald Chi
2
 46.32 8.69 3.34 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.0000 0.0032 0.0674 
We have reported the estimated coefficients of the variables and the standard errors (in the 
parentheses). *, **, and *** refer to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level respectively.  
 
   The duration of a crisis is longer when it begins during a term of higher ratio of 
domestic credit in the private sector to GDP, which implies a larger exposure of the 
banking sector to the private sector borrowers. Similarly to the finding on real interest 
rate, the finding of this variable is in line with other studies on banking crises. DKD 
(1999 and 2005) find the variable to be positively related with the likelihood of crises 
 132 
and also with the costs of crises. Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003) find that this 
variable is positively related with the likelihood of currency crises as well. In all, it 
implies that although the expansion of the private sector is the fundamental basis of a 
capitalist and market economy, a higher ratio of domestic credit increases the 
probability of crisis, its costs, and makes the crisis-spell last longer. Of course, a 
major cause could be the inefficient management of the domestic private sector. 
   The growth of real private domestic credit lagged by two years is significant having 
a negative relation with the durations of crises. This implies that the crisis-spells 
which are preceded by the liberalized financial systems, implying the increases of the 
real private domestic credits, do not in fact last long. Those crises are recovered 
rapidly. However, our finding on this variable is different from others on the issue of 
banking crises. For instance, DKD (1999, 2002 and 2005) find a similar variable to be 
positively related with the likelihood of crises and the costs of crises.
55
 Komulainen 
and Lukkarila (2003) also find that a similar variable is positively related with the 
likelihood of currency crises. 
   The estimation results show that the durations of crises do not last long if the 
beginning of crises coincides with the liquidity shortage of banks. Although the 
shortage of banks’ cash reserve is found by DKD (1999) to be one of the causes (at 
weak significance level) of banking crises,
56
 we find that a crisis-spell developing 
from the liquidity shortage is in fact recovered relatively faster. Evidently, the crises 
spells of Sweden (1991-94), Australia (1989-92), Indonesia (1992-94), Thailand 
(1983-87), and Finland (1991-94) began with the shortage of banks’ cash reserve and 
lasted relatively shorter than those in Ecuador (1980-85), Nicaragua (1985-96), 
Burkina Faso (1988-94), Columbia (1982-87), Israel (1977-83), Peru (1983-90), 
Ghana (1982-89), and of Mexico (1981-91), which began with relatively high banks’ 
cash reserve. 
   Another significant explanatory variable is the implementation of explicitly formed 
deposit insurance scheme (DIS). The sign implies that the crises spells developing 
with the existence of explicitly formed DIS last long, perhaps because the scheme is 
not supported by a well-designed and effective system. It is also possible that the 
                                                 
55
 DKD (1999) have used the growth of total, instead of private, domestic credits. However, the aim of 
using this factor – as the proxy of financial liberalization – is the same in DKD’s two other papers, as it 
is in our study. 
56
 However, the result is different in the case of currency crises, as Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003) 
find that banks’ cash reserve is positively related (not statistically significant) with the likelihood of 
currency crisis in the emerging economies. 
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prudential regulation and the efficient supervision of banks are lacking. Consequently 
excessive risk-taking on the part of bank management is possible. For similar reasons 
DKD (1999, 2002 and 2005) find that the use of explicitly formed DIS to be 
positively related with the probability of banking crises and with the costs of crises. 
   When each of the variables is tested independently, most of the variables still hold 
the similar signs. However, none of the variables are statistically significant, except 
the growth of real private domestic credits lagged by two years and this growth with 
its average over the period of crisis-spells last. The results with the variables found 
significant are only reported in Table-6. Average growth of real private domestic 
credits is found to be positively related (at weak significance level) with the length of 
crisis-spells, which is different from the relationship of the growth of real private 
domestic credits lagged by two years. That is, the financial sector reform with an aim 
of lowering the private domestic credit growth is essential immediately after the onset 
of a crisis in order to shorten the crisis-spell. 
   Like the growth of real private domestic credits, we also estimate all other variables 
reported in Table 4 by taking their average over the periods the crisis-spells last. We 
estimate each independently and also taking all of them together, but none of those 
variables are significant (the results are not reported).  
 
 
4.3.2 CRP measures and the durations of crises 
 
This subsection focuses on examining the effects of CRP measures on the durations of 
crises, where the duration estimation model is used. Table 7 reports the estimation 
results. All the CRP variables reported in Section 3 are included. The variables found 
significant in Column 1 of Table 6 are used as the control variables. The number of 
observations, the number of failures and the time at risk in Table 7 are respectively 
34, 27 and 169. As mentioned early, only 3 of the crisis-episodes in our dataset with 
CRP measures found without using any kinds of CRP measures. Thus we focus on the 
relative effectiveness of the CRP measures in terms of the durations of crises.  
   Amongst the measures, the most unfavorable one is “Forbearance-A”, i.e., the most 
accommodating forbearance of bank regulations as it allows the insolvent banks to 
remain operative. This measure is found to be strongly significant (at 1% level) and 
negatively related with the hazard function. The hazard value is reduced by about 
78% for switching from no application to the application of this forbearance. The 
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result implies that permitting the regulation forbearance in order to keep the insolvent 
banks operating not only increases the costs of crises as HK (2003) find, it also 
increases the durations of crises. The reason could be that this forbearance allows the 
bank managements of the insolvent banks to play undue role for the personal benefit 
on their own, i.e. the moral hazard problem. The managements of the solvent banks 
may also take the advantage of the forbearance by signifying themselves as insolvent. 
Thus the destabilization of the already distressed banking system rather enlarges. 
 
Table 7. Estimating the hazard function of crisis-spells: the effects of CRP measures 
 
Dep. var. = hazard of 
crises spells 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Real interest rate -.048* 
(.025) 
-.052** 
(.025) 
-.0249 
(.026) 
-.047* 
(.025) 
-.044
##
 
(.030) 
-.044* 
(.026) 
-.048* 
(.026) 
Private domestic 
credit / GDP 
-.04*** 
(.013) 
.037*** 
(.013) 
-.047*** 
(.014) 
-.039*** 
(.013) 
-.038*** 
(.015) 
-.047*** 
(.016) 
-.039*** 
(.0147) 
Private domestic 
credit growtht-2 
.008 
(.015) 
.009 
(.015) 
.002 
(.013) 
.007 
(.016) 
.0089 
(.015) 
.0125 
(.0143) 
.0099 
(.0141) 
Banks’ cash reserve / 
Total assets 
-.065*** 
(.018) 
-.057*** 
(.015) 
-.057*** 
(.019) 
-.06*** 
(.016) 
-.058*** 
(.017) 
-.06*** 
(.017) 
-.059*** 
(.017) 
DIS -.572 
(.443) 
-.59 
(.434) 
-.285 
(.462) 
-.532 
(.461) 
-.502 
(.504) 
-.431 
(.429) 
-.575 
(.444) 
Blanket guaranty .220 
(.423) 
      
Open ended, extensive 
liquidity supply 
 -.234 
(.411) 
     
Forbearance-A   -1.51*** 
(.520) 
    
Forbearance-B    -.246 
(.441) 
   
Recapitalization     -.288 
(.588) 
  
Public debt relief 
program 
     -.692
##
 
(.478) 
 
Asset Management 
Company 
      .0845 
(.401) 
 
 3.01*** 
(.551) 
2.9*** 
(.512) 
3.46*** 
(.647) 
2.99*** 
(.527) 
2.91*** 
(.524) 
3.10*** 
(.529) 
2.96*** 
(.505) 
Constant -2.68*** 
(.736) 
-2.5*** 
(.657) 
-2.88*** 
(.86) 
-2.44*** 
(.672) 
-2.58*** 
(.658) 
-2.4*** 
(.765) 
-2.65*** 
(.825) 
Log-likelihood -19.37 -19.36 -15.64 -19.39 -19.40 -18.53 -19.47 
Wald Chi
2
 17.54 15.76 24.58 15.75 18.81 16.18 20.08 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.0075 0.0151 0.0004 0.0152 0.0045 0.0128 0.0027 
***, **, * and ## refer to 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% significance level. 
 
   CRP variable with “Public debt relief program” is significant at weak level (15% 
level) of significance. The hazard value is reduced by about 50% if this program is 
adopted. As said earlier, government implements this debt relief program with an aim 
to help credit borrowers by relieving them from repaying their obligations. The 
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program probably worsens the distressed banking situation by attracting borrowers 
who would not be able to pay debts even in good times. Like the most 
accommodating forbearance, this debt relief program is also found to increase the 
costs of crises in HK (2003). 
   Rests of the CRP measures are found to be statistically insignificant to have any 
relation with the durations of crises. Two of the measures “Blanket guarantee” and 
“Asset Management Company” are even found to have positive relation with hazard 
function. That is, the blanket guarantee during the panicking stage of crisis and also 
the use of a centralized Asset Management Company reduce the durations of crises.
57
  
   In order to estimate the CRP variables with all 35 observations, as reported in Table 
3, we drop the variable “Real interest rate” from the regression as it contains one 
missing value (results reported in Table A4 of the appendix). Estimation results 
remain much the same as those above. However, the level of significance with the 
CRP variable “Public debt relief program” improves (significant at 10% level). An 
alternative procedure to use all 35 observations is to replace a predicted value of the 
real interest rate in its missing value. Doing also such a procedure, we find much the 
similar results with the CRP variables, where the significance level with the public 
debt relief program is improved (at 11% level) as well.
58
 The result is not reported. 
   Thus our overall arguments are as follows. Once a country is in trap of banking 
crisis, the government might feel less confident to have any alternatives other than 
taking some CRP measures. The reason is otherwise the government does not know 
how long the crisis would last. If so, we propose the government to avoid using the 
CRP measures like the most accommodating forbearance of bank regulations that 
keep insolvent banks in operation and also the measure of public debt relief program. 
The government can choose some CRP measures with possibly the least adverse 
effect in terms of durations of banking crises. In this regard the CRP measures having 
the least possible adverse effect are the blanket guarantee and the use of centralized 
Asset Management Company. The next set of CRP measures to choose is the liquidity 
                                                 
57
 Klingebiel (2000) and Calomiris et al (2004), through case studies, find a mixed success record of 
using the centralized Asset Management Company in achieving the goal of hastening the recovery of 
crisis-spells. In addition, HK (2000) find its relation with the recovery costs of crises to be 
insignificant. 
58
 In this procedure, “Real interest rate” is estimated first using the OLS model and then find its 
predicted values. The explanatory variables used are the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP, 
private domestic credit growth lagged by two years, the ratio of banks’ cash reserve to total assets, 
deposit insurance scheme, and GDP per capita. 
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support, recapitalization of banks and the regulation forbearance allowing the lesser 
degree of lenience towards banks.
59
 
 
 
The time parameter of hazard function  
The time parameter of hazard function is given by “.” It can be seen from all of the 
regressions in Tables 6 and 7 that  is strongly significant and its coefficient is greater 
than one. This implies that the Weibull distribution model performs better than the 
Exponential one. In addition, 

 >1 implies that the hazard function exhibits positive 
duration dependence, i.e., the probability of ending a crisis-spell increases by itself as 
the spell grows older. This observation of the time parameter on a crisis-spell is 
supported by Abderrezak (2000). 
 
The quality of regression model 
The quality of a regression model in the duration model is evaluated by the log-
likelihood value, the Wald-chi-squared value, and the joint significant level (Prob > 
chi
2
) of the estimated parameters. The higher Wald-chi-squared value, lower 
Prob>chi
2
 value, and the higher log-likelihood value imply the better quality of a 
regression model.  
 
 
 
4.3.3 Robustness of the estimation results   
 
There could be a potential problem of simultaneity bias here. That is, a severe crisis, 
which is likely to last long, may have triggered the adoption of CRP measures. If this 
is so, the effects of the CRP measures estimated above are contaminated. We need to 
verify that our results are not contaminated by the reverse causality. To do so we use 
an instrumental variable estimation, where we try to purge the endogenous 
components of the CRP measures in the first step of a two-step estimation approach. 
In a nutshell, in the first step, CRP measures are the dependent variables and are 
estimated from a number of explanatory variables where there is at least one variable 
that is uncorrelated with the durations of crises. In the second step, we estimate the 
                                                 
59
 The regulation forbearance allowing the lesser degree of lenience towards banks could be e.g. over 
looking violations of laws, standards and regulations by individual banks, business deregulation on 
banking designing to introduce new profit opportunities to weak banks and so on. 
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benchmark columns (the columns of Table 7) with the predicted values of adopting 
CRP measures estimated in the first step.  
 
Table 8. Durations of crises and the CRP measures: two-step estimation 
 
a) OLS estimation model: CRP-measures as the dependent variables 
 Blanket 
guaranty 
Open 
ended, 
extensive 
liquidity 
supply 
Forbearan
ce-A 
Forbearan
ce-B 
Recapitali
zation 
Public debt 
relief 
program 
Asset 
Managem
ent 
Company 
Private domestic credit / 
GDP 
.0026 
(.0027) 
.0028 
(.003) 
.0005 
(.0018) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.0048 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.001) 
.003 
(.003) 
Corruption -.049 
(.074) 
-.064 
(.068) 
-.085* 
(.047) 
-.081## 
(.053) 
-.058 
(.050) 
-.106*** 
(.03) 
-.052 
(.07) 
Crises-around .092 
(.072) 
.031 
(.072) 
-.014 
(.057) 
.017 
(.045) 
.068 
(.048) 
.0127  
(.058) 
.117* 
(.05) 
Constant .321 
(.360) 
.586* 
(.317) 
.529** 
(.255) 
.832*** 
(.23) 
-.001 
(.20) 
.704*** 
(.25) 
.091 
(.279) 
F-values 1.30 0.53 1.15 2.05 1.29 5.01 1.95 
Prob > F 0.2914 0.6672 0.3451 0.1276 0.2962 0.0060 0.1416 
R-squared 0.0930 0.0440 0.0840 0.1458 0.1681 0.1967 0.1530 
Root MSE .50576 .51414 .40679 .37012 .38765 .41623 .4725 
***, **, * and ## refer to 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% significance level. 
 
b) Estimating the hazard function of crisis-spells: the effects of predicted CRP-measures  
Dep. Var. = hazard of 
crises-spells 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Real interest rate -0.056** 
(0.028) 
-0.048* 
(0.026) 
-0.039 
(0.026) 
-0.045* 
(0.026) 
-0.053** 
(0.027) 
-0.043* 
(0.026) 
-0.057** 
(0.028) 
Private domestic credit 
/ GDP 
-0.041*** 
(0.013) 
-0.039*** 
(0.014) 
-0.048*** 
(0.016) 
-0.037*** 
(0.014) 
-0.043*** 
(0.014) 
-0.046*** 
(0.016) 
-0.042*** 
(0.013) 
Private domestic credit 
growtht-2 
0.010 
(0.015) 
0.009 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
0.009 
(0.015) 
Banks’ cash reserve 
/ Total assets 
-0.071*** 
(0.015) 
-0.060*** 
(0.016) 
-0.051*** 
(0.019) 
-0.056*** 
(0.016) 
-0.067*** 
(0.015) 
-0.055*** 
(0.017) 
-0.073*** 
(0.015) 
DIS -0.771* 
(0.473) 
-0.553 
(0.428) 
-0.307 
(0.457) 
-0.459 
(0.430) 
-0.702 
(0.451) 
-0.420 
(0.435) 
-0.790* 
(0.480) 
Blanket guaranty - 
Predicted 
1.829 
(1.430)       
Open ended, extensive 
liquidity supply- 
Predicted 
 
-0.130 
(1.580)      
Forbearance-A- 
Predicted 
 
 
-2.776** 
(1.294)     
Forbearance-B- 
Predicted 
   -1.001 
(1.215) 
   
Recapitalization- 
Predicted 
    1.243 
(1.519) 
  
Public debt relief 
program- Predicted 
     -1.098 
(0.920) 
 
Asset management 
company- Predicted 
      1.734## 
(1.200) 
 
 3.061*** 
(0.491) 
2.951*** 
(0.506) 
2.977*** 
(0.518) 
2.941*** 
(0.513) 
3.006*** 
(0.496) 
2.943*** 
(0.516) 
3.086*** 
(0.489) 
Constant -3.338*** 
(0.768) 
-2.516*** 
(0.980) 
-1.915** 
(0.863) 
-1.934* 
(1.083) 
-2.585*** 
(0.684) 
-2.107** 
(0.837) 
-2.998*** 
(0.675) 
Log-likelihood -18.69 -19.49 -18.45 -19.33 -19.19 -19.19 -18.46 
Wald Chi2 24.57 16.34 17.5 14.37 20.88 14.02 26.31 
Prob > Chi2 0.0004 0.012 0.0076 0.0258 0.0019 0.0294 0.0002 
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   We use corruption (the higher the value, the lower the corruption) as an instrument 
of CRP measures, which is positively related with the adoption of CRP measures, but 
has no link with the durations of crises. This instrument is technically supported by 
HK (2003), who argues that corruption has no link with the costs of crises, but is 
positively linked with the adoption of CRP measures. The number of crises 
simultaneously occurring around the globe, i.e., “Crises around”, is also used as an 
instrument of CRP measures. The assumption is that the greater the number of crises 
occurring simultaneously around the globe, the greater the panic of the central 
authority, which triggers the adoption of a CRP measure. The ratio of private 
domestic credit to GDP, i.e., the degree of the banking sector’s exposure to the private 
sector borrowers, is also used as an explanatory variable of CRP measures; the 
assumption is that the greater the exposure of the banking sector to private sector 
borrowers, the stronger the incentive of the government to adopt a CRP measure to 
protect the private sector.  
   Tables 8(a) and (b) report the results of the two-step estimation approach. The 
results of the first step estimation using an OLS model are reported in Table 8(a). 
Robust standard errors are taken. Both of the variables “corruption” and “crises-
around” have the expected signs in almost all of the regressions in the table. However, 
not all are statistically significant. The ratio of private domestic credit to GDP has also 
the expected sign in almost all regression columns, but the parameter is insignificant 
in most of the cases. 
   As can be seen from Table 8(b), CRP measures with their predicted values still have 
much the similar signs and the significance levels as those in Table 7. Forbearance-A 
with its predicted values is still the significant CRP measure having positive relation 
with the durations of crises. Thus the effects of the CRP measures on the durations of 
crises derived in Table 7 should not be of suspicion because of the reverse causality. 
 
 
Estimation by OLS model 
We also estimate OLS model using the sample of crisis-spells with only the durations 
complete; thus many crisis-spell observations are dropped out because of their 
incomplete durations. The result with the explanatory variables other than the CRP 
measures is reported in Table A5 of the appendix. The results show that some of the 
explanatory variables, which were found significant in the duration model, are still 
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significant with the similar signs. For example, the ratio of banks’ cash reserve to total 
assets, private domestic credit growth lagged by two years, and the average private 
domestic credit growth are significant with the similar signs (the latter two variables 
are significant only when each is tested as the sole independent variable). Although 
not statistically significant, the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP and the deposit 
insurance scheme still exhibit the similar signs (real interest rate has a similar sign 
only when tested as the sole independent variable).  
   Results with the OLS model show that the variable for the government’s fiscal 
position, i.e., the ratio of government budget surplus to GDP, is significant and has a 
negative relationship with the duration of crisis. This implies that the greater the 
government’s budget surplus, the shorter the duration of crisis. This variable has the 
same sign in the duration model (Table 6) as well, but is not statistically significant. 
Abderrezak (2000) in his duration model finds that the government’s fiscal position is 
negatively associated with the length of banking crisis. 
   OLS estimation results with the CRP measures are reported in Table A6 of the 
appendix. The sample takes the crisis-spells for which the durations are complete. The 
effects of the CRP measures on the durations of crises remain much the same as that 
depicted in the duration model of Table 7. Forbearance-A is still the only strongly 
significant CRP measure. 
 
Further robustness 
A duration model is estimated by using the sample of 31 crisis-spells with CRP 
measures, i.e. dropping 4 crisis-spells encompassing Egypt (1991), France (1994), 
New Zealand (1987) and Turkey (1994), because the crises are non-systemic (see 
Section 3). The estimation results with the CRP measures are reported in Table-A7 of 
the appendix and they are much the same as in Table 7. Forbearance-A is strongly and 
the “Public debt relief program” is weakly significant with signs similar to those in 
Table 7.  
   We estimate different columns of Table 7 using the Cox proportional hazard model 
as well, because we find the Cox model also fit our sample. To fit this model, the plot 
of the log(-log(survival)) versus the plot of log(survival time) of the uncensored 
crises-spells need to be parallel with each other. The estimation results are nonetheless 
the same as our results with the Weibull distribution model (results not reported here 
due to limited space, but are available from the author on request).  
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4.3.5 The precise findings of this study relative to others 
 
Table 9. The findings of this study relative to other studies 
 
Explanatory variable  Sign found by 
others  
Dependent variable  Studies The sign with 
duration of crisis 
in our study 
Forbearance-A (i.e. regulation forbearance 
to keep insolvent banks operative)  
+ve Costs of BC HK (2003) +ve 
Public debt relief program  +ve Costs of BC HK (2003) +ve (weakly 
significant) 
Asset Management Company Insignificant Costs of BC HK (2000 & 2003) Insignificant 
Real interest rate +ve Costs & occurrence 
of BC 
DKD (1999 & 
2005) 
+ve 
Government budget surplus / GDP -ve Lengths of BC 
Occurrence of CC 
Abderrezak (2002) 
Komulainen and 
Lukkarila (2003) 
-ve 
(Insignificant) 
Private domestic credit / GDP   +ve Costs & occurrence 
of BC 
Occurrence of CC 
DKD (1999 & 
2005) 
Komulainen & 
Lukkarila (2003) 
+ve 
Private domestic credit growtht-2 
 
 
+ve Occurrence of BC 
 
Costs of BC 
DKD (2005 & 
2002) 
DKD (1999) 
-ve 
Banks’ cash reserve / Total asset  -ve 
+ve 
(Insignificant) 
Costs of BC 
Occurrence of CC 
DKD (1999) 
Komulainen & 
Lukkarila (2003) 
+ve 
DIS  +ve Costs of BC 
Occurrence of BC 
DKD (1999) 
DKD (2002) 
+ve 
Note: BC and CC refer to “banking crises” and “currency crises” respectively. 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The costs of long-lasting crises can be high and difficult to measure. The entire credit 
system can become disrupted by the worsened aftermath of the real economy. 
Domestic creditors and investors may transfer their funds abroad. To tackle this 
vulnerable situation, the government can borrow money from international source like 
the IMF, or attempt to increase the inflow of foreign private capital. However, credit 
from foreign sources can become rather costly, because the more distressed a 
country’s banking system is, the tougher the terms-and-conditions imposed by the 
foreign sources. It is thus extremely important to defend the economy from having to 
pay such a high price caused by a long crisis-spell, and to identify the factors 
associated with long-lasting spells. 
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   Aiming at identifying the factors associated with the durations of crises, this study 
uses the data on crises with different durations for the period of 1977-2003. Both the 
developing and the industrialized countries are used. A duration model is used to 
obtain robust estimation results by taking into account the censoring problems caused 
by the incomplete crisis-spells.  
   To recover a crisis experienced economy early, the government can be strict by 
sticking to its existing banking regulations. However, it is found that in most of the 
crisis-episodes governments come up with using some CRP measures. The possible 
reason is that otherwise the governments do not know how long the crises would last. 
The usual CRP measures are blanket guarantee, open-ended and extended liquidity 
support, regulation forbearance, recapitalization, public debt relief program for bank 
borrowers, and setting up a centralized Asset Management Company. These measures 
might rather extend the crisis period, because the measures relax the existing bank 
regulations and the bank management can use this relaxed regulations to their 
advantage. In most of the cases, these measures are not even fully market-oriented.  
   This study finds that the regulation forbearance to keep insolvent banks functioning 
strongly and the government’s public debt relief program is weakly significant, 
having the positive relation with the durations of crises. The rests of the measures do 
not have significant relation with the durations of crises. The measure of blanket 
guarantee and the use of centralized Asset Management Company are even having 
negative signs with the durations of crises, i.e. these measures reduce the durations of 
crises. We thus propose governments avoid using the measure of regulation 
forbearance keeping the insolvent banks in operation and also the public debt relief 
program. Instead the governments can choose, if they feel less confident to be strict 
by sticking to the existing banking regulations, a measure which has no significant 
relation with durations of crises; especially it can choose the measure of blanket 
guarantee or the use of a centralized Asset Management Company.     
   In testing a set of explanatory variables other than the CRP measures, this study 
finds that some of the variables not only increase the probability of crises to occur or 
the costs of crises, they also increase the durations of crises. Evidently, crisis-spells 
last long when they begin during a period of high real interest rates, or begin when the 
banking sectors have greater exposure to private sector borrowers, or begin in the 
presence of deposit insurance scheme. DKD (1999, 2002 and 2005) find all these 
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variables to be positively correlated not only with the probability of crises to occur, 
but also with the costs of crises.    
   Some of the explanatory variables are however differently related. For instance, 
crises spells do not last long if they begin during a term of higher credit growth lagged 
by two years. Nor do they last long if the onset of crises coincides with the shortage of 
bank liquidity. DKD (1999 and 2005), however, find that high lagged credit growth, 
which may capture a credit boom, is positively correlated with the probability of 
crises occurrence and the costs of crises. DKD (1999) also observe that the shortage 
of bank liquidity is positively correlated with the probability of crises occurrence. 
Finally, similar to the result of Abderrezak (2000), this study finds that the probability 
of ending crisis-spell increases as the spell grows older.  
   This study has some limitations, however. Defining the crisis-spells of the sample 
used in this study is not based on a unique criterion or a decisive factor. Rather it is 
based on the evaluations of specific financial experts of each country. The study 
would have been more robust, had the crisis-spells been defined based on a single 
decisive factor. We intend to do this in the near future. Finally, the estimation results 
should be viewed with caution, as the sample size used is not large enough.  
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Appendix 
 
Non-parametric methods of estimation in duration model 
 
The aim of the method is to summarize and graphically view the sample distribution 
of the duration of crisis-spells. The methodology employed is intuitive and robust to 
the censored observations. Much of the following development is taken from Kiefer 
(1988). 
    We have the simple survivor function: 
 
            Sˆ (t) = n
-1
(no. of sample points ≥ t) 
 
where n is the number of observations. We need a modification to allow censoring. 
Let us consider that the completed durations in the sample of size n are ordered from 
the smallest to the largest as t1 < t2 < …< tK. The number of the completed durations 
K is less than n because some of the observations are censored (i.e. their spells have 
not ended within our survey period 1977-2003) or because of “ties”. Ties usually 
occur when two or more observations have the same duration. 
    Now consider the sample of crisis-spells, the time unit of which is by year. Table-
A1 below is created using a sample with 41 observations, which we use in regression-
column 1 of Table-6. There are 10 spells that did not end within our study period and 
thus considered as the censored spells. Furthermore, there are a number of ties in the 
data; 2 episodes lasting 2 years, 5 episodes 3 years, 7 episodes 3 years and so on. In 
all, K the number of distinct crisis-spells equals 11.   
    Let hj be the number of crisis-spells with completed duration tj, for j = 1, 2, . . ., K. 
In the absence of any ties, hj are all equal to one. The values of hj for the sample are 
given in Table A1. Let mj be the number of observations censored between tj and tj+1. 
Thus mK is the number of censored observations, which continue at least till the time 
tK, the longest completed duration. mj for the data of crisis-spells are also given in the 
table. Then nj be the number of spells neither completed nor censored before duration 
tj. Thus we have, 
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          nj = ∑
≥
+
K
ji
ii hm )( . 
 
The values of nj are given in the table. Then the hazard λ(tj) can be formulated as 
follows, 
 
           
j
j
j
n
h
t =)(λˆ . 
 
Table A1: Nonparametric hazard and survival estimates of the crisis-spells 
 
Duration 
in years, tj 
hj 
(Completed 
Spells) 
mj (Censored 
Spells) nj 
Hazard 
Function, 
 
(tj) 1-
 
(tj) 
Survival 
Function, 
S(tj) 
Integrated 
Hazard, 
Λˆ (tj) 
1 1 0 41 0.02439 0.97561 0.97561 0.02439 
2 2 0 40 0.05 0.95 0.926829 0.07439 
3 5 0 38 0.131579 0.868421 0.804878 0.205969 
4 7 0 33 0.212121 0.787879 0.634146 0.41809 
5 4 1 26 0.153846 0.846154 0.536585 0.571937 
6 3 4 21 0.142857 0.857143 0.45993 0.714794 
7 3 1 14 0.214286 0.785714 0.361374 0.929079 
8 3 1 10 0.3 0.7 0.252962 1.229079 
9 1 0 6 0.166667 0.833333 0.210801 1.395746 
10 1 1 5 0.2 0.8 0.168641 1.595746 
11 1 2 3 0.333333 0.666667 0.112427 1.929079 
 
The hazard value implies the probability of completing a spell with duration tj 
conditional upon the spell reaching duration tj. The Kaplan-Meier or product-limit 
estimator for the survivor function is, 
 
          ∏∏
==
−=−=
j
i i
j
i iiij
nhntS
11
)ˆ1(/)()(ˆ λ . 
 
This estimator is in fact obtained by setting the estimated conditional probability of 
completing a spell at tj equal to the observed relative frequency of completion at tj. 
Both the values for )(ˆ jtλ  and )(ˆ jtS  are reported in the table.  
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    We know that for the exponential distribution the hazard is constant and the 
integrated hazard is linear in duration t.
60
 The integrated hazard can be estimated by  
 
         ∑
≤
=Λ
ji
jj tt )(
ˆ)(ˆ λ . 
The values of the integrated hazard, )(ˆ jtΛ , are also reported in the table. 
     Graphical presentation helps to describe the distribution of duration of spells. We 
have plotted in Figure-A1 the estimated survivor function and the integrated-hazard 
function
61
 for the sample of 41 crisis-spells. Both the survival and the integrated 
hazard values for our testing sample seem non-linearly related with the duration of 
spells. That is, the survival or hazard values are not the same for all crisis-spells. The 
hazard increases as the spells grow older.  
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Figure-A1: Survival and the integrated-hazard functions of crisis-spells  
 
    Two well-known distribution models in the survival estimation are the Exponential 
and the Weibull distribution. Let’s set the integrated-hazard  (t) = t, where t is the 
durations of spells. Using exponential distribution is appropriate when 

 = 1, i.e., the 
integrated hazard is linearly related with the durations of spells. However, the 
integrated hazard function in the above graphical presentation seems to have 

>1, i.e., 
a non-linear relation between the integrated hazard and the durations of spells. Thus, 
in our case, using Weibull distribution is more appropriate than using the Exponential 
one. 
                                                 
60
 For the exponential distribution with parameter  > 0:  cumulative distribution, F(t) = 1 – exp(-t); 
survivor function, S(t) = exp(-t); density function, f (t) = exp(-t); hazard function, 
 
(t) = ; integrated 
hazard function, (t) = t. 
 
61
 As the estimate of the hazard function exhibits an implausible variation over time, very often 
economists plot integrated hazard in order to smoothen the variation over time.  
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    Another way of choosing the distribution is to see the graph of the log(-logS(t)) vs. 
log (durations of spells). In the case of Weibull distribution, the graph will show a 
linear relationship. The appropriateness of using Weibull distribution can also be 
proven by viewing the estimated value of 

, which should be significantly greater than 
one. The value of 

 can be estimated by running regression with the Weibull 
distribution.  
 
 
Other Tables 
 
Tabe-A2: Summary statistics of different variables without CRP variables 
 
                                                  Variable |    Obs        Mean          Std. Dev.        Min               Max 
                                               -------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------
----- 
                               Crisis-spell duration |        78    5.935897    3.630104          1                   20 
                                    GDP growth rate |        63    1.567029    10.66896        -29.46377       34.21468 
                           Terms of trade change |        26   -2.610769    8.476297        -17.08             14.38 
                                          Inflation rate |        64    26.68312    47.23188         -3.96               276.34 
                                   Depreciation rate |        74    20.79864    47.84037         -18.03945       336.4302 
                                    Real interest rate |        61   -5.258056    32.39425         -210.556        21.2114 
                   Govt. budget surplus / GDP |        54    -3.83037     4.509938          -21.79           2.59 
            M2 / Foreign exchange reserves |        72    31.33956    80.49275           1.18              411.25 
               Private domestic credit / GDP |        67    34.63521    26.65081         .1787805         120.87 
          Private domestic credit growtht-2  |        62    6.701025    20.7429           -55.11988        65.7771 
Average private domestic credit growth |        70    2.917606    17.72366         -61.40312        80.28796 
         Banks’ cash reserve / Total assets |         74    12.35027    13.61766          .0731742        61.14 
                                                        DIS  |        78    .3076923    .4645258           0                     1 
                                          GDP / Capita |        68    3.885          6.887869          .01                   30.5 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-A3: The outlying observations and the variables for which they are outliers 
Outlying observations The variables 
Congo D. R. (1980) GDP growth rate 
Argentina (1989), Brazil (1990 and 1994) and 
Congo D. R. (1994) 
Inflation rate, Depreciation rate, and Real interest 
rate 
Kuwait (1980) Govt. budget surplus / GDP 
Chad (1980) M2 / Foreign exchange reserves 
Guinea (1993) Private domestic credit / GDP 
Brazil (1990), Nepal (1988) Private domestic credit growtht-2 
Nepal (1988) Average private domestic credit growth 
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Table A4. Estimating the hazard function crisis-spells: the effects of CRP measures 
(The variable “Real interest rate” is dropped from the set of control variables used in 
Table 7 so that we can use all 35 observations with CRP measures)  
 
Dep. Var. = hazard 
of crisis-spells 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Private domestic 
credit / GDP 
-.036*** 
(.012) 
-.0349*** 
(.012) 
-.044*** 
(.0123) 
-.034*** 
(.0123) 
-.0323** 
(.013) 
-.042*** 
(.012) 
-.034*** 
(.013) 
Private domestic 
credit growtht-2 
-.003 
(.008) 
-.003 
(.0076) 
.0023 
(.010) 
-.0031 
(.0079) 
-.0026 
(.007) 
.004 
(.008) 
-.0027 
(.007) 
Banks’ cash reserve 
/ Total assets 
-.051*** 
(.018) 
-.046*** 
(.015) 
-.049*** 
(.019) 
-.046*** 
(.016) 
-.044*** 
(.016) 
-.046*** 
(.016) 
-.045*** 
(.017) 
DIS -.167 
(.491) 
-.146 
(.492) 
-.1278 
(.456) 
-.127 
(.492) 
-.078 
(.539) 
-.121 
(.473) 
-.158 
(.503) 
Blanket guaranty .234 
(.387) 
      
Open ended, 
extensive liquidity 
supply 
 .0509 
(.398) 
     
Forbearance-A   -1.51*** 
(.483) 
    
Forbearance-B    -.306 
(.387) 
   
Recapitalization     -.590 
(.524) 
  
Public debt relief 
program 
     -.763* 
(.473) 
 
Asset Management 
Company 
      .0861 
(.426) 
 
 2.96*** 
(.567) 
2.91*** 
(.534) 
3.5*** 
(.666) 
2.96*** 
(.558) 
2.85*** 
(.520) 
3.1*** 
(.558) 
2.9*** 
(.53) 
Constant -3.10*** 
(.728) 
-3.04*** 
(.699) 
-3.3*** 
(.819) 
-2.89*** 
(.596) 
-2.98*** 
(.655) 
-2.9*** 
(.71) 
-3.1*** 
(.875) 
Log-likelihood -20.94 -21.08 -16.29 -20.92 -20.59 -19.87 -21.07 
Wald Chi
2
 12.88 12.91 24.63 14.56 13.48 19.42 14.03 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.0245 0.0242 0.0002 0.0124 0.0192 0.0016 0.0154 
***, **, * and ## refer to 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% significance level. The number of observations, the 
number of failures and the time at risk are respectively 35, 28 and 175. 
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Table-A5. OLS estimation: explanatory variables other than the CRP measures and 
the durations of crises (the sample of spells with durations complete) 
Dep. V. = durations of 
crises 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate .022  
(.055) 
    
Inflation rate -.023  
(.045) 
    
Depreciation rate -.025  
(.060) 
    
Real interest rate -.067  
(.077) 
    
Govt. budget surplus / 
GDP 
-.317**  
(.117) 
-.29***  
(.069) 
   
M2 / Foreign 
exchange reserves 
.003  
(.002) 
    
Private domestic 
credit / GDP 
.011 
 (.035) 
    
Private domestic 
credit growtht-2 
.035  
(.05) 
 -.058***  
(.02) 
  
Average private 
domestic credit 
growth 
.046 
 (.051) 
  .088***  
(.03) 
 
Banks’ cash reserve / 
Total assets 
.076*** 
 (.025) 
   .05***  
(.027) 
DIS 1.18  
(.995) 
    
GDP / Capita .004  
(.088) 
    
Constant 2.2 
(1.4) 
3.5*** 
(.43) 
5.9***  
(.45) 
5.4*** 
(.42) 
4.8*** 
(.57) 
No. of Obs. 31 41 50 50 60 
F-values 4.27 17.91 7.70 7.45 3.42 
Prob > F 0.0029 0.0001 0.0079 0.0088 0.0695 
R-squared 0.4663 0.2431 0.1654 0.1285 0.0493 
Root MSE 2.3027 2.4859 2.9047 2.9682 3.3015 
We have reported the estimated coefficients of the variables and the standard errors (in the 
parentheses). *, **, and *** refer to 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level respectively 
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Table-A6. OLS model: CRP measures and durations of crises (the sample includes 
only the crises-spells with durations complete) 
 
Dep. Var. = dur. of cr.-spell (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Private domestic credit / 
GDP 
.035 (.026) .032 (.026) .030 (.024) .035 (.028) .038 (.028) .038 (.027) .036 (.026) 
Private domestic credit 
growtht-2 
-.004 (.014) -.005 (.016) -.004 (.012) -.005 (.014) -.007 (.016) -.01 (.014) -.006 (.014) 
Banks’ cash reserve / 
Total assets 
.07** (.03) .064**(.029) .05* (.029) .07*** (.02) .077*** (.025) .07*** (.02) .07** (.026) 
DIS .12 (.83) .14 (.77) .064 (.70) .091 (.77) .024 (.83) .07 (.76) .10 (.79) 
Blanket guaranty -.17 (.81)       
Open ended, extensive 
liquidity supply 
 .64 (.78)      
Forbearance-A   2.1*** (.80)     
Forbearance-B    .029 (.42)    
Recapitalization     .52 (.74)   
Public debt relief 
program 
     .63 (.69)  
Asset Management 
Company 
      -.34 (.77) 
Constant 2.4** (1.1) 2.2* (1.1) 2.4** (1.0) 2.4** (1.0) 2.2* (1.1) 2.2* (1.1) 2.5*** (1.1) 
F-values 2.01 1.87 10.52 2.12 2.17 3.34 2.05 
Prob > F 0.1162 0.1398 0.0000 0.1015 0.0948 0.0214 0.1109 
R-squared 0.1780 0.2016 0.3514 0.1762 0.1825 0.1961 0.1832 
Root MSE 1.9219 1.8941 1.7072 1.924 1.9166 1.9006 1.9158 
We have reported the estimated coefficients of the variables and the standard errors (in the 
parentheses). *, **, and *** refer to 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level respectively. All of the above 
results are derived by using 28 observations. 
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Table-A7. Estimating the hazard function of crisis-spells: the effects of CRP 
measures (the sample contains 31 spells with CRP measures; 4 spells are dropped 
because they are not accompanied by systemic crises) 
  
Dep. Var. = hazard 
of crises-spells 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Private domestic 
credit / GDP 
-.04*** 
(.013) 
-.04*** 
(.013) 
-.054*** 
(.013) 
-.036*** 
(.013) 
-.035*** 
(.014) 
-.047*** 
(.013) 
-.036*** 
(.014) 
Private domestic 
credit growtht-2 
-.003 
(.009) 
-.002 
(.008) 
.003 
(.0119) 
-.003 
(.008) 
-.002 
(.008) 
.0043 
(.009) 
-.0019 
(.007) 
Banks’ cash reserve 
/ Total assets 
-.06*** 
(.02) 
-.059*** 
(.018) 
-.063*** 
(.023) 
-.054*** 
(.020) 
-.05*** 
(.020) 
-.055*** 
(.020) 
-.049** 
(.022) 
DIS -.431 
(.562) 
-.488 
(.577) 
-.492 
(.50) 
-.385 
(.564) 
-.340 
(.602) 
-.416 
(.533) 
-.419 
(.582) 
Blanket guaranty .405 
(.437) 
      
Open ended, 
extensive liquidity 
supply 
 .432 
(.421) 
     
Forbearance-A   -1.81*** 
(.566) 
    
Forbearance-B    -.568 
(.437) 
   
Recapitalization     -.384 
(.543) 
  
Public debt relief 
program 
     -.905* 
(.523) 
 
Asset Management 
Company 
      .187 
(.51) 
 
 3.4*** 
(.62) 
3.37*** 
(.548) 
4.3*** 
(.63) 
3.44*** 
(.58) 
3.27*** 
(.547) 
3.63*** 
(.579) 
3.36*** 
(.559) 
Constant -3.7*** 
(.78) 
-3.6*** 
(.71) 
-3.9*** 
(.815) 
-3.3*** 
(.58) 
-3.55*** 
(.663) 
-3.39*** 
(.713) 
-3.78*** 
(1.00) 
Log-likelihood -13.89 -13.85 -8.50 -13.82 -14.04 -12.81 -14.16 
Wald Chi
2
 10.44 13.51 27.88 11.96 8.92 15.93 12.36 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.0638 0.0191 0.0000 0.0353 0.1123 0.0070 0.0301 
NB: No. of obs. = 31, No. of failure = 24, Time at risk =163. 
 
 
Table-A8. Sample compositions 
 
Row-1 Column 1 of Table 6 All countries of Table-2 except Algeria, Argentina-2, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil-1 and 
-2, Cameroon-1, Central African R., Chad, Congo D. R. -1 and -2, Cote d’lVoir, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Equ. Guinea., Ghana-2, Guinea-1 and -2, Israel, Jamaica, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Sao T. 
P., Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia 
Row-2 Column 2 and 3 of Table 6 All countries of Table-2 except Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil-1, Chad, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-1 and -2, Lebanon,  Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Sao T. P., 
Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia 
Row-3 Columns 1-7 of Table 7 All countries of Table-3 
Row-4 Columns 1-7 of Table A4 of 
Appendix 
All countries of Table-3 except Brazil-2  
 
 
